Wood v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., CIVIL ACTION H–09–1390

• Decision Date: 30 September 2015
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION H–09–1390
• Parties: John Wood, Rene Wood, and Robert Wood, Plaintiffs, v. Katy Independent School District and Board of Trustees of the Katy Independent School District, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

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John Wood, Rene Wood, and Robert Wood, Plaintiffs,
v.
Katy Independent School District and Board of Trustees of the Katy Independent School District, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION H–09–1390

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division.

Signed September 30, 2015

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Susan N. Burgess, Law Office of Susan N. Burgess, Independence, KY, Martin Jay Cirkiel, Cirkiel Assoc., Round Rock, TX, for Plaintiffs.

Christopher P. Borreca, Thompson & Horton LLP, Deandrea C. Washington, Muskat, Martinez & Mahony, LLP, Houston, TX, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

MELINDA HARMON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

The above referenced cause is an appeal by Plaintiffs Robert Wood (“Rob”) and his parents, John Wood and Rene Wood, of Texas Education Agency (“TEA”) Special

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Education Hearing Officer Mary Carolyn Carmichael's February 7, 2009 decision¹ that Defendant Katy Independent School District (“KISD”) had provided Rob, allegedly impaired by dyslexia according to his parents and undisputedly learning disabled, with a free, appropriate public education (“FAPE”) in compliance with the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 –1491, specifically § 1415(i)(2)(a).² Plaintiffs complain that KISD did not comply with the IDEA's procedural requirements and failed to design an individualized education program (“IEP”) reasonably calculated to enable Rob to receive educational benefits. Pending before the Court are amended cross motions for summary judgment filed by (1) Plaintiffs John Wood, Rene Wood, and Robert Wood (instrument # 102) and (2) by the KISD (# 103).

For the procedural history of this case, the Court refers the parties to its Opinion and Order of September 12, 2012 (# 100).

Moreover, because initially the massive record for summary judgment was not organized in any accessible way to allow the Court to locate specific documents, because much of it and the parties' earlier motions for summary judgment addressed numerous extraneous matters that were not relevant to Plaintiffs' remaining IDEA claims and included documents not part of the administrative record (# 67) provided by TEA, to which the Court has restricted this appeal (see # 65 and 100), because citations to the record were inconsistent and unclear or incorrect, and because the parties failed to address significant elements essential to Plaintiffs' claims, inter alia, in that September 12, 2012 Opinion and Order the Court instructed the parties to file amended motions of not more than 50 pages addressing the two key issues: whether the state complied with the IDEA's procedural requirements³ and whether the IEP was reasonably calculated to enable Rob to receive educational benefits.⁴ See

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Richardson ISD v. Michael Z. , 580 F.3d 286, 293 (5th Cir.2009) (The scope of judicial review of an IEP is limited to two questions: “has the state complied with the procedural requirements of the IDEA” and “is the [IEP] developed through the Act's procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits?”), citing Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist. v. Rowley , 458 U.S. 176, 206–07, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1047, 118 S.Ct. 690, 139 L.Ed.2d 636 (1998) ). While KISD has complied with the Court's order, Plaintiffs' submission is still voluminous, contains documents that are not part of the official administrative record, an absence of citations to the record to support their assertions, and irrelevant and/or incompetent summary judgment evidence.⁵ The Court does the best it can with the current record and again reminds the parties that it is not obligated to “sift through the record in search of evidence” to support a party's opposition to a motion for summary judgment. Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir.1994). Rather the nonmovant must identify evidence in the record and demonstrate how it supports his claim. Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir.1998).

Standard of Review

Summary Judgment Under the IDEA: Review of Hearing Officer's Decision

When addressing a summary judgment motion appealing a hearing officer's decision under the IDEA, the court reviews the administrative record of the due process hearing and examines new evidence at the request of any party. HISD v. V.P. ex rel. Juan P., 582 F.3d 576 (5th Cir.2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1007, 130 S.Ct. 1892, 176 L.Ed.2d 365 (2010)(No. 09–841 );

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Cypress–Fairbanks ISD v. Mi chael F., 118 F.3d 245, 252 (5th Cir.1997) (citing Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1047, 118 S.Ct. 690, 139 L.Ed.2d 636 (1998) ). When no new evidence is presented to the district court in an IDEA suit, ... “the motion for summary judgment is simply the procedural vehicle for asking [the judge] to decide the case on the basis of the administrative record.” El Paso ISD v. Richard R., 567 F.Supp.2d 918, 927 (W.D.Tex.2008), citing Heather S. v. State of Wis., 125 F.3d 1045, 1052 (7th Cir.1997). See also D.C. v. Klein ISD, 711 F.Supp.2d 739, 744 (S.D.Tex.2010) (same; “The district court must ‘reach an independent decision based on a preponderance of the evidence.”), citing Loch v. Edwardsville School Dist. No. 7, 327 Fed.Appx. 647, 650 (7th Cir.2009) ; Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884, 892 (9th Cir.1995) (“Though the parties [in an IDEA action] may call the procedure ‘a motion for summary judgment’ ... the procedure is in substance an appeal from an administrative determination, not a summary judgment.”). “Thus even though it is termed ‘summary judgment,’ the district court's decision is based on the preponderance of the evidence.” Loch, 327 Fed.Appx. at 650. Therefore the existence of a disputed issue of material fact will not defeat such a motion for summary judgment. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C). While the district court may take additional evidence beyond the administrative record,⁶ the review here is restricted to the administrative record below.⁷

While the district court on review must give the Hearing Officer's findings “due weight,” it must make an independent, “virtually de novo” decision based on preponderance of the evidence before it. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C) ; Michael F., 118 F.3d at 252 ; R.P. v. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist., 703 F.3d 801, 807–08 (5th Cir.2012). In applying the “due weight” standard, “the hearing officer's findings are not conclusive and the court may take additional evidence and reach an independent conclusion based on the preponderance of evidence.” Teague ISD v. Todd L., 999 F.2d 127, 131 (5th Cir.1993). Furthermore the district court does not have to defer to the Hearing Officer's findings “when its own review of the evidence indicates that the hearing officer erroneously assessed the facts or erroneously applied the law to the facts.” Id. The Teague appellate panel quoted Rowley :

“Congress expressly rejected provisions that would have ... severely restricted the role of reviewing courts. In substituting the current language of the statute [20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) ] for language that would have made state administrative findings conclusive if supported by substantial evidence, the Conference Committee explained that courts were to make ‘independent decision[s] based on a preponderance of the evidence.’ ”

999 F.2d at 131, quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (quoting S. Cong. Rec. 37416 (1975)(remarks of Sen. Williams)). Nevertheless this preponderance-of-the-evidence standard is not “an invitation to the courts to substitute their own notion of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review.” Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034. “The primary responsibility for formulating the education to be accorded

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to a handicapped child, and for choosing the educational method most suitable to the child's needs, was left by the Act to state and local educational agencies in cooperation with the parents or guardian of the child.” Id. at 207, 102 S.Ct. 3034.

While the court reviews a mixed question of fact and law de novo, “the underlying fact-findings, ‘such as finding that a disabled student obtained educational benefits under an [individualized education program (“IEP”) ],⁸ are reviewed for clear error.’ ” HISD v. Bobby R., 200 F.3d 341, 347 (5th Cir.2000) (quoting Cypress–Fairbanks, 118 F.3d at 252 ), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 817, 121 S.Ct. 55, 148 L.Ed.2d 23 (2000). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court based on all the evidence is left with the definitive and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Houston Exploration Co. v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 359 F.3d 777, 779 (5th Cir.2004).

The IDEA

The Fifth Circuit has held that the IDEA creates a presumption that the school district's...