D'Andrea v. Hulton

• Citation: 81 F.Supp.2d 440
• Decision Date: 08 November 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98-CV-523A.,98-CV-523A.
• Parties: Dana D'ANDREA, Plaintiff, v. Sgt. Edward G. HULTON, Corrections Mark P. Drews, Corrections Officer Richard Lata, Corrections Officer Jeffrey Sekuterski, G. Patterson, L.P.N., Deforest Tenico, L.P.N., R. Muller, L.P.N., and Ronald Moscicki in their individual and official capacities as Corrections Officers, and/or as Personnel employed by the New York State Department of Corrections, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of New York

81 F.Supp.2d 440

Dana D'ANDREA, Plaintiff, v. Sgt. Edward G. HULTON, Corrections Mark P. Drews, Corrections Officer Richard Lata, Corrections Officer Jeffrey Sekuterski, G. Patterson, L.P.N., Deforest Tenico, L.P.N., R. Muller, L.P.N., and Ronald Moscicki in their individual and official capacities as Corrections Officers, and/or as Personnel employed by the New York State Department of Corrections, Defendants.

No. 98-CV-523A.

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

November 8, 1999.

Andrew F. Plasse, New York City, for plaintiff.

William Lonergan, Office of State Attorney General, Buffalo, NY, for defendants.

ORDER

ARCARA, District Judge.

This case was referred to Magistrate Judge Carol E. Heckman pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). On August 12, 1999, defendants filed a motion for motion for summary judgment. On November 8, 1999, Magistrate Judge Heckman filed a Report and Recommendation, recommending that defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted and the case dismissed.

Plaintiff filed objections to the Report and Recommendation on November 29, 1999.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this Court must make a de novo determination of those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections have been made. Upon a de novo review of the Report and Recommendation, and after reviewing the submissions and hearing argument from the parties, the Court adopts the proposed findings of the Report and Recommendation.

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in Magistrate Judge Heckman's Report and Recommendation, defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted and the case dismissed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER

HECKMAN, United States Magistrate Judge.

This case has been referred to the undersigned by Hon. Richard J. Arcara for all pretrial matters and to hear and report on dispositive motions, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff is barred from relitigating his claims under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. For the following reasons, defendants' motion should be granted. Plaintiff's counsel's motion for admission pro hac vice is granted.

BACKGROUND

On August 5, 1997, plaintiff brought this action in United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking $10,000,000.00 in damages against employees of the New York State Department of Correctional Services ("D.O.C.S.") for civil rights violations based on an incident alleged to have taken place at the Lakeview Shock Incarceration Facility in Brocton, New York (see Item 1). The case was transferred to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) by order of Hon. Kimba Wood dated August 4, 1998 (Item 14).

Plaintiff claims that on August 6, 1994 he was assaulted at the Lakeview facility by Sergeant Hulton and Officers Drews and Lata, while Officer Sekuterski watched. Plaintiff claims to have sustained severe personal injuries as a result of the assault, "necessitating a laminectomy in March 1995" (Item 1, ¶ 14). He also claims that Nurses Patterson, Tenico and Muller altered his medical records to cover up the incident, and that Superintendent Moscicki permitted a pattern and policy of unreasonable use of force by corrections officers at Lakeview.

On April 24, 1995, plaintiff filed a claim for damages in the New York State Court of Claims based on the August 6, 1994 incident. On May 2, after a trial on liability, Court of Claims Judge John P. Lane granted defendants' motion to dismiss the claim for failure to establish a cause of action in negligence by a preponderance of the evidence (see Appendix to Item 8). Judge Lane specifically rejected plaintiff's claims that the corrections officers "testified falsely in order to cover up their use of unlawful force ...," and "that the medical records indicating that his back problems preceded his entry into State custody had been altered as a part of the cover-up" (id., p. 9). According to Judge Lane, the preponderance of the credible evidence presented at trial showed that the officers carefully followed D.O.C.S. routine, and that the medical records were not altered in any way. Judge Lane also rejected plaintiff's testimony based on his "demeanor as a witness, contradictions in his testimony and his criminal record ..." (id., p. 10). Judge Lane's decision was unanimously affirmed by the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, without opinion. D'Andrea v. State, 690 N.Y.S.2d 464, 261 A.D.2d 896 (1999).

Defendants now move for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff's federal civil rights action is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. For the following reasons, it is recommended that the motion be granted.

DISCUSSION

Under New York law, the doctrine of collateral estoppel (or "issue preclusion") "precludes a party from relitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue clearly raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party or those in privity, whether or not the tribunals or causes of action are the same." Ryan v. New York Telephone Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 500, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 467 N.E.2d 487 (1984), quoted in Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 792 (2d Cir.1994). There are two requirements for the application of collateral estoppel: 1) an "identity of issue which has necessarily been decided in the prior action and is decisive of the present action," and 2) the party against whom application of collateral estoppel is sought must have had "a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now said to be controlling." Burgos v. Hopkins, supra (quoting Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 71, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 246 N.E.2d 725 (1969)).

The party seeking the benefit of collateral estoppel has the burden of showing the identity of the issues, whereas the party contesting its application has the burden of showing that he or she did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claims in the prior action. Khandhar v. Elfenbein, 943 F.2d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 1991); Cox v. Colgane, 1998 WL 148424, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. March 27, 1998). Identity of issue requires a showing that the issue to be decided in the second action is material to the first action or proceeding and essential to the decision rendered therein, and that it is the point actually to be determined in the second action or proceeding such that "a different judgment in the second would destroy or impair rights or interests established by the first." Schuykill Fuel Corp. v. B. & C. Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 N.Y. 304, 307, 165 N.E. 456 (1929), quoted in Ryan v. New York Telephone Co., supra, 62 N.Y.2d at 500-01, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 467 N.E.2d 487. A determination whether the first action or proceeding genuinely provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate requires consideration of the following specific factors:

the nature of the forum and the importance of the claim in the prior litigation, the incentive and initiative to litigate and the actual extent of litigation, the competence and expertise of counsel, the availability of new evidence, the differences in the applicable law and the foreseeability of future litigation.

Ryan, supra at 501, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 467 N.E.2d 487.

Upon consideration of these factors in this case, I find that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes plaintiff from relitigating in federal court the claims set forth in his complaint. The issues actually to be determined in this case — whether plaintiff was assaulted on August 6, 1994, and whether his medical records were altered to cover up the assault — have already been decided by Judge Lane in defendants' favor after trial on the merits in the New York Court of Claims. Those issues are material and essential to the issues in both litigations, such that a judgment in favor of plaintiff in this action on either his excessive force or conspiracy claims would impair the judgment entered in favor of defendants in the first action.

Plaintiff contends that issue preclusion does not apply here because the federal claims raised in this action could not have been raised in the Court of Claims. However, as the New York Court of Appeals made clear in its decision in Ryan v. New York Telephone Co., when determining whether issue preclusion applies, "[w]hat is controlling is the identity of the issue which has necessarily been decided in the prior action or proceeding ..." not the way the cause of action is framed, the nature of the relief sought, or the availability of the relief in the prior forum. Ryan v. New York Telephone Co., supra, 62 N.Y.2d at 500, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 467 N.E.2d 487. Rather, in assessing identicality, the court must determine whether the material, dispositive issues raised in the action before it were necessarily resolved by the prior action. Id. at 502-03, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 467 N.E.2d 487; see also Wright v. Coughlin, 1987 WL 19633, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (New York Court of Claims decision given collateral estoppel effect in subsequent federal civil rights action, even though claim was not barred by res judicata principles since plaintiff could not have litigated civil rights claim against individual corrections officers in Court of Claims), aff'd, 868 F.2d 1268 (2d Cir.1988) (Table).

The central issues raised by plaintiff in this federal civil rights action are whether the corrections officers applied excessive force during the August 6, 1994 incident, and whether the officers conspired with the other defendants to cover up their use of excessive force. The core inquiry for the court in assessing an inmate's claim that prison officials used excessive force is "whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore prison discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992). An inmate claiming that prison officials subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment by...