D.M.M. v. State
Decision Date | 17 June 1994 |
Citation | 647 So.2d 57 |
Parties | D.M.M. v. STATE. CR 93-486. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Joe W. Morgan, Jr., Birmingham, for appellant.
James H. Evans, Atty. Gen., and Gregory O. Griffin, Sr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
This is the appeal from the order of the Juvenile Court of Jefferson County transferring D.M.M., 1 a juvenile, to circuit court for criminal prosecution as an adult on a charge of capital murder in the death of Corey Denson in violation of Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-5-40(a)(17). The appellant raises three issues on this appeal.
The appellant contends that the juvenile court erred in admitting his statement into evidence at the transfer hearing because "he asked to communicate with his mother, as was his right under law, and he was denied that right."
The homicide occurred on September 22, 1993. The appellant gave two statements to the police regarding the homicide. On September 27, 1993, he signed printed waiver of rights forms at 12:45 p.m. and at 2:10 p.m. (C.R. 33, 34) and gave a statement denying any involvement in the homicide. The appellant's mother was present when this statement was made. He was released after making that statement.
The next day, the police arrested the appellant at Phillips High School and brought him to the Police Administration Building. The appellant gave a second statement on September 28, 1993, after signing a printed waiver of rights form at 2:25 p.m. C.R. 35. There was testimony that the police contacted the appellant's mother before they questioned the appellant and that the mother refused to come or to allow the police to bring her to the Police Administration Building. The evidence was conflicting about whether the appellant requested his mother's presence before making this statement.
A large portion of the conflict and the controversy centers around the following statements, which appear at the end of the appellant's second statement to the police:
At the transfer hearing, Birmingham Police Detective Andre Pressley testified that the appellant did not request that his mother be present until the end of the second statement as reflected above. Pressley testified that his reason for the above colloquy was:
The juvenile court judge initially denied the appellant's motion to suppress, finding that the "statement ... was not illegally obtained" and that "the police did more than they had to do to try to get [D.M.M.'s] parents there." R. 163-64. Subsequently, the judge withdrew that ruling in order to "get some more testimony on" when the appellant requested his mother's presence. R. 179. After further testimony, the judge denied the appellant's motion to suppress with the following comments:
"All right. On the motion to suppress, I think with some explanation [the additional testimony] helped and then it didn't help.... But I will say to you that what I had ruled before was that the testimony was in conflict about whether he [the appellant] asked for his mother or not. I now have two law enforcement officers saying he did not. He says he did. Somewhere in here his mother told someone--or they called her. I don't know. But if he didn't ask for her then the right--it's his right you understand. And I do believe his rights were given to him.
Rule 11(A)(4), A.R.Juv.P., provides: "When [a] child is taken into custody," and "his counsel, parent, or guardian is not present, [the child] has a right to communicate with them, and that, if necessary, reasonable means will be provided for him to do so." In E.C. v. State, 623 So.2d 364 (Ala.Cr.App.1992), this Court recently addressed the issue of a juvenile's right to communicate with his parent prior to custodial interrogation by a law enforcement officer.
Applying those principles to this case and based on the conflicting evidence of voluntariness presented in the record, we find that the juvenile court judge did not abuse her discretion in determining that the appellant's statements were voluntary and admissible.
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