Redd v. Leftenant
| Decision Date | 07 September 2017 |
| Docket Number | 16-CV-4919 (JFB) (SIL) |
| Parties | FEDIE R. REDD, Plaintiff, v. ZINA LEFTENANT, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Before the Court is a Report and Recommendation ("R&R," ECF No. 30) from Magistrate Judge Locke advising the Court to (1) grant motions to dismiss (ECF Nos. 18, 21) filed by defendants Megan Rudy and Patricia Wright (the "County Defendants") and defendants Zina Leftenant, Jason Zimmer, Richard Samuel, and Raymond Horton (the "Freeport Defendants") pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(b)(6); (2) deny the Freeport Defendants' request for an injunction barring plaintiff from filing additional lawsuits; and (3) deny plaintiff leave to amend.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court adopts the thorough and well-reasoned R&R and (1) dismisses plaintiff's federal claims with prejudice; and (2) declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims, which the Court dismisses without prejudice to re-filing in state court. In addition, the Court denies the Freeport Defendants' request for an injunction barring plaintiff from filing additional lawsuits.
A district judge may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge. See DeLuca v. Lord, 858 F. Supp. 1330, 1345 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Walker v. Hood, 679 F. Supp. 372, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). As to those portions of a report to which no "specific written objections" are made, the Court may accept the findings contained therein, as long as the factual and legal bases supporting the findings are not clearly erroneous. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985). When a party submits a timely objection to a report and recommendation, the district judge will review the parts of the report and recommendation to which the party objected under a de novo standard of review. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) (); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3) ( ).
In his R&R, Magistrate Judge Locke recommends that the Court grant the County Defendants' motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) because the County Defendants are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, and plaintiff's federal claims against them are barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. With respect to the Freeport Defendants, the R&R advises that dismissal of the federal claims against defendant Leftenant is warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) due to inadequate service. In addition,Magistrate Judge Lock recommends dismissal of the federal claims against the Freeport Defendants based on collateral estoppel.
Further, the R&R states that plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) ("Section 1985") claims against all defendants are time-barred and therefore subject to dismissal, and that the Section 1985 claims fails to state a cause of action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because plaintiff does not allege that defendants acted with any racial, class-based, or otherwise cognizable discriminatory animus. Moreover, Magistrate Judge Locke recommends dismissal of plaintiff's claim for an expungement of her criminal record for failure to join necessary New York State actors.
Finally, the R&R advises that the Court (1) decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims in the absence of any viable federal claims; (2) deny the Freeport Defendants' alternative motion for a more definitive pleading pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e); (3) deny the Freeport Defendants' request for an injunction barring plaintiff from filing additional lawsuits; and (4) deny plaintiff leave to amend.
Plaintiff thereafter filed timely objections to the R&R on August 15, 2017 ("Pl.'s Objs.," ECF No. 33) and the County Defendants filed a response on August 30, 2017 (ECF No. 33). For the reasons explained below, and after de novo review of the R&R, the Court adopts Magistrate Judge Locke's R&R and the recommendations contained therein.
Having reviewed plaintiff's objections, the relevant law, and the R&R, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Locke's that plaintiff's federal claims under Sections 1983 and 1985 are time-barred. In her objections, plaintiff argues, as she did in his original briefing papers, that she satisfied the limitations requirement by commencing suit in state court. (Pl.'s Objs. at 7-8.) Thisargument was squarely presented to Magistrate Judge Locke, and the Court agrees that it lacks merit.
There exists no federal statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 377-81 (2004). "[W]here state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions, courts considering § 1983 claims should borrow the general or residual statute for personal injury actions." Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989). In New York, Section 214 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules sets forth a three year statute of limitations for actions "to recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute." N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2). New York law also determines "whether the limitations period has been tolled, unless state tolling rules would 'defeat the goals' of section 1983." Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 641 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 2002)). Federal law determines when such claims accrue, and the Second Circuit has held that accrual of a Section 1983 claim occurs when the plaintiff "knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action." Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Shomo v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176, 181 (2d Cir. 2009) . Although the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, it "may be raised by a pre-answer motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), without resort to summary judgment procedure, if the defense appears on the face of the complaint." Pani v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, 152 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing, inter alia, Ghartey v. St. John's Queens Hosp., 869 F.2d 160, 162 (2d Cir. 1989)). A Section 1985 claim also has a three-year limitations period and accrues "once the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action." Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 703 (2d Cir. 1994).
Here, the gravamen of plaintiff's Section 1983 and 1985 claims is that she was falsely arrested on February 5, 2010 and that defendants provided false testimony and evidence during a New York State arbitration proceeding on May 17, 2010. (Compl., ECF No. 1, at 15.) Thus, plaintiff's injuries arose more than three years prior to the commencement of this action on September 9, 2016, and her federal claims are, therefore, barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
1. Equitable Tolling
Although plaintiff did not specifically raise the issue of equitable tolling in her objections to the R&R, she did so in her opposition to defendants' motions. (Pl.'s Opp'n Br., ECF No. 25, at 13.) Accordingly, the Court addresses that argument de novo and concludes that it lacks merit.
With respect to equitable tolling in Section 1983 actions, it is well-settled that federal courts also should borrow the forum state's tolling rules. See Pearl, 296 F.3d at 80 (citing Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 484-86 (1980)); accord Keating v. Carey, 706 F.2d 377, 381 (1983). As the Second Circuit has explained, New York courts have adopted the same equitable tolling doctrine that exists under federal law. Keating, 706 F.2d at 382. "Equitable tolling allows courts to extend the statute of limitations beyond the time of expiration as necessary to avoid inequitable circumstances." Johnson v. Nyack Hosp., 86 F.3d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1996). Thus, the Second Circuit "has applied the doctrine 'as a matter of fairness' where a plaintiff has been 'prevented in some extraordinary way from exercising his rights, or h[as] asserted his rights in the wrong forum.'" Johnson, 86 F.3d at 12 (quoting Miller v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 755 F.2d 20, 24 (2d Cir. 1985)). However, "[e]quitable tolling requires a party to pass with reasonable diligencethrough the period it seeks to have tolled." Johnson, 86 F.3d at 12. For example, under the equitable tolling doctrine, "when the defendant fraudulently conceals the wrong, the time does not begin running until the plaintiff discovers, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the cause of action." Keating, 706 F.2d at 382.
In the instant case, there is absolutely no basis to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling. Plaintiff was clearly aware of defendants' alleged violations because, by her own admission, she commenced several lawsuits in New York State court1—including an Article 75 proceeding seeking vacatur of an arbitral award and an action in Supreme Court, Nassau County alleging, inter alia, false arrest. Under these circumstances, the Court finds that plaintiff failed to act with reasonable diligence in pursuing her claims during the three-year period and, therefore, that there are...
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