Czerwinsky v. Lieske
| Decision Date | 04 May 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 19206,19206 |
| Citation | 831 P.2d 564,122 Idaho 96 |
| Parties | Joyce CZERWINSKY, aka Joyce Lieske, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dan LIESKE, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Hines Law Offices of Boise for plaintiff-appellant. Douglas W. Crandall argued.
Elam, Burke & Boyd of Boise for defendant-respondent. Bobbie K. Dominick argued.
This appeal involves the award of certain costs and denial of attorney fees in a personal injury action. Joyce Czerwinsky, aka Joyce Lieske, appeals from the district court's memorandum decision and order regarding costs and fees. We affirm.
The underlying action arose from an auto accident where Dan Lieske was the driver, and Joyce was the passenger. Joyce's complaint alleged that her damages were in excess of the jurisdictional limits of the magistrate division, but did not plead any maximum amount. A jury found that Dan had negligently caused the accident and awarded Joyce $4,468.18 in damages. Because Joyce had rejected Dan's earlier $5,000 offer of judgment under I.R.C.P. 68, the court awarded Joyce costs of $460.95 incurred prior to the offer and offset against that award $1,301.15 in costs incurred by Dan after the offer of judgment. The district court denied Joyce's request for attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(1), leaving Joyce with a total recovery of $3,628. Joyce appeals from that order. She seeks attorney fees below and on appeal and an award of additional costs.
in any action where the amount pleaded is twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) or less, there shall be taxed and allowed to the prevailing party, as part of the costs of the action, a reasonable amount to be fixed by the court as attorney fees.
Although Joyce concedes that she did not specifically plead damages in an amount of $25,000 or less in her complaint, she maintains that the statutory language of the "amount pleaded" was not meant to require the actual amount to be pleaded, but that it really entails the idea that the amount "claimed" must be $25,000 or less. Joyce asserts that because she had presented a demand letter requesting $25,000 to Dan's insurer more than ten days before commencing the action, she had notified Dan that she was claiming $25,000 in damages.
Joyce further contends that she complied with the pleading requirements of I.C. § 5-335 and I.R.C.P. 9(g), which effectively prohibited her literal compliance with the pleading requirement set forth in I.C. § 12-120(1). Idaho Code § 5-335 provides in part:
In any action for recovery because of personal injury or death, the claim for relief shall not specify the amount of damages claimed, but shall, instead, contain a general allegation of damage and shall state that the damages claimed are within any minimum or maximum jurisdictional limits of the court to which the pleading is addressed. At any time after service of the pleading, the defendant may, by special interrogatory, demand a statement of the amount of damages claimed by the plaintiff, which shall be answered within fifteen (15) days. [Emphasis added.]
Idaho Rule Civil Procedure 9(g) reads:
Damages.--When items of special damage are claimed, they shall be identified by category and the specific dollar amount may be stated. When items of general damage or punitive damages are claimed, no dollar amount or figure shall be included in the complaint beyond a statement reciting that the jurisdictional amount established for filing the action is satisfied. [Emphasis added.]
Joyce asserts that she did not state a specific dollar amount of damage in her complaint in order to comply with the above-quoted statute and rule. Joyce also contends that, in addition to her demand letter, she gave Dan further notice of her claimed damages approximately three months after the answer was filed by answering Dan's special interrogatory regarding damages and informing him that she was claiming damages in the amount of $25,000.
Dan contends that Joyce essentially "rode the fence" by not stating in her complaint that her damages amounted to $25,000 or less. Dan contends that Joyce did not want to limit herself to $25,000 in damages given a chance for a larger jury verdict, yet she now contends that she never "claimed" more than $25,000 in damages. Dan asserts that because the demand letter intimated that a likely jury verdict would range from $25,000 to $50,000, and that Joyce would be "willing to accept $25,000 as a settlement," the letter cannot be construed to satisfy the pleading requirement of I.C. § 12-120(1). Dan argues that Joyce's complaint, demand letter, and responses to interrogatories all indicate that she hoped to receive a jury verdict awarding her damages greater than $25,000. We agree. More importantly, however, Joyce did not "plead" damages in the amount of $25,000 or less, notwithstanding her responses to interrogatories or the contents of her demand letter. For this reason, we hold that the district court did not err by refusing to award attorney fees to Joyce.
After oral argument on appeal in this case, our Supreme Court issued Pancoast v. Indian Cove Irrigation Dist., 121 Idaho 984, 829 P.2d 1333 (1992). In Pancoast, the trial court awarded the defendant attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(1) after a jury found that the defendant was not liable to plaintiff for any damages. Although the plaintiff had pled damages in "an amount in excess of $10,000," the trial court awarded attorney fees because the proof submitted by the plaintiff at trial indicated damages less than $25,000. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that I.C. § 12-120 "does not authorize the substitution of 'the amount proved' for 'the amount pleaded.' " Id. at 985, 829 P.2d at 1334. The Court noted that the legislature had indicated in other statutes that it understands the term "plead(ed)" and, therefore, the Court was bound to apply the statute as written. Id.
We emphasize that our decision above is not dependent upon Pancoast, which is not yet final because of a pending petition for rehearing. Of course, if Pancoast were a final decision, we would be constrained to follow it, and in following it, we would reach the same result.
In Pancoast, the Supreme Court did not discuss the problem of construing the provisions of I.C. § 12-120(1) with those of I.C. § 5-335 and I.R.C.P. 9(g). Joyce has made the argument here that she did not state a specific dollar amount of damage in her complaint in order to comply with I.C § 5-335 and with Rule 9(g). We believe this argument needs to be addressed. However, we are not persuaded that it was necessary for Joyce to plead a specific amount of damages for purposes of I.C. § 12-120(1), thereby contravening the provisions of I.C. § 5-335 and I.R.C.P. 9(g). Although the language of I.C. § 12-120(1) seems to conflict with I.C. § 5-335 and Rule 9(g), these statutes and rule should...
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Cox v. Mueller
...we agree with the solution to the problem posed by these two statutes that was adopted by the Court of Appeals in Czerwinsky v. Lieske, 122 Idaho 96, 831 P.2d 564 (Ct.App.1992). In Czerwinsky, the Court of Appeals concluded that to comply with both statutes, a personal injury plaintiff shou......