Cutshaw v. Karim
| Decision Date | 05 August 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 12039,12039 |
| Citation | 256 N.W.2d 566 |
| Parties | Gerald J. CUTSHAW, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Ruth KARIM, Howard Hutchings, Robert Nystrom, William Sahr, and Robert Shay, as Individuals and as members of the Board of Education, Pierre Independent School District # 1, Defendants and Respondents. |
| Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
Robert B. Looby, Pierre, for plaintiff and appellant.
Charles M. Thompson, May, Adam, Gerdes & Thompson, Oren P. Coler, Pierre, for defendants and respondents.
This action was brought against the members of the Board of Education of Pierre Independent School District No. 1 (Board) by Gerald J. Cutshaw, a teacher who had been continuously employed by the defendants beginning with the 1971-1972 academic year. He alleges that he was not properly notified of the Board's determination not to renew his teaching contract for the 1976-1977 school term and that he is, therefore, entitled to reinstatement under the terms of his prior contract and to $25,000 as punitive damages. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on all issues. The plaintiff appeals from that decision. This court affirms the decision of the trial court.
The source of this dispute was a letter to Mr. Cutshaw dated March 23, 1976. The letter reads as follows:
No evidence has been presented to suggest that the Board meeting was improper, or that the letter was not written at the direction of the Board, or that it was not timely delivered to the plaintiff. Rather, the plaintiff claims that the letter is insufficient because it was not signed by the Board itself.
The statute relied upon by the plaintiff in his assertion that he is entitled to reinstatement because the statutory notification requirements were not met is SDCL 13-43-10, which states
It is the plaintiff's position that this statute must be strictly interpreted by the court. He contends that since the Board did not sign the notification letter, the provision of the statute requiring notice by the Board has not been met. Therefore, he alleges, his contract was automatically renewed and he is entitled to reinstatement as a matter of law.
While there have been cases which support the principle that a statute of this nature should be strictly interpreted, Perry v. Independent School District No. 696, 1973, 297 Minn. 197, 210 N.W.2d 283; Knickerbocker v. Redlands High School District, 1942, 49 Cal.App.2d 722, 122 P.2d 289; Weckerly v. Mona Shores Board of Education, 1972, 388 Mich. 731, 202 N.W.2d 777, this court does not find that, even under the strictest interpretation, the notice is insufficient. The validity of the notice depends on whether or not the Board's delegation of the purely ministerial duty of communicating its termination notice to Mr. Cutshaw contravenes the notification requirements of SDCL 13-43-10. While the Board may not delegate duties which are decisional in nature, delegation is proper where the duty is nonjudgmental and nondecisional in nature. Noe v. Edmonds School Dist. No. 15 of Snohomish County, 1973, 83 Wash.2d 97, 515 P.2d 977; State ex rel. Rutherford v. Barberton Board of Education, 1947, 148 Ohio St. 242, 74 N.E.2d 246; Bessler v. Board of Ed. of Chartered Sch. Dist. No. 150, 1973, 11 Ill.App.3d 210, 296 N.E.2d 89; Gilliland v. Board of Ed. of Pleasant View Con. S.D., 1976,35 Ill.App.3d 861, 343 N.E.2d 704; Knickerbocker v. Redlands High School District, supra; State ex rel. Isaacson v. Parker, 1918, 40 S.D. 102, 166 N.W. 309; Murray v. Sioux Falls Board of Education, 1975, S.D., 225...
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Ferebee v. Hobart
...sanctions an opportunity to work before imposing an even more severe sanction on Ferebee such as an injunction. See Cutshaw v. Karim, 256 N.W.2d 566, 568-69 (S.D.1977)(stating that the extraordinary remedy of an injunction will not lie where the plaintiff has another adequate remedy). See a......
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Deerfield Hutterian Ass'n v. Ipswich Bd. of Ed., Civ. No. 76-1022.
...statute provides a specific and exclusive means of obtaining reversal of a school board's decision." (emphasis added) Cutshaw v. Karim, S.D., 256 N.W.2d 566, 568 (1977). That case also held that an appeal from a school board decision cannot take the form of an ordinary civil appeal. The Sou......
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Scheller v. Faulkton School Dist. #24-3
...superintendent had no authority to send the letters of nonrenewal.2 They cite two cases, both of which are inapposite. In Cutshaw v. Karim, 256 N.W.2d 566 (S.D.1977), a teacher claimed that because the board had not signed the letter of nonrenewal, the notice was ineffective. In concluding ......
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Reiff v. Avon School Dist. No. 4-1, 4-1
...has often held that the appeal created by SDCL 13-46-1 is the exclusive means of challenging a school board decision. Cutshaw v. Karim, 256 N.W.2d 566 (S.D.1977); Stene v. School Bd. of Beresford Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 68, 87 S.D. 234, 206 N.W.2d 69 (1973); Murray v. Sioux Falls Board of Educa......