Czetli v. State, 2D07-16.
Decision Date | 08 August 2007 |
Docket Number | No. 2D07-16.,2D07-16. |
Citation | 961 So.2d 1123 |
Parties | Shane P. CZETLI, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Shane P. Czetli appeals the summary dismissal of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We reverse the postconviction court's order and remand for consideration on the merits.
The postconviction court dismissed Czetli's instant motion as successive under rule 3.850(f), a prior rule 3.850 motion that Czetli filed on October 24, 2004. In that prior motion, Czetli attacked the constitutionality of his sexual predator designation. However, until this court issued its 2005 opinion in King v. State, 911 So.2d 229 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005), a defendant could not challenge a sexual predator designation in a postconviction motion because "designation as a sexual predator [was] neither a sentence nor a punishment, and [] the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure do not, in general, apply to this statutory provision." Angell v. State, 712 So.2d 1132, 1132 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); see also Jackson v. State, 801 So.2d 212, 213 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) ( ). In King, we held that a sexual predator designation "may be challenged like a sentencing issue by postconviction motions pursuant to rule 3.800(a) and 3.850." 911 So.2d at 234 (emphasis added).
The postconviction court incorrectly reasoned that because Czetli couched his claim in his first rule 3.850 motion in terms of constitutionality it was cognizable pursuant to rule 3.850(a)(1). However, rule 3.850(a)(1) provides that one may attack a judgment or sentence on constitutional grounds. At the time Czetli filed his first motion, this court considered a sexual predator designation a civil matter and not a judgment, sentence, or any creature of criminal law. See Collie v. State, 710 So.2d 1000, 1013 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) ( ); see also Coblentz v. State, 775 So.2d 359, 360 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) ( ). Therefore, Czetli's first rule 3.850 motion raised a claim that was not cognizable in any postconviction motion at that time but, subsequent to this court's opinion in King, has been treated as a sentencing issue.
Consequently, the postconviction court should not have considered the prior motion as filed under rule 3.850 to determine that the instant motion was successive. See Ramirez v. State, 822 So.2d 593, 594 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) ( ); see also Davis v. State, 953 So.2d 612 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (...
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