Cuyahoga Cty. Support Enforcement Agency v. Lozada

Decision Date10 July 1995
Docket Number67654 and 67659,Nos. 67463,67639,67553,s. 67463
Citation102 Ohio App.3d 442,657 N.E.2d 372
PartiesCUYAHOGA COUNTY SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, Appellant, v. LOZADA et al., Appellees.
CourtOhio Court of Appeals

Stephanie Tubbs Jones, Cuyahoga County Pros. Atty., and Timothy Spackman, Asst. Pros. Atty., Cleveland, for appellant.

David Lozada, Cleveland, pro se.

Gerald Baylor, Columbus, pro se.

Curtis Looney, Shaker Heights, pro se.

Angelina Martinez, East Cleveland, pro se.

Julio Martinez, East Cleveland, pro se.

Teresa Underwood, East Cleveland, pro se.

NUGENT, Judge.

This is a consolidated appeal brought by the Child Support Enforcement Agency of Cuyahoga County from decisions of the Juvenile Division of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. All five cases were filed with the juvenile court as objections to determinations of child support amounts made by the Cuyahoga Support Enforcement Agency ("CSEA"). All five filings were made under R.C. 3111.22(C), which establishes the procedure by which parties can initiate a judicial review of the CSEA's administrative determination of child support.

The procedures through which these five actions came before this court are substantially similar except for one difference. The matter of Lozada encompasses two of the actions presented before this court in this consolidated appeal. In Lozada (case Nos. 67463 and 67553), Jacqueline Glenn, the mother/obligee, filed the objection with the juvenile court to the award of child support ordered to be paid by David Lozada for the support of his son, Tevin Glenn. Lozada was found to be the father of Tevin Glenn through an administrative determination of paternity. 1

In the three remaining actions, Underwood, Wright and Martinez, the fathers/obligors filed their objections with the juvenile court to the award of child support. In Underwood (case No. 67654), Gerard Baylor filed his objection to the award of child support ordered to be paid for the support of his son, Brandon Underwood. Baylor was found to be the father of Brandon Underwood through an order made by an administrative hearing officer. In Wright (case No. 67639), Curtis Looney filed his objection with the juvenile court to the award of child support ordered to be paid for the support of his daughter, Whitney Wright. Looney was found to be the father of Whitney Wright through an order made by an administrative hearing officer. In Martinez (case No. 67659), Julio Martinez filed his objection with the juvenile court to the award of child support ordered to be paid for the support of his son, Hidarmis Martinez. Julio Martinez was found to be the father of Hidarmis Martinez through an order made by an administrative hearing officer.

Following the objections to the administrative determinations of child support, the juvenile court made the following determination in each of the five actions:

In Lozada, the referee added the CSEA as a party to the action and allowed the Cuyahoga County prosecutor's office to make an oral notice of appearance as attorney of record to represent the interests of the CSEA. As attorney of record, the prosecutor entered into discovery to determine the income of the obligor, David Lozada. The trial judge disapproved the referee's joining of the CSEA as a party and removed the CSEA, along with the prosecutor's office, as a party. Due to this fact, neither the prosecutor's office nor the CSEA was notified of subsequent hearings before the juvenile court, nor were they present for the argument before the court.

In the three remaining actions, the juvenile court dismissed the CSEA as a party; however, the court relied upon different statutes as authority for dismissing the CSEA.

In Wright and Martinez, the juvenile court dismissed the CSEA on the basis that there was no authority for it to be a party to the action under R.C. 3111.22(C). However, in Underwood, the juvenile court dismissed the CSEA on the basis that it was not a proper party to bring the action under R.C. 2151.231.

Appellant separately and timely filed its notices of appeal in all five cases. On October 25, 1994, finding that the cases represented similar issues of law and fact this court consolidated the above cases on motion of the appellant. Appellant has presented the following six assignments of error for our review 2:

"I. The trial court erred in dismissing the Cuyahoga Support Enforcement Agency as a party in these actions.

"II. The trial court's dismissal of the CSEA as a party in an action for child support pursuant to R.C. 3111.21(B)(2) and or R.C. 3111.22(C)(4)(b) via R.C. 2151.231 violated the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions, when a similarly situated residential parent who legitimizes a child through probate court is entitled to have the CSEA advocate for a proper child support order in the juvenile court pursuant to R.C. 3111.20(C) via R.C. 2151.231.

"III. The trial court erred in dismissing the state of Ohio, CSEA, from these actions without notice, as CSEA is a real party in interest.

"IV. The trial court erred by not following the mandatory requirements of R.C. 3113.215 in ordering a deviation in child support.

"V. Whether the trial court erred in failing to comply with the requirements of R.C. 3113.217(C) in not issuing a separate order regarding health insurance.

"VI. The trial court erred in dismissing the state of Ohio, CSEA, sua sponte where the defendants did not raise the defense in any pleading."

I

The disposition of appellant's assignments of error requires a brief understanding of the legislative history of child enforcement laws both in the state and federal system.

All plans for child support enforcement that are designed by the states must meet the mandates of Title IV-A and Title IV-D of the Social Security Act of 1975, codified in Sections 601 through 615 and 651 through 666, Title 42, U.S.Code. The IV-D amendment provides an outline for state programs to follow. These state programs are to be designed for "[t]he purpose of enforcing the support obligations owed by absent parents to their children." Section 651, Title 42, U.S.Code. Specifically, Section 654 states as follows:

"A State plan for child support must--

" * * *

"(6) provide that (A) the child support collection or paternity determination services established under the plan shall be made available to any individual not otherwise eligible for such services upon application filed by such individual with the State, including support collection services for the spouse (or former spouse) with whom the absent parent's child is living (but only if a support obligation has been established with respect to such spouse, and only if the support obligation established with respect to the child is being enforced under the plan) * * *; [and]

"(7) provide for entering into cooperative arrangements with appropriate courts and law enforcement officials (A) to assist the agency administering the plan, including the entering into of financial arrangements with such courts and officials in order to assure optimum results under such program * * * [.]" (Emphasis added.)

The codification of the state of Ohio's programs for determining parentage and child support enforcement mandated under Title IV-D is found under R.C. Titles 31 and 51. Specifically, R.C. 5101.31(A) states as follows:

"The division of child support is hereby created in the department of human services. The division shall establish and administer a program of child support enforcement, which program shall meet the requirements of Title IV-D of the 'Social Security Act,' 88 Stat. 2351 (1975), 42 U.S.C. 651, as amended, and any rules promulgated under Title IV-D. The program of child support enforcement shall include, but not be limited to, the location of absent parents, the establishment of parentage, the establishment and modification of child support orders and medical support orders, the enforcement of support orders, and the collection of support obligations."

Prior to the amendments of R.C. Chapters 3111 and 3113, the role of the child support enforcement agencies in Ohio was limited. The effectiveness of child support enforcement laws was greatly expanded by the changes to R.C. 3111.01 through R.C. 3111.19 with the enactment of Am.Sub.S.B. 10, effective July 15, 1992. Before the General Assembly's amendments and additions, the role of child support enforcement agencies in the collection of child support awards was inadequate to fulfill the mandates listed in Title IV-D.

For example, in State ex rel. Athens Cty. Dept. of Human Serv. v. Wolf (1991), 77 Ohio App.3d 619, 603 N.E.2d 252, the court of appeals, construing then-existing R.C. 3111.04, held that county agencies did not have standing to initiate a parentage action. This holding was a correct and proper conclusion under the wording of R.C. 3111.04 as it existed at that time. However, not allowing a child support enforcement agency to initiate a paternity determination falls short of the mandates of Section 654(6), Title 42, U.S.Code, quoted above. Therefore, the statute, as it was previously written, did not satisfy the mandates of Title IV-D.

The holding of Athens Cty. was subsequently bypassed by the General Assembly with the enactment of Am.Sub.S.B. 10 and the enactment of the present R.C. 3111.04, which states:

"(A) An action to determine the existence or nonexistence of the father and child relationship may be brought by * * * the child support enforcement agency of the county in which the child resides if the child's mother is a recipient of public assistance * * *."

With the enactment of R.C. 3111.04, the General Assembly clearly included child enforcement agencies as parties in parentage actions. This addition allowed county departments of human services to initiate parentage actions, thus facilitating greater compliance with the federal requirements in...

To continue reading

Request your trial
43 cases
  • In re S.K.L.
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • May 5, 2016
    ...of a particular construction * * *.").{¶ 34} Furthermore, as this court stated in Cuyahoga Cty. Support Enforcement Agency v. Lozada, 102 Ohio App.3d 442, 657 N.E.2d 372 (8th Dist.1995) :The business of writing statutes is often a complex and cumbersome affair. In determining the intent of ......
  • State ex rel. Scioto Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Gardner, 95CA2384
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • July 25, 1996
    ...held corporation. Consequently, any deduction for business expenses would be improper. See Cuyahoga Cty. Support Enforcement Agency v. Lozada (1995), 102 Ohio App.3d 442, 457, 657 N.E.2d 372, 381-382. Appellant does not explain why his business expenses should be deducted pursuant to R.C. 3......
  • State v. Timothy C. Keslar
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • November 17, 1999
    ...372. Appellant's omission to pay support affects a legitimate interest of the state in protecting children who are residents of this state. Lozada; Marker v. Grim (1992), 65 St.3d 139, 601 N.E.2d 496. We hold, in the case at bar, that the crime of nonsupport occurred when the appellant omit......
  • Sweeney v. Sweeney
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • March 31, 2016
    ...wishes on their behalf.” In response, CJFS–OCSS argues, citing R.C. 3121.36 and 3123.22 and this court's decision in Cuyahoga Cty. Support Enforcement Agency v. Lozada, 102 Ohio App.3d 442, 453, 657 N.E.2d 372 (8th Dist.1995), that because CJFS–OCSS was permitted to intervene in the proceed......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT