D.B. v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., Dep't of Workforce Dev., & Anderson Transit Sys., Inc.

• Decision Date: 05 November 2013
• Docket Number: No. 93A02–1301–EX–71.,93A02–1301–EX–71.
• Citation: 2 N.E.3d 705
• Parties: D.B., et al., Appellants, v. REVIEW BOARD OF the INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT, Department of Workforce Development, and Anderson Transit System, Inc., Appellees.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

2 N.E.3d 705

D.B., et al., Appellants,

v.REVIEW BOARD OF the INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT, Department of Workforce Development, and Anderson Transit System, Inc., Appellees.

No. 93A02–1301–EX–71.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Nov. 5, 2013.

Thomas E. Hamer, Anderson, IN, Richard W. McHugh, (Temporary Admission), National Employment Law Project, Ann Arbor, MI, Attorneys for Appellants.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Frances Barrow, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellees.

OPINION

BAILEY, Judge.

Case Summary

David Ball, et al., and Anderson Transit System, Inc. (“Anderson Transit”) (collectively, “Claimants”) appeal from the decision of the Review Board (“the Board”) of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development (“the Department”), which denied Claimants' application for unemployment compensation under the Indiana Employment Security Act (“the Act”). SeeInd.Code § 22–4–1–1, et seq.

We affirm.

Issue

Claimants raise numerous issues on appeal. We consolidate these into a single issue, whether the Board's construction of Indiana Code section 22–4–3–5, which excludes from the statutory definition of the term “unemployed” certain individuals who are not working because of an employer's regular unpaid vacation period, was erroneous.

Facts and Procedural History

We take our statement of facts largely from a joint stipulation of facts entered into by Claimants and the Department. (Exs. at 72.)

Claimants are employees or owners of Anderson Transit, which since 1970 had contracted with Anderson Public Schools to provide school bus services for the school district. For several years preceding this appeal, Anderson Transit operated 181 business days during the year—one more day than Anderson Public Schools held classes. During school breaks and recesses, Anderson Transit did not operate.

For several years, and through the 2011–2012 school year, employees of Anderson Transit were informed of the next year's school schedule in advance of the end of the then-current school year. Before the beginning of summer break, employees were offered reasonable assurance of the availability of employment when school returned to session.¹

Also through the previous years and the 2011–2012 school year, it had been the practice of Anderson Transit's employees to apply for unemployment compensation benefits at the commencement of the summer break, during which time the business did not operate. Anderson Transit's owners never opposed the provision of unemployment compensation benefits to their employees, and indeed sought unemployment compensation benefits for themselves during the School summer break.

In the years preceding the 2011–2012 school year, the employees of Anderson Transit were generally granted unemployment benefits during the summer break. At the conclusion of the 2011–2012 school year, Anderson Transit employees again sought unemployment compensation benefits.

Unlike prior years, however, the Department denied those applications, and the Claimants individually appealed. On September 21, 2012, the Board ordered the appeals consolidated due to the common issues. (Exs. at 1.)

A hearing was held on October 29, 2012, during which testimony was offered by several of the individual Claimants, representatives of Anderson Transit, and representatives of the Department.² On December 29, 2012, the Board reached its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and finding of ultimate fact denying the claims. As a basis for the denial, the Board pointed to changes made in 2011 and 2012 to statutory language of the Act. Specifically, the Board interpreted and applied Indiana Code section 22–4–3–5, which was added by Public Law 2–2011, Section 3, and amended by Public Law 6–2012, Section 152.

Interpreting this statute in light of its expertise and with reference to other statutes governing unemployment compensation, the Board found that the summer break period was a vacation period within the regular vacation policy and practice of Anderson Transit, and that Anderson Transit gave its employees reasonable assurance of employment at the conclusion of the vacation period. The Board further noted that the Department had implemented no rule or policy regarding the filing of any kind of notice or other document in advance of Anderson Transit's closure for the summer break, and thus there was no policy with which Anderson Transit could be said to have failed to comply. The Board also found that Claimants had not contended that they were otherwise involuntarily unemployed so that they would otherwise be eligible for benefits. The Board thus found as an ultimate fact that Claimants were not eligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits during the summer break, and denied all of the claims.

This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

Claimants appeal from a final decision of the Board. Our standard of review for such appeals is well settled:

The standard of review on appeal of a decision of the Board is threefold: (1) findings of basic fact are reviewed for substantial evidence; (2) findings of mixed questions of law and fact—ultimate facts—are reviewed for reasonableness; and (3) legal propositions are reviewed for correctness. McClain v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 693 N.E.2d 1314, 1318 (Ind.1998). Ultimate facts are facts that “involve an inference or deduction based on the findings of basic fact.” Id. at 1317. Where such facts are within the “special competence of the Board,” the Court will give greater deference to the Board's conclusions, broadening the scope of what can be considered reasonable. See id. at 1318.

Recker v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 958 N.E.2d 1136, 1139 (Ind.2011). “Courts uniformly recognize that propositions of law, such as the construction of the statute, are for the court to determine.” McClain, 693 N.E.2d at 1317. On questions of ultimate fact—which our supreme court has characterized as mixed questions of fact and law—reviewing courts “must determine whether the Board's finding of ultimate fact is a reasonable one,” and the extent of deference extended to the decision “turns on whether the issue is one within the expertise of the Board.” Id. at 1318.

Legal Standard

Claimants challenge the Board's construction of Indiana Code section 22–4–3–5, which the Board concluded placed Claimants within an exclusion from the definition of “unemployed” as it is used in the Act, and thus rendered Claimants ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits.

Statutory interpretation is a pure matter of law. Whiteside v. Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 873 N.E.2d 673, 675 (Ind.Ct.App.2007). We review such issues de novo. Chrysler Grp., LLC v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 960 N.E.2d 118, 124 (Ind.2012). If the languageof the statute is clear and unambiguous, we give the words and phrases of the statute their plain, ordinary, and usual meanings to determine and implement the legislature's intent. Id. Where, as here, the statute is one an administrative agency is charged with enforcing, we defer to the agency's reasonable interpretation of such a statute over an equally reasonable interpretation by another party. Id.

As a guide to construction of the Act, our legislature has declared:

the public policy of this state is declared to be as follows: Economic insecurity due to unemployment is declared hereby to be a serious menace to the health, morale, and welfare of the people of this state and to the maintenance of public order within this state. Protection against this great hazard of our economic life can be provided in some measure by the required and systematic accumulation of funds during periods of employment to provide benefits to the unemployed during periods of unemployment and by encouragement of desirable stable employment. The enactment of this article to provide for payment of benefits to persons unemployed through no fault of their own, to encourage stabilization in employment, and to provide for integrated employment and training services in support of state economic development programs, and to provide maximum job training and employment opportunities for the unemployed, underemployed, the economically disadvantaged, dislocated workers, and others with substantial barriers to employment, is, therefore, essential to public welfare; and the same is declared to be a proper exercise of the police powers of the state. To further this public policy, the state, through its department of workforce development, will maintain close coordination among all federal, state, and local agencies whose mission affects the employment or employability of the unemployed and underemployed.

I.C. § 22–4–1–1.

“[C]ourts regularly construe provisions of the Act liberally to favor the unemployed and promote the Act's humanitarian purpose.” Chrysler Grp., 960 N.E.2d at 126. “Liberal construction of a statute requires narrow construction of its exceptions.” Robinson v. Indiana University, 659 N.E.2d 153, 156 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied. Nevertheless, we interpret statutes to give effect to the intent of the legislature, and presume that “the legislature intended the language used in the statute be applied logically and not to bring about an unjust or absurd result.” Penny v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 852 N.E.2d 954, 960 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), trans. denied. Too, we avoid interpreting a statute in such a manner as to render its provisions mere surplusage. In re Adoption of D.C., 887 N.E.2d 950, 959 (Ind.Ct.App.2008).

In order to be eligible to collect unemployment benefits under the Act, an individual must ordinarily, among other requirements, satisfy the Act's definition of someone who is unemployed. I.C. § 22–4–14–1(a). The definitions of “totally unemployed” and “partially unemployed” are provided by statute. I.C. §§ 22–4–3–1 & –2. An individual is totally unemployed “in any week with respect to...