Morales v. Town of Johnston

• Decision Date: 26 April 2006
• Docket Number: No. 2004-310-Appeal.,2004-310-Appeal.
• Citation: 895 A.2d 721
• Parties: Roxanna MORALES a/k/a Roxanna Vinagre, v. TOWN OF JOHNSTON et al. v. Ronald Rotondo d/b/a A Cut Above Landscaping Service.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

895 A.2d 721

Roxanna MORALES a/k/a Roxanna Vinagre, v. TOWN OF JOHNSTON et al. v. Ronald Rotondo d/b/a A Cut Above Landscaping Service.

No. 2004-310-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

April 26, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Joseph G. Miller, for Plaintiff Morales.

Peter F. Mathieu, Providence, for Defendant Town of Johnston.

Mark T. Reynolds, Providence, for Defendant Central Falls School District.

Megan J. Goguen, Providence, for Defendant Rotondo.

Present WILLIAMS, C.J., GOLDBERG, SUTTELL, and ROBINSON, JJ.

OPINION

Justice GOLDBERG, for the Court.

These consolidated cases came before the Supreme Court on December 7, 2005. The plaintiff, Roxanna Morales a/k/a Roxanna Vinagre (Morales or plaintiff), filed suit against the City of Central Falls and the Central Falls School District (Central Falls or school district), the Town of Johnston and the Johnston School Committee (Johnston or town), and Ronald Rotondo, d/b/a A Cut Above Landscaping Service (Rotondo), for an injury she suffered while playing in a high school soccer game. After plaintiff presented her case, the trial justice granted Johnston's and Rotondo's motions for judgment as a matter of law. The jury returned a verdict against Central Falls, the only remaining defendant, and awarded plaintiff $212,000. Central Falls appeals from several of the trial justice's rulings. The plaintiff appeals from the trial justice's grant of judgment as a matter of law in favor of Johnston and Rotondo. For the reasons stated herein, we vacate the judgment with respect to Central Falls and Johnston, affirm the judgment concerning Rotondo, and remand these cases to the Superior Court.

Facts and Travel

The multiple appeals and myriad of issues in this case arose from a simple event and an equally simple place: a high school soccer game and the field on which the game was played. On September 10, 1997, Morales, a student-athlete at Central Falls High School and a member of its soccer team, played in an away-game against Johnston High School. Although it is unclear from the record which team won the game that day, plaintiff suffered an extraordinary loss. The game was held at Johnston High School — on a field owned by the town. The coaches from both teams discussed beforehand a potential hazard posed by a water drain that was partially covered by grass and located just out of bounds from the playing field. The Central Falls coach testified that, before the game, both he and his assistant coach warned their players about the water drain. However, plaintiff testified that she had no recollection of that warning. During the game, while chasing after the soccer ball near the water drain, plaintiff stumbled into the water drain and suffered a severe knee injury that required two surgeries and resulted in permanent disability.

The plaintiff filed a negligence action against Central Falls under a theory of respondeat superior, based inter alia, on the negligence of its soccer coaches. She did not sue the coaches because athletic coaches in this state are immune from suit pursuant to G.L.1956 § 9-1-48(b).¹ In a separate complaint, plaintiff brought a negligence claim against Johnston for its failure to maintain the field in a safe condition and for its negligent failure to warn of a dangerous condition on the field. The town filed a third-party action against Rotondo, who was responsible for mowing the field, seeking indemnification and contribution in the event the town was adjudged liable. Central Falls also filed a third-party complaint against Rotondo for indemnification and contribution. Thereupon, plaintiff brought suit against Rotondo alleging that, as the party responsible for mowing the grass and maintaining the area around the drainage grates, Rotondo breached his duty of care and proximately caused plaintiff's injury. The Superior Court consolidated the cases.

During pretrial proceedings, Central Falls moved for summary judgment on the ground that § 9-1-48(b) barred plaintiff's derivative claim against the school district based upon the coaches' negligence. The motion was denied by a hearing justice of the Superior Court and, on March 15, 2004, the cases were tried before a jury.

At the conclusion of plaintiff's case, all three defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law in accordance with Rule 50 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial justice granted judgment in favor of Johnston and Rotondo, but denied Central Falls' motion. The trial justice found that Johnston could not be found liable as a matter of law, based on G.L.1956 § 32-6-3, the recreational use statute.² He concluded that Johnston was a land owner within the provisions of the statute and also concluded that the plaintiff had failed to present any evidence that justified an application of the willful conduct exception set forth in § 32-6-5.³

Concerning Rotondo, the trial justice found that plaintiff failed to prove the standard of care for a landscaper under the circumstances in this case. The trial justice found that Rotondo was hired to cut the lawn on the playing field twice a week and that no evidence was introduced to indicate that he failed to perform those duties. Consistent with his finding that no evidence of negligence was introduced against Rotondo, the trial justice also directed that judgment enter in favor of Rotondo on plaintiff's complaint and on the third-party complaints brought by Johnston and Central Falls.

The trial justice denied Central Falls's motion for judgment as a matter of law, declaring that a duty existed on the part of the Central Falls coach to warn of a known danger and that the school district could be held liable for such purported negligence. The trial court, in denying the school district's Rule 50 motion, limited plaintiff's case to potential liability for the alleged negligence of the coaches. Although plaintiff argued that the school district may have direct liability, based on alleged negligent supervision of its coaching staff and a failure to promulgate written protocols and regulations, this claim was not submitted to the jury. The trial justice found that plaintiff failed to present any evidence of independent negligence on the part of the school district, and plaintiff has not appealed from that ruling.

The plaintiff's case proceeded against Central Falls. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff and fixed her damages at $400,000, which was reduced to $212,000 based on plaintiff's comparative negligence. Central Falls argued that the statutory cap on damages as set forth in the Tort Claims Act, G.L.1956 § 9-31-3,⁴ should limit the award to $100,000 and that prejudgment interest should not be added to the judgment. Finding that Central Falls was engaged in a proprietary function rather than a governmental function, the trial justice directed the entry of judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $212,000 plus prejudgment interest and costs. Central Falls filed motions for a new trial concerning plaintiff's claims and its third-party complaint against Rotondo. These motions were denied, and Central Falls appealed. The plaintiff also has appealed the trial justice's grant of motions for judgment as a matter of law with respect to Johnston and Rotondo.

Central Falls School District

Before this Court, Central Falls assigns error to the denial of its motion for summary judgment by a Superior Court hearing justice and to several rulings of the trial justice. Because we are satisfied that summary judgment should have been granted in this case, it is unnecessary for us to address those additional contentions.

The school district argues that the trial justice erred in denying its motion for summary judgment on the basis of the coaches' immunity. Central Falls contends that the immunity provision set forth in § 9-1-48, which shields its coaches from tort claims, also precludes plaintiff's derivative claim against the coaches' employer. The school district argues that plaintiff's claim is based solely on a theory of vicarious liability and, because the soccer coaches are immune from liability, there can be no derivative claim against the school district.

When reviewing the denial of a motion for summary judgment, this Court applies the same standard as the hearing justice. Ensey v. Culhane, 727 A.2d 687, 689 (R.I.1999). In performing that function, we review "the pleadings, affidavits * * * and other [relevant documents] in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party" and proceed to determine "whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. (quoting Marchetti v. Parsons, 638 A.2d 1047, 1049 (R.I. 1994)). The burden of establishing an issue of fact rests with the party opposing the motion for summary judgment and that party may not rely "on allegations or denials in the pleadings or on conclusions or legal opinions." Taylor v. Mass. Flora Realty, Inc., 840 A.2d 1126, 1129 (R.I.2004) (quoting United Lending Corp. v. City of Providence, 827 A.2d 626, 631 (R.I.2003)).

To support its argument that the immunity of its soccer coaches bars the plaintiff's claim against the school district, Central Falls points to DiQuinzio v. Panciera Lease Co., 612 A.2d 40 (R.I.1992), in which we analyzed a different immunity statute, G.L.1956 § 28-29-20,⁵ the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. In DiQuinzio, 612 A.2d at 41, the operator of a motor vehicle negligently injured the plaintiff passenger. The plaintiff sued the vehicle operator, as well as the vehicle's owner, invoking the theory of vicarious liability. Id. at 42. This Court held that because the operator of the vehicle was immune from suit pursuant to the exclusivity provision, there could be no cause of action against the vehicle's owner. Id. at 43. The Court held that an owner-lessor is not a tortfeasor "except by way of the legal fiction of vicarious liability." Id.; see also DelSanto v. Hyundai...