Cutroneo v. F. W. Woolworth Co.

• Decision Date: 14 February 1974
• Docket Number: No. 1991-A,1991-A
• Citation: 112 R.I. 696,315 A.2d 56
• Parties: Josephine CUTRONEO v. F. W. WOOLWORTH CO. ppeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 56

315 A.2d 56

112 R.I. 696

Josephine CUTRONEO v. F. W. WOOLWORTH CO.

No. 1991-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Feb. 14, 1974.

Joseph G. Miller, Warwick, for plaintiff

Roberts & Willey Inc., David W. Carroll, Providence, for defendant.

OPINION

JOSLIN, Justice.

In this civil action the plaintiff seeks damages for injuries allegedly sustained when she slipped and fell as she entered the Woolworth Store premises on Westminster Street in Providence. After a jury in the Superior Court returned a verdict in her favor, the trial justice granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on which he had reserved decision. The plaintiff thereupon appealed from the judgment entered thereon. ¹

Since the case comes to us solely on the question of whether the trial justice erred in granting defendant's motion for a direction, we view the evidence and the reasonable inferences to which it is susceptible in the same manner as was incumbent upon the trial justice, namely, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and without regard to its weight or the credibility of the witnesses. Molinari v. Sinclair Refining Co., 111 R.I. 490, 494, 304 A.2d 651, 654 (1973); Gonsalves v. First National Stores Inc., 111 R.I. 438, 440, 304 A.2d 44, 45 (1973).

On the facts so viewed it appears that on Saturday, April 22, 1967, plaintiff, then about sixty, took a bus to the downtown area of Providence intending to purchase a dress at a clearance sale at defendant's store. It was raining and her attire included a raincoat, boots and a plastic covering for her hat. When she arrived at defendant's store about one-half hour after its 9:30 a.m. opening, it was still raining lightly. She entered the store through an outer door, walked through a foyer which was about five feet deep, passed through another door, and then started up a ramp which had been constructed in 1960 coincident with the opening of the store. That ramp rose about four feet along its 15-to-20-foot length, led to the main shopping area, and was covered with 12-inch squares of asphalt or vinyl tile most of which has a rough, sandpaper-like finish and were of an abrasive or nonskid variety. Interspersed among them, however, and particularly at the top of the ramp, were a number of 'smooth' tiles.

As plaintiff walked up the ramp, she noticed that it was wet. Then, just as she had almost reached the top of the slope, she came to a part which was 'all smooth, very smooth.' In addition, it was 'wet and spotty' with droplets '(a)s though someone had shaken an umbrella or something.' First one foot and then the other slid out from under her as if she had slipped one ice, and she fell, injuring her left leg. It is for the injuries thus sustained and their consequences that she brought this action.

The parties agree generally that the controlling law on the issues raised by them is that a possessor of business premises, although not an insurer of the safety of its invitees, owes them a duty to use reasonable care to keep and maintain its premises in a safe condition for the purpose of the invitation extended, Gonsalves v. First National Stores, Inc., supra, 111 R.I. at 440-441, 304 A.2d at 45; McVeigh v. McCullough, 96 R.I. 412, 417, 192 A.2d 437, 441 (1963), and that it has a duty to protect against the risks reasonably to be apprehended from a dangerous condition existing on the premises, provided it knows of or by the exercise of reasonable care would have discovered that condition. Molinari v. Sinclair Refining Co., supra; 2 Restatement (Second) Torts § 343 (1965).

Where the parties disagree is on whether the testimonial and inferential evidence, viewed most favorably to plaintiff, was sufficient to require a submission to the jury of the following questions: (1) Did the wet, sloping, tile ramp in defendant's entranceway constitute a hazard to plaintiff? (2) Did defendant have actual or constructive notice that the ramp would become slippery when wet? and (3) Did defendant know or have reason to know that the ramp was wet at the time plaintiff slipped and fell? ²

Those of our own cases which are of the most assistance on the question of whether defendant's ramp, if wet, would be hazardous to those who walk upon it are Cardall v. Shartenberg's, Inc., 69 R.I. 97, 31 A.2d 12 (1943), and Royer v. Najarian, 60 R.I. 368, 198 A. 562 (1938). Both were 'slip and fall' cases, and in each an expert testified that the particular kind of terrazzo used in paving the defendant-shopkeeper's vestibule where the plaintiff-patron fell would become slippery when wet. The expert in Royer said, in addition, that a person walking on such a pavement would be in danger of falling. In both cases it was held that such evidence justified an inference that the patron fell because of a dangerous condition which the storekeeper had allowed to develop. ³

In this case, unlike the Cardall and Royer cases, there is no expert testimony that the ramp was so constructed that it became slippery when wet. But expert testimony is not always necessary. We made that clear in McVeigh, where the customer testified that as the crossed the threshold of the defendant's market she stepped into a large, deep puddle of water which had accumulated in a depression on the floor. It was slippery and she said she 'slid like on a sheet of ice.' That testimony, we held, reasonably warranted the inference that her 'fall was caused by slipping because of the puddle.' McVeigh v. McCullough, supra, 96 R.I. at 419, 192 A.2d at 442.

Here, plaintiff's positive testimony is not only that she slipped and fell as she stepped on the smooth part of the ramp which had become wet, but that her feet slid out quickly from under her and that when she fell it was like slipping and falling on ice. That...