D'Agastino v. City of Miami
Decision Date | 22 June 2017 |
Docket Number | No. SC16–645,SC16–645 |
Parties | Freddy D'AGASTINO, et al., Petitioners, v. The CITY OF MIAMI, et al., Respondents. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Robert C. Buschel and Eugene G. Gibbons of Buschel Gibbons, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida; and Ronald J. Cohen of Rice Pugatch Robinson Storfer & Cohen PLLC, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for Petitioners
Victoria Méndez, City Attorney, and John A. Greco, Deputy City Attorney, Miami, Florida, for Respondent City of Miami
Edward G. Guedes, John J. Quick, and Adam A. Schwartzbaum of Weiss Serota
Helfman Cole & Bierman, P.L., Coral Gables, Florida, for Respondent City of Miami Civilian Investigative Panel
G. "Hal" Johnson, General Counsel, Florida Police Benevolent Association, Inc., Tallahassee, Florida; and Robert D. Klausner, Adam P. Levinson, and Paul A. Daragjati of Klausner Kaufman Jensen & Levinson, Plantation, Florida, for Amicus Curiae Florida Police Benevolent Association, Inc.
Richard A. Sicking and Mark A. Touby of Touby, Chait & Sicking, P.L., Coral Gables, Florida, for Amicus Curiae Florida Professional Firefighters, Inc., International Association of Firefighters, AFL–CIO
Nancy G. Abudu of American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Florida, Miami, Florida; and Jeanne Baker of Jeanne Baker Attorney at Law, PA, Miami, Florida, for Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, Greater Miami Chapter of American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, Miami–Dade Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and National Association of Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement
The many and multiple complexities and conflicts generated in today's society have produced numerous difficulties inherent in the delivery of police work and services. The City of Miami, along with other governmental units, have responded to some of those difficulties inherent in modern police work by creating citizen review and investigative panels. The present case has been generated by the creation of and powers given to a group known as the City of Miami Civilian Investigative Panel (CIP), which is an independent body designed to investigate and review instances of alleged police misconduct, and review police policies and procedures, with the ultimate goal of making recommendations to the relevant law enforcement agency. Today we consider a challenge to some of the CIP's authority, in which Lieutenant Freddy D'Agastino and the Fraternal Order of Police seek review of the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in D'Agastino v. City of Miami , 189 So.3d 236 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016), on the basis that it expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Demings v. Orange County Citizens Review Board , 15 So.3d 604 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009), on a question of law. The policy or wisdom of such investigative panels is not before us. Specifically, the only question before us involves the operative effect of the Police Officers' Bill of Rights (PBR), codified in sections 112.531–.535, Florida Statutes (2008), and whether those state statutes have any preemptive force with regard to the activities of other review panels. Due to the conflict of decisions, we have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
On March 5, 2009, a complaint was filed with the CIP against Lt. D'Agastino for alleged misconduct that had occurred the day before during a traffic stop. The City of Miami Police Department's Internal Affairs Division (Internal Affairs) subsequently fully investigated the matter, interviewing under oath the complainant, Lt. D'Agastino, and two other officers who were present during the traffic stop. On April 8, 2009, Internal Affairs mailed a letter to the complainant indicating that it had completed its investigation and that its findings were "inconclusive" as to the alleged misconduct "because insufficient evidence exists to prove or disprove the allegation." Specifically, the Internal Affairs report indicated that there were no independent witnesses to corroborate either conflicting account of the incident that emerged from the sworn interviews conducted by Internal Affairs.
On April 17, 2009, nine days after the letter indicating Internal Affairs had completed its investigation, the CIP issued a subpoena to Lt. D'Agastino ordering him to appear before the CIP to testify. However, on May 22, 2009, Lt. D'Agastino filed an action in the circuit court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit alleging that the CIP as an investigative authority conflicts with a component of the PBR, section 112.533(1), Florida Statutes. As a result, Lt. D'Agastino requested that the subpoena issued by the CIP be quashed and a protective order entered. Separately, the Fraternal Order of Police had filed a declaratory action also alleging that the CIP was in conflict with section 112.533(1), Florida Statutes. The two cases were consolidated and the trial court ultimately ruled in favor of the City of Miami and the CIP on cross-motions for summary judgment. Lt. D'Agastino then appealed the trial court's decision to the Third District Court of Appeal. The Third District affirmed, entertained a motion for rehearing for three years, but ultimately issued a substituted opinion once again affirming the trial court's order. The Third District's decision was by a vote of two to one. Before we delve into the details of the legal reasoning at issue, however, it is helpful to understand the state law and municipal ordinances that are at issue and under consideration here.
We begin with the Police Officers' Bill of Rights, codified in Part VI of Chapter 112 of the Florida Statutes. Most relevant here, section 112.533 is titled "Receipt and processing of complaints," and provides in pertinent part:
§ 112.533(1), Fla. Stat. (2008) (emphasis added).1
Immediately preceding is section 112.532, titled "Law enforcement officers' and correctional officers' rights." Section 112.532 introduces several rights afforded to law enforcement officers2 with the following language, "All law enforcement officers ... employed by or appointed to a law enforcement agency ... shall have the following rights and privileges ." § 112.532(1), Fla. Stat. Those rights and privileges are enumerated in six subsections and many subparagraphs.
The first set of rights and privileges are those "Rights of Law Enforcement Officers and Correctional Officers While Under Investigation," enumerated in subsection 112.532(1):
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