D'Angelo Plastering Co. v. Isaac
| Decision Date | 04 December 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 57641,57641 |
| Citation | 393 So.2d 1066 |
| Parties | D'ANGELO PLASTERING COMPANY and United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, Petitioners, v. Richard ISAAC and the Florida Industrial Relations Commission, Respondents. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Summers A. Warden, Miami, for petitioners.
Joseph J. Finkelstein of Pelzner, Schwedock & Finkelstein, Miami, for respondents.
Respondent Richard Isaac suffered two separate injuries, both of which were found compensable under Florida's workmen's compensation law by the judge of industrial claims and the Industrial Relations Commission. There is no dispute concerning the first injury, but the employer and carrier argue that Isaac's being struck over three months later by a car while he was attempting to cross a street was not a natural consequence of the first injury. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution (1972), and we find that the second injury is not compensable under the workmen's compensation law.
The facts are basically not in dispute. Isaac, while employed by D'Angelo Plastering Co., sustained injuries to his left heel bone and back following a fall from a scaffold on September 27, 1977. Clearly this accident arose out of and in the course of his employment. On January 13, 1978, Isaac was still wearing a back brace and, according to his testimony, using crutches. He attempted to cross at the intersection of two streets and in doing so was struck by a car driven by one G. Williams. There is no dispute between the parties here that Williams, and not Isaac, was negligent. Isaac testified that while crossing the street he felt a sudden pain in his back and that, had it not been for this pain, he would have been able to avoid the onrushing car. The judge concluded:
These facts lead me to find that Mr. Isaac's actions did not contribute to the accident so as to break the chain of causation in that he attempted a normal crossing, and, but for the sharp pain which he developed during his attempted crossing and his awkwardness or inability to react and/or move normally due to his injuries and use of crutches, the subsequent accident could have been avoided.
This is an unusual type of case. It is not a case in which the compensable injury allegedly was the medical cause for the claimant to fall, collapse, deteriorate, or otherwise suffer complications. It deals, instead, with a "miscellaneous consequence" having some causal connection with the compensable injury, an area of compensation law where, as one commentator puts it, "the difficulty of expressing a body of coherent principles is at the maximum." 1
We have had occasion to judge the consequences of a claimant by his own negligence breaking the chain of causation from the compensable injury. In Johnnie's Produce Co. v. Benedict & Jordan, 120 So.2d 12 (Fla.1960), the employee suffered a compensable ankle injury while working for one employer. While working for a second employer, he jumped off a truck and, due at least in part to the weak ankle, fell and injured his back. We cited with approval the following language of the Florida Industrial Commission:
It is strenuously argued by claimant and the second employer that this is a case which falls within the rule as stated by Larson in his treatise on Workmen's Compensation Law. Essentially, the rule is that when the primary injury is shown to have arisen out of and in the course of employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the employment unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable to claimant's own negligence or misconduct.... Assuming, arguendo, that claimant did have a weak right ankle, the cause of the second accident can, in no way, be attributed to the first accident. If a claimant, knowing of...
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Tims v. J.D. Kitts Constr.
...a work-related injury requiring him to use crutches was struck by a vehicle as he was crossing the street. See D'Angelo Plastering Co. v. Isaac, 393 So.2d 1066, 1068 (Fla.1980) (holding that the unknown driver's negligence was an independent, intervening cause of the claimant's injuries). H......
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Lou Grubb Chevrolet, Inc. v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona
...manner of second injury immaterial when industrial injury made condition more susceptible to further injury) with D'Angelo Plastering Co. v. Isaac, 393 So.2d 1066 (Fla.1981) (intervening negligence superseding ...
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Telcon, Inc. v. Williams
...Inc. v. Harris, 475 So.2d 1300 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), in which I participated and which was based in part on D'Angelo Plastering Company v. Isaac, 393 So.2d 1066 (Fla.1980). The claimant in Harris sought the assistance of an employee of the rehabilitation provider for the purpose of meeting a......
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IMC Phosphates Co. v. Prater
...consequence of the original injury." This concept pre-dates the 1990 enactment of subsection (5). See, e.g., D'Angelo Plastering Co. v. Isaac, 393 So.2d 1066, 1068 (Fla.1980); Sosenko v. Am. Airmotive Corp., 156 So.2d 489 (Fla.1963). One commentator expressed the underlying principle as Whe......