D.J. v. State, 94-1166

Decision Date14 March 1995
Docket NumberNo. 94-1166,94-1166
Citation651 So.2d 1255
Parties98 Ed. Law Rep. 1164, 20 Fla. L. Weekly D685 D.J., a child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender and P. Douglas Brinkmeyer, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Giselle Lylen Rivera, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant, a high school student, was adjudicated delinquent after being found guilty of the misdemeanor offenses of attempted battery on a school employee and affray. On appeal, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain findings of guilt for these offenses. We agree that the state failed to carry its burden of proving the attempted battery offense, but we sustain the finding of guilt on affray.

A delinquency petition charged the appellant with battery on a school employee and affray. The charges arose from appellant's schoolyard fistfight with a fellow student in which an assistant principal was struck while attempting to stop the fight. To prove the battery offense, the state presented testimony from several witnesses, including the alleged victim and appellant's opponent in the fight. None of the state's witnesses saw the appellant strike the assistant principal, and the victim herself conceded that appellant's opponent could have struck the blow. In response to appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal, the state successfully argued that appellant's intent to strike his opponent could be transferred to the assistant principal. Accepting this argument, the trial court found the appellant guilty of attempted battery upon a school employee.

We agree with the appellant that the doctrine of transferred intent will not sustain the finding of guilt. As we held in Mordica v. State, 618 So.2d 301 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), the doctrine only operates to transfer the defendant's intent as to the intended victim to the unintended victim. Thus, only the appellant's intent to strike his opponent--a student--could be transferred, and there could be no intent to strike a school employee.

Concerning the affray, 1 we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the finding of guilt and the adjudication of delinquency. Florida has adopted the common law definition of "affray," which proscribes "the fighting of two or more persons in a public place to the terror of the people." Carnley v. State, 88 Fla. 281, 102 So. 333 (1924); see O.A. v. State, 312 So.2d 202 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). The appellant has argued that the fight was not in a public place, having occurred at a high school that was not open to the public, and further, that the fight was not "to the terror of the people."

Although Florida authority is nonexistent, we are instructed by the experiences of North Carolina and Alabama, which states have adopted the identical common law definition of affray. The requirement that the fight occur in "a public place" has not been given strict or literal construction in the common law. 12 Am.Jur.2d Breach of Peace Sec. 20 (1964). Thus, a fight in a fenced private lot could support conviction for an affray where...

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11 cases
  • Hickman v. State Of Md.
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • June 3, 2010
    ...has alluded to support for the position that terror may be presumed simply by the presence of witnesses. See D.J. v. State, 651 So.2d 1255, 1256 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1st Dist.1995) Carwile, 35 Ala. 392); see also 12 Am. Jur. 2d Breach of Peace and Disorderly Conduct § 20. Other states require ......
  • Travis v. Sec'y
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida
    • May 12, 2015
    ...of an affray are 1) the fighting of two or more people in a public place, and (2) to the terror of the people. SeeD.J. v. State, 651 So. 2d 1255, 1256 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). Accordingly, the elements of an affray cannot be subsumed within second degree murder. Consequently,an affray is not a ......
  • Hickman v. State, No. 882 September Term, 2009 (Md. App. 6/3/2010)
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • June 3, 2010
    ...alluded to support for the position that terror may be presumed simply by the presence of witnesses. See D.J. v. State, 651 So. 2d 1255, 1256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1995) (citing Carwile, 35 Ala. 392); see also 12 Am. Jur. 2d Breach of Peace and Disorderly Conduct § 20. Other states......
  • Sagner v. State, 4D00-836.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • July 11, 2001
    ...a simple battery on her brother to the specific intent required to commit aggravated battery on a pregnant woman); D.J. v. State, 651 So.2d 1255 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)(where juvenile's intent was only to strike student, doctrine could not support finding of guilt of attempted battery upon scho......
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