Czaja v. State
| Decision Date | 17 May 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-04611,94-04611 |
| Citation | 674 So.2d 176 |
| Parties | 21 Fla. L. Weekly D1177 Daniel L. CZAJA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Timothy J. Ferreri, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Helene S. Parnes, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
Daniel Czaja appeals from his judgment and sentence that arose from a fatal traffic accident. Czaja was charged with one count of DUI manslaughter and two counts of driving under the influence with serious bodily injury. His jury trial commenced on October 17, 1994. During the course of voir dire, Czaja attempted to make a peremptory strike of juror Monroe. The following exchange occurred:
The trial court sustained the state's objection to the peremptory strike. Czaja argues that the state's objection was insufficient to invoke a Neil 1 inquiry, and if it was sufficient, it was nonetheless error to sustain the objection. We agree and reverse.
In State v. Johans, 613 So.2d 1319, 1322 (Fla.1993), our supreme court clarified what is necessary to invoke a Neil inquiry, saying:
Under our decision today, the presumption of validity of peremptory strikes established in Neil is still the law in Florida. Furthermore, a peremptory strike will be deemed valid unless an objection is made that the challenge is being used in a racially discriminatory manner.
The state's objection fails to refer to race or discrimination and does not meet the minimum threshold.
Even if the objection were sufficient to trigger a Neil inquiry, Czaja's counsel gave a reasonable and specific reason to meet the requirements of Johans and Neil. A close relationship between the juror and a law enforcement officer is a race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory strike. See Alexander v. State, 643 So.2d 1151 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). Once defense counsel has given a race-neutral reason for the strike, the trial court has the duty to determine "whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination." Purkett v. Elem, --- U.S. ----, ----,...
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Hayes v. State
...(“[T]he law enforcement background of a juror's spouse is a properly neutral reason for a peremptory challenge....”); Czaja v. State, 674 So.2d 176, 177 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (“A close relationship between the juror and a law enforcement officer is a race-neutral reason for exercising a peremp......
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Norona v. State, 3D11–2306.
...the duty to determine ‘whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial [or gender] discrimination.’ ” Czaja v. State, 674 So.2d 176, 177 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995)). The record in this case, however,......
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Landis v. State
...law enforcement background of a juror's spouse is a properly neutral reason for a peremptory challenge ....”); Czaja v. State, 674 So.2d 176, 177 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (“A close relationship between the juror and a law enforcement officer is a race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory st......
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Russell v. State, 3D03-2658.
...gender neutral reason for a peremptory strike. See, e.g., Rojas v. State, 790 So.2d 1219, 1221 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Czaja v. State, 674 So.2d 176, 177 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Alexander v. State, 643 So.2d 1151, 1152 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). Thus, the judge's failure to accept this as a facially neutr......
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Preserving error in jury trials: rules to remember.
...1163 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1996) ("Your Honor, we would ask for a gender-neutral reason" held insufficient as an objection); Czaja v. State, 674 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1996) (failure to refer to race or discrimination invalidates objection); Pride v. State, 664 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 19......