Czajka v. Holt Graphic Arts, Inc.

• Decision Date: 23 November 2022
• Docket Number: 18-CV-1257,19-CV-64
• Parties: Nicholas Anthony Czajka, Appellant, v. Holt Graphic Arts, Inc., Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

Nicholas Anthony Czajka, Appellant, v. Holt Graphic Arts, Inc., Appellee.

Nos. 18-CV-1257, 19-CV-64

Court of Appeals of The District of Columbia

November 23, 2022

Submitted September 22, 2020

Appeals from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (CAR-3673-18) (Hon. William M. Jackson, Trial Judge)

David H. Cox and Erica L. Litovitz for appellant.

Horace L. Bradshaw, Jr. for appellee.

Before Easterly, McLeese, and Deahl, Associate Judges.

McLeese, Associate Judge

Appellee Holt Graphic Arts, Inc. (HGA) obtained a judgment in California, filed that judgment in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, and then initiated the present action to enforce that judgment. Appellant Nicholas Anthony Czajka argues that the trial court should have dismissed the action as barred by the statute of limitations. We affirm the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The following basic facts appear to be undisputed for current purposes. HGA obtained a judgment against Allen Wilson in California in 2001. HGA filed the California judgment in Superior Court in November 2006. HGA then began efforts in Superior Court to enforce that judgment, including by trying to force the judicial sale of a condominium owned by Mr. Wilson in the District of Columbia. Substantial additional litigation ensued, and no judicial sale occurred. Rather, Mr. Wilson passed away, and the personal representative of Mr. Wilson's estate sold the condominium to two purchasers who in turn sold the condominium to Mr. Czajka.

In May 2018, HGA filed the current action, seeking to judicially foreclose on the condominium in order to enforce the California judgment that had been filed in Superior Court. Mr. Czajka's predecessors in interest moved to dismiss the action, arguing among other things that the action was barred by the twelve-year statute of limitations applicable to the enforcement of judgments rendered by the Superior Court. D.C. Code § 15-101(a). HGA opposed the motion to dismiss, arguing among other things that the twelve-year period did not begin to run until the California judgment was filed in Superior Court in November 2006.

The trial court agreed with HGA and denied the motion to dismiss. The trial court also granted summary judgment to HGA on the merits, directing that the condominium be sold and that the proceeds be applied to HGA's judgment.

II. Analysis

On appeal, Mr. Czajka argues only that HGA's action was barred by the statute of limitations. We uphold the ruling of the trial court on that issue.

"We decide issues of statutory interpretation de novo." In re G.D.L., 223 A.3d 100, 104 (D.C. 2020). "In interpreting statutory text, we first look to see whether the statutory language at issue is plain and admits of no more than one meaning." Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). We also "consider statutory context and structure, evident legislative purpose, and the potential consequences of adopting a given interpretation." Id.

A. Statutory Text

The issue before the court turns on the interaction between two provisions. We have already mentioned the first: D.C. Code § 15-101(a). In pertinent part, that provision states,

[E]very final judgment or final decree for the payment of money rendered in the . . . Superior Court of the District of Columbia, when filed and recorded in the office of the Recorder of Deeds of the District of Columbia, is enforceable, by execution issued thereon, for the period of twelve years only from the date when an execution might first be issued thereon . . . .

The second provision, D.C. Code § 15-352, governs the filing of foreign judgments. In pertinent part, that provision states, "A foreign judgment filed with the Clerk shall have the same effect and be subject to the same procedures, defenses, or proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of the Superior Court and may be enforced or satisfied in the same manner." For purposes of that provision, a foreign judgment is "any judgment, decree, or order of a court of the United States or of any other court that is entitled to full faith and credit in the District." D.C. Code § 15-351(2). It is undisputed that the California judgment is a foreign judgment for purposes of § 15-352.

Mr. Czajka appears to read those two provisions in the following way. Under § 15-101(a), the twelve-year limitation period for a Superior Court judgment begins to run as of the date when "an execution might first be issued thereon." Once filed in Superior Court, a foreign judgment has the same effect as a Superior Court judgment, is subject to the same defenses, and is enforced in the same manner. D.C. Code § 15-352. The limitation period for enforcing a foreign judgment that has been filed in Superior Court therefore is twelve years from when the execution might have been had on the foreign judgment. Implicitly assuming that California law permits immediate execution on judgments, Mr. Czajka concludes that the twelve-year period began to run when the California judgment was entered in 2001. On that view, this action is untimely, because the action was filed in 2018.

HGA reads the provisions differently. HGA points out that an execution could not have been issued on the California judgment in Superior Court until the California judgment was filed in Superior Court. HGA emphasizes the language in § 15-352 stating that a registered foreign judgment has the same effect as a Superior Court judgment and may be enforced in the same manner. Although HGA does not fully lay out the steps in its reasoning, the theory seems to be the following: (1) the limitation period for a Superior Court judgment cannot begin until judgment has been entered in Superior Court; (2) foreign judgments should be treated in the same way; and (3) the limitation period for foreign judgments thus cannot begin until the foreign judgment has been filed in Superior Court. On that theory, this action is timely, because the California judgment was filed in Superior Court in November 2006 and the action was filed in May 2018.

In a related but potentially distinct line of reasoning, HGA argues that the filing of the California judgment in Superior Court created a new judgment. On HGA's view, that new judgment would be enforceable for twelve years from the date of its entry. (Arguably, the new judgment would be enforceable for twelve years after the new judgment could be executed upon, rather than the date the new judgment was entered. See D.C. Code § 15-101(a); Super. Ct. Civ. R. 62(a) (judgments generally may not be executed upon until thirty days after entry).) The current action would also be timely under this line of reasoning.

Mr. Czajka and HGA each contend that their interpretation is compelled by the plain language of the provisions. We conclude instead that both proposed interpretations are facially plausible readings of the statutory language at issue. It is undisputed that a filed foreign judgment "shall have the same effect" as a Superior Court judgment. The question is whether that requires that the filed foreign judgment be treated like a Superior Court judgment entered on the date of the foreign judgment or instead like a Superior Court judgment entered on the date the foreign judgment was filed in Superior Court. In our view, the text of sections 15-101(a) and 15-352 does not clearly answer that question. We therefore turn to other tools of statutory interpretation.

B. Statutory Context, Structure, and History

1. D.C. Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act

Section 15-352 was enacted in 1990, as part of the District of Columbia Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (DC UEFJA). D.C. Law 8-173, § 2(b), 37 D.C. Reg. 6561 (Oct. 19, 1990). The DC UEFJA is closely modeled on the Revised Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act of 1964 (RUEFJA). Unif. Enf't of Foreign Judgments Act, Revised 1964 Act, 13 pt. 1 U.L.A. 155-245 (2002); see The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act of 1990, D.C. Council, Report on Bill 8-56 at 2 (June 20, 1990). Section 15-352 is almost identical to § 2 of the RUEFJA, with some minor wording changes to tailor the provision to the Superior Court. 13 pt. 1 U.LA. at 163. Also, one sentence from the RUEFJA was not included in § 15-352. See 13 pt. 1 U.L.A. 163 ("The Clerk shall treat the foreign judgment in the same manner as a judgment of the [District Court of any city or county] of this state.") (brackets in original). The committee report makes clear that the DC UEFJA was intended to be substantially identical to the RUEFJA. See Report on Bill 8-56 at 2 (stressing need for uniformity among states and describing Bill 8-56 as having been adopted in thirty-nine states); see also id. at 4 (witness describes Bill 8-56 as "almost identical" to RUEFJA); id. attach. 3 at 4-5 (witness describes Bill 8-56 as "substantially identical" to RUEFJA, with changes "of a technical or grammatical nature"). When it enacted the DC UEFJA, the D.C. Council explicitly directed the courts to interpret the DC UEFJA "to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of jurisdictions that enact" the RUEFJA. D.C. Code § 15-357; see also Nader v. Serody, 43 A.3d 327, 333 (D.C. 2012) ("The UEFJ[A]'s general purpose is to obtain uniformity with the rulings of [other] state courts.") (internal quotation marks omitted).

The committee report on the DC UEFJA does not directly address the issue in this case. The report explains generally that the purpose of the DC UEFJA is to "provide an expeditious and simple procedure to enforce foreign judgments in courts of the District of Columbia." Report on Bill 8-56 at 2. The report also states that "[t]he act of filing the foreign judgment gives it...