Czikora v. Hutcheson, 7065
Decision Date | 26 June 1969 |
Docket Number | No. 7065,7065 |
Parties | Stephen Andrew CZIKORA et al., Appellants, v. Gladys Odom HUTCHESON et vir, Appellees. . Beaumont |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Renfrow, Zeleskey, Cornelius, Rogers & Berry, Lufkin, for appellants.
Joe H. Tonahill, Monte D. Lawlis, Jasper, for appellees.
Gladys Odom Hutcheson and husband, W. J. Hutcheson, residents of Jasper County, Texas, sued Stephen Andrew Czikora and Akard Associates, Inc. for common law damages arising out of the collision of automobiles in Jasper, Jasper County, Texas, on December 22, 1967 . The defendants, residents of Dallas County, Texas, filed their pleas of privilege to be sued in the county of their residence, which were overruled. Hence this appeal. The parties will be designated as they were in the trial court. Judgment of the trial court is reversed and judgment rendered sustaining the pleas of privilege of both defendants.
The plaintiffs would sustain venue in Jasper County under exceptions 9 and 9a of Article 1995, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. An automobile in the collision was owned by defendant, Akard Associates, and driven by Czikora, who was an employee of Akard. His wife and children were in this car. The other car in the collision was a Buick driven by Mrs. Hutcheson. Paragraph III of plaintiffs' petition is:
'That the collision made the basis of this suit was proximately caused by the negligent acts of omission and commission of your defendants, both jointly and severally, and in combination thereof, in one or more or all of the following particulars, whether singularly, concurrently, or in combination thereof, to-wit:
Defendants were requested by plaintiffs to admit that Czikora was in the course and scope of his employment for Akard Associates, Inc. at the time of the collision. In their answer thereto, the defendants specifically denied such to be a fact.
The only evidence concerning the employment of Stephen Andrew Czikora, the ownership of the automobile he was driving at the time of the collision, and the course and scope of Czikora's employment for Akard Associates, Inc. at the time in question is from a deposition by Czikora quoted below:
'
The collision in question occurred in Jasper County, Texas, between the Buick driven by Mrs. Hutcheson and an automobile driven by Czikora and owned by Arkard Associates, Inc. at the time of the collision. The suit was instituted in the District Court of Jasper County, Texas, where the collision occurred. Czikora and Akard Associates, Inc. filed their pleas of privilege in proper form to be sued in the county of their residence at all dates pertinent to venue, alleging their residence and principal place of business as being in Dallas County, Texas, and not in Jasper County, Texas. In their controverting affidavit, the plaintiffs relied upon exceptions 9 and 9a of Article 1995, Texas Revised Civil Statutes. Exception 9 to Article 1995 is not applicable. Subdivision 9a requires:
'* * * The venue facts necessary for plaintiff to establish by the preponderance of the evidence to sustain venue in a county other than the county of defendant's residence are:
The fact that the vehicle driven by Czikora, an employee of Akard, was owned by Akard Associates, Inc. gives rise to the presumption that Czikora was within the course and scope of his employment by Akard. Upon contrary evidence being introduced, this presumption vanishes. There is no evidence that Czikora was in the course and scope of his employment by Akard Associates, Inc. at the time of the collision. Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v. Muegge, 135 Tex. 520, 143 S.W.2d 763 (1940); Pioneer Mutual Compensation Co. v. Diaz, 143 Tex. 184, 177 S.W.2d 202 (1944); and Whittle v. Saunders, 396 S.W.2d 155 (San Antonio Tex.Civ.App., 1965, no writ).
Defendants have contended in their first point of error that the trial court erred in overruling the plea of privilege filed by Akard Associates, Inc. because there is no evidence to support the trial court's implied finding that Czikora committed any acts or omissions of negligence while in the course and scope of his employment for Akard Associates, Inc. Such point of error is sustained.
The plea of Czikora requires us to make a more detailed statement of the evidence. This we do, recognizing the rule which requires us to examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the implied findings of the court.
MRS. HUTCHESON'S TESTIMONY:
The collision occurred between 4 and 5 o'clock in Jasper, when Mrs . Hutcheson, driving her car north on Bevil Loop, arrived at its intersection with Highway 190, which runs east and west. There is a sign requiring Bevil Loop travelers to stop which is located two car lengths south of Highway 190. A Highway Patrol car on Bevil Loop was stopped at the stop sign and she stopped behind it. The Highway Patrol car proceeded into the intersection, turning to the right and proceeded on. Highway 190 is a four-lane highway with an esplanade in the center. Mrs. Hutcheson pulled up where the patrol car had stopped at the stop sign. She looked, finding the cars to the north were stopped, 'and there were not any cars coming from the east or west when I started on the highway.' She looked to her left, which is west. She looked left, right, and in front, 'and no vehicles moving in any direction.' Cars coming from Newton would be coming from her right. When she pulled out in the highway, she did not see any vehicle coming from Lufkin (to the north) or Woodville (to the west). She saw Czikora's car for the first time when it was the length 'of this room' from her. Her attention was directed toward this automobile by hearing the screeching of brakes, and when she looked to her left 'there he was, right almost making impact then.' It was her intention to make a left-hand turn from Bevil Loop and go west on Highway 190. The collision occurred when the front of her car was entering 'into the complete turn to the left.' The Czikora car was in the inside lane, next to the esplanade. Highway 190 had two lanes for traffic and an improved shoulder on each side. There were concrete islands where you do not drive. The hood of her car had reached the concrete curb when Czikora hit the center of her car at the center post and front door. She knew of no witnesses to the accident other than the occupants of the two cars. No one had told her of other witnesses. Police investigated the accident, not the Highway Patrol car occupant. She did not talk to Mr. Czikora or his wife. She was moved to the hospital. (Details as to her injuries, etc. omitted.) She explained why she did not see Czikora's car until immediately before the collision as follows:
She was driving a '67 Electra custom sedan (Buick). Czikora was driving a lighter car, a Ford. The center post of her car was pushed in, the front seat moved, with the side and frame moved into the seat. From such facts she testified:
'I would say he was going at an extremely fast speed with him doing as much damage as he did, his being a lighter car.'
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