D.C v. Klein Indep. Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 05 May 2010
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. H-09-1714.
• Citation: 711 F.Supp.2d 739
• Parties: D.C. and A.C., Individually and a/n/f T.C., A Minor Student, Plaintiff,v.KLEIN INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

711 F.Supp.2d 739

D.C. and A.C., Individually and a/n/f T.C., A Minor Student, Plaintiff,v.KLEIN INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.

Civil Action No. H-09-1714.

United States District Court,

S.D. Texas,

Houston Division.

May 5, 2010.

Martin Jay Cirkiel, Cirkiel Assoc., Round Rock, TX, for Plaintiff.

Jeffrey L. Rogers, Feldman and Rogers, Houston, TX, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LEE H. ROSENTHAL, District Judge.

This is an appeal from the decision of a Texas Education Agency special education hearing officer under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. The statute provides that a disabled child's parents may file a complaint “with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6). The plaintiffs are the parents of T.C., a child with a disability. This suit arises out of the plaintiffs' dissatisfaction with the education T.C. received while attending a high school in the Klein Independent School District (the “KISD”) in Spring, Texas. The plaintiffs removed her from the KISD, sent her to three different private schools outside the district, and later requested an administrative due process hearing under the IDEA. The hearing officer ruled that limitations barred all but one of the plaintiffs' claims and that the remaining claim failed on the merits. In this suit, the plaintiffs ask this court to reverse, enter judgment for them on the claim the hearing officer denied on the merits, and remand to the hearing officer to decide the claims that the hearing officer found to be time-barred. The KISD has moved for summary judgment affirming the hearing officer's decision and dismissing the plaintiffs' case. (Docket Entry No. 10). The plaintiffs have responded, (Docket Entry No. 15), the KISD has replied, (Docket Entry No. 20), and the plaintiffs have filed a surreply, (Docket Entry No. 22), to which the KISD has replied, (Docket Entry No. 26).

Based on the parties' submissions, the record, and the applicable law, this court grants the KISD's motion for summary judgment. The hearing officer's order dismissing all claims is affirmed. The reasons for this ruling are explained below.

I. Background

In the fall of 2007, T.C. was a tenth-grade student at Klein Oak High School in the KISD. T.C. had been diagnosed with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”), which manifested itself as severe bipolar disorder, anxiety, and an oppositional defiant disorder, and was classified as a student with a disability. On November 27, 2007, the KISD convened an Admissions, Review & Dismissal Committee (“ARDC”) meeting for T.C. The IDEA requires an annual ARDC meeting to determine the Individual Education Plan for each student with a disability. Annual ARDC meetings had been held for T.C. from kindergarten through the sixth grade when she lived and attended school in Huntington Beach, California. After her family moved to Spring, Texas, the KISD held annual ARDC meetings for T.C. in the seventh, eighth, and ninth grades. These meetings determined the special education plan that the school would implement for T.C. each year.

Throughout her childhood, T.C. had emotional difficulty and struggled at school. These problems became more pronounced when she entered high school, in part because some middle-school programs were not available in high school. T.C.'s parents were especially concerned during the first few months of her tenth grade year, before the November 27, 2007 ARDC meeting. At least one of T.C.'s parents attended the meeting and signed to acknowledge presence at the meeting, participation in the discussion, and understanding of what was discussed. All those present at the meeting mutually agreed to the IEP developed for T.C. (Admin. Rec. at 211).

The plaintiffs state that between the ARDC meeting on November 27 and T.C.'s winter break, which began around December 15, they “continued to verbally complain to school personnel about the substantive problems” with the plan developed at the meeting, about T.C.'s “ongoing emotional and educational problems at home due to unresolved issues at school,” and about a failure to implement the plan developed at the meeting properly. (Docket Entry No. 15 at 8). The plaintiffs sent “a number of emails to school personnel during this same period expressing these concerns,” but the school failed to respond to complaints. ( Id.).

The plaintiffs allege that T.C.'s condition worsened over the winter break. ( Id.). On January 10, 2008, T.C.'s mother sent an e-mail to KISD personnel informing them that T.C. would be leaving the KISD. The e-mail stated:

After much deliberation we have decided to transfer [T.C.] to a private school in Houston. We would prefer to transfer her immediately (Monday, Jan. 14). Despite the difficulties-the enormous financial burden, and the distance-we cannot continue to let T.C. experience so much despair and anxiety In the past two weeks she has been physically ill, throwing up, uncommunicative, and unable to function. She was examined by the family M.D. but it is obvious that her condition is exacerbated by being so overwhelmed with her work. This private school, Tenney School, allows for mostly one on one sessions, and small intimate group instructions. We hope that it will be the right environment for [T.C.].

I would like to talk with you tomorrow (Friday) about how we can proceed with this transfer. How can we make it possible for [T.C.] to get the credits for her course work this semester? Her 2nd six week report card was passing.

It is really urgent that I talk with you tomorrow morning, so that I know if I need to get [T.C.] to study for the finals next week, or if she can do something else in the other school to still receive the credits. If she needs to study this weekend for the finals, I will need to get all the pertinent study guides, etc. Also, all missing assignments, etc. that will bring her grades up. We will try to work on these over the weekend, if that is what [is] needed.

(Admin. Rec. at 299-300).

T.C. began attending the Tenney School on January 14, 2008. That school is outside the KISD. Her parents were not satisfied with her progress there and transferred her to a residential treatment facility in Draper, Utah. (Admin. Rec. at 951-64). In January 2009, she transferred to a therapeutic boarding school, which was also located in Utah. T.C. has not returned to the KISD.

Two months earlier, in November 2008, T.C.'s parents retained Jillian Bonnington, an employee of Possibilities Educational Services in Southern California. Bonnington, who is not an attorney, was hired to investigate filing a complaint with the Texas Education Agency (“TEA”) and requesting an administrative due process hearing. On November 13, 2008, Bonnington sent a letter to the KISD's attorney asking for T.C.'s educational records and reimbursement for T.C.'s private school tuition. (Admin. Rec. at 306). After Bonnington paid a copy and postage fee, the KISD sent her 432 pages of documents. (Admin. Rec. at 301-304).

On January 7, 2009, with the plaintiffs' authorization, Bonnington mailed a complaint to the TEA. (Admin. Rec. at 51-57). The complaint asserted that the KISD had failed to:

(1) develop an appropriate education plan at the November 27, 2007 ARDC meeting;

(2) have appropriate professionals present at the November 27, 2007 meeting;

(3) develop appropriate goals and objectives at the November 27, 2007 meeting;

(4) convene an ARDC meeting after the plaintiffs requested one in January 2008;

(5) follow the “residential application process” outlined in the Texas Education Code;

(6) provide written responses to the notice from T.C.'s parents that they were placing T.C. in private school, including the information requested in the November 13, 2008 letter;

(7) conduct appropriate assessments of T.C.'s abilities; and

(8) hold an annual ARDC meeting in November 2008. ( Id.).

On January 14, 2009, the TEA faxed the plaintiffs' complaint to the KISD. (Admin Rec. at 50). The TEA attached the complaint to a fax cover sheet, which stated that the TEA had received the plaintiffs' complaint on January 14, 2009. The TEA cover sheet also informed the KISD that Bonnington would represent the plaintiffs and that Brenda Rudd, an attorney, would serve as the hearing officer for the case. The TEA informed the KISD that the hearing officer would contact the parties to schedule a prehearing conference addressing procedural matters, that mediation services were available, and that the hearing officer's deadline for deciding the case was March 30, 2009.

The plaintiffs obtained legal counsel. A prehearing conference was held. The parties each submitted briefs. On March 8, 2009, the hearing officer issued an Order of Partial Dismissal and Partial Summary Judgment. In the order, the hearing officer held that the KISD had no duty to convene an annual review meeting in November 2008 after T.C. had been transferred outside the district's geographic area. The hearing officer also held that limitations barred the plaintiffs' other claims. (Admin. Rec. at 5-8).

The plaintiffs filed this case on June 4, 2009 challenging the administrative officer's decision. (Docket Entry No. 1). The KISD has moved for summary judgment. Both parties have briefed the issues extensively. These issues are analyzed below.

II. The Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “The movant bears the burden of identifying those portions of the record it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Triple Tee Golf, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 485 F.3d 253, 261 (5th Cir.2007) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)).

If the...