D'Egidio v. City of Santa Clarita

• Decision Date: 24 October 2016
• Docket Number: B269095
• Citation: 209 Cal.Rptr.3d 176,4 Cal.App.5th 515
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Arthur D'EGIDIO, as co-trustee etc., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF SANTA CLARITA, Defendant and Respondent.

4 Cal.App.5th 515

209 Cal.Rptr.3d 176

Arthur D'EGIDIO, as co-trustee etc., Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.CITY OF SANTA CLARITA, Defendant and Respondent.

B269095

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California.

Filed October 24, 2016

Callanan, Rogers & Dzida and Joseph S. Dzida, Los Angeles, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Burke, Williams & Sorensen, Joseph M. Montes and Joseph P. Buchman, Los Angeles, for Defendant and Respondent.

WILLHITE

, Acting P.J.

The Outdoor Advertising Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 5200 et seq.

(the Act))¹ regulates advertising displays (i.e., billboards)² adjacent to interstate or primary highways in California. Section 5270 of the Act states: “The regulation of the placing of advertising displays by this chapter, insofar as such regulation may affect the placing of advertising displays within view of the public highways of this state in unincorporated areas, shall be exclusive of all other regulations for the placing of advertising displays within view of the public highways of this state in unincorporated areas whether fixed by a law of this state or by a political subdivision thereof.” Despite this statement of exclusivity, the Act also contains several provisions that authorize counties and cities to enact regulations or ordinances affecting the placing of billboards, imposing restrictions on advertising displays adjacent to any highway, or requiring permits and/or licenses for the placing of billboards in view of any highway. (E.g., §§ 5227, 5230, 5231.)

The primary question presented in this case is whether section 5270 precludes application of county or city billboard ordinances with respect to a billboard that was placed in an area that was unincorporated at the time of its placement.³ The trial court concluded that in light of the entire statutory scheme, section 5270 does not preempt county- or city-enacted limitations on billboards in unincorporated areas that are stricter than the limitations set forth in the Act. We agree, and affirm the judgment in favor of City of Santa Clarita (City).

BACKGROUND

The relevant facts of this case are for the most part undisputed. Plaintiffs Arthur D'Egidio, co-trustee of the Restated D'Egidio Trust dated October 26, 1989, and Carol A. D'Egidio, trustee of the Carol A. D'Egidio Irrevocable Trust dated July 19, 1996, are co-owners, along with other members of the D'Egidio family, of a parcel of property that currently is within the city limits of City. The D'Egidios bought the property in May 1984 from Kaufman & Broad/Marion Land Company. At the time of the purchase, the property was in an unincorporated area of Los Angeles County (County).

State Route 14, also known as the Antelope Valley Freeway, runs along the southern border of the property. Before the D'Egidios bought the property, Kaufman & Broad had erected a billboard nine feet from the freeway, designed to be viewed from the freeway, that was used to advertise new homes it was developing in the subdivision located across the street from the property. When Kaufman & Broad conveyed the property to the D'Egidios, it reserved an easement to allow it to maintain the billboard for three years, to 1987. Throughout its management of the billboard, Kaufman & Broad used the billboard solely to advertise its new development.

After Kaufman & Broad's easement expired, Arthur D'Egidio took over the management of the billboard. He obtained an outdoor advertising permit from the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) and began leasing out the billboard for general commercial advertising.

Under County ordinances as they existed in 1987, signs advertising subdivisions that were being offered for sale or lease for the first time were allowed to be placed on the subdivision property, oriented to be read from the street or highway, without any restriction as to the distance from the street or highway. (L.A. County Code, §§ 22.08.190 [definition of “Subdivision sales sign”], 22.52.980 [rules governing subdivision sales signs].) A sign that advertised a business, profession, product, or service that was not offered or sold on the property on which the sign was placed (i.e., an “outdoor advertising sign”), however, could not be placed within 660 feet of the edge of right-of-way of a freeway or scenic highway if the sign was designed to be viewed primarily by persons traveling on that freeway or highway. (L.A. County Code, §§ 22.08.190 [definition of “Outdoor advertising sign”], 22.52.840, subd. (D) [placement condition on outdoor advertising sign].)

City, which had incorporated in December 1987, annexed the area in which the property was located in 1990. At the time of its incorporation, City adopted as City's ordinances all ordinances codified in the Los Angeles County Code. In 1989, City amended its sign ordinances to require a conditional use permit to erect or maintain any outdoor advertising sign, and to prohibit such signs within 1000 feet of the edge of right-of-way of a freeway or scenic highway if the sign was designed to be viewed partially or primarily by persons traveling on the freeway or highway. (Santa Clarita Ord. No. 89–17, amending Santa Clarita Mun. Code, § 22.52.840.) Those requirements remained in effect (codified in 1992 as Santa Clarita Mun. Code, § 17.19.050 (A), (E)) until 2003, when City again amended its sign regulations to provide that outdoor advertising signs (which it called “off-site signs”) were not permitted at all, except that such signs that were lawfully erected before the effective date of the amendment could be lawfully maintained as a legal nonconforming use. (Santa Clarita Ord. No. 03–17, amending and restating Santa Clarita Mun. Code, §§ 17.19.240 (M) [prohibiting off-site signs, with exceptions for legal nonconforming use], 17.19.160 [allowing existing lawfully erected signs as legal nonconforming use].) The provisions prohibiting offsite signs, but permitting such signs that previously were lawfully erected to be maintained as legal nonconforming uses currently are found at subdivisions (M) and (U)(12) of Santa Clarita Municipal Code section 17.51.080. However, in 2014, City passed an ordinance that amended the regulations and required, among other things, the removal within five years of offsite signs that were lawfully erected before November 13, 1990. (Santa Clarita Ord. No. 14–01, amending Santa Clarita Mun. Code, § 17.05.050.)

In 2007, City asserted (for the first time) that the D'Egidios' billboard was illegal because it was not properly permitted. City and the D'Egidios entered into negotiations concerning the billboard, but failed to reach a settlement.⁴ On May 27, 2014, City sent a letter to counsel for the D'Egidios, stating that, in accordance with Santa Clarita Municipal Code section 17.05.050 (B)(3),⁵ the D'Egidios were required to remove their billboard by April 24, 2019.

The D'Egidios filed a complaint for declaratory relief three weeks later. They alleged that at all times during its existence, the billboard was authorized by permits issued by Caltrans, which they believed in good faith were the only permits required. They also alleged on information and belief that before City was incorporated, County did not require any permit to maintain the billboard and that, even if County did require such a permit, that requirement was preempted by state law. Finally, the D'Egidios alleged that City's demand for removal of the billboard is barred by the doctrines of laches and estoppel. They asked for a judicial determination as to the rights and obligations of the parties regarding the billboard.

After City's demurrer to the complaint was overruled and its motion to strike portions of the complaint was denied, City filed a cross-complaint against the D'Egidios, alleging that the billboard was not lawfully erected under the Act and the County Code in effect in 1987, and therefore cannot be deemed a legal nonconforming use. It alleged claims for violation of the Santa Clarita Municipal Code and maintenance of a public nuisance, and sought declaratory relief and an injunction prohibiting the D'Egidios from maintaining the billboard. City also sought attorney fees under Santa Clarita Municipal Code section 23.30.130.

City filed a motion for summary judgment on the complaint and cross-complaint, contending that (1) the Act does not preempt local government regulations regarding billboards; (2) the undisputed evidence shows that the D'Egidios' billboard did not comply with the Los Angeles County Code when its use was modified in 1987 from a subdivision sales sign to an outdoor advertising sign; (3) because the billboard was not lawfully erected, it is unlawful under City's municipal code and must be removed; and (4) City cannot be estopped from enforcing its municipal code with regard to the billboard. The D'Egidios did not dispute in any meaningful way City's facts in support of its motion.⁶ The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of City in a detailed ruling. It entered judgment finding that the billboard was not lawfully erected in 1987 when the D'Egidios changed its use to an outdoor advertising sign because its placement violated Los Angeles County Code section 22.52.840, it is prohibited under the Santa Clarita Municipal Code, and it constitutes a public nuisance. The court ordered that the D'Egidios were permanently enjoined and prohibited from maintaining the billboard on their property.

City moved for its attorney fees under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1702

, Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(10)(B), Government Code section 38773.5, and Santa Clarita Municipal Code section 1.01.220(D). The court granted City's motion, awarding City attorney fees in the amount of $48,633.20. The D'Egidios timely filed notices of appeal from the judgment and the postjudgment order granting City attorney fees.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, the D'Egidios contend the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because (1) the court...