E.C. v. State, CR-91-753
Decision Date | 18 September 1992 |
Docket Number | CR-91-753 |
Citation | 623 So.2d 364 |
Parties | E.C. v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
R. Wendell Sheffield of Sheffield, Sheffield, Sheffield & Lentine, Birmingham, for appellant.
James H. Evans, Atty. Gen., and Norbert H. Williams, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
The appellant, 16-year-old E.C., appeals from an order of the juvenile court transferring him to the circuit court for criminal prosecution as an adult on the charge of felony-murder.
On this appeal of the transfer order, the appellant raises two issues. He contends that the statement he made to Bessemer police Sgt. T.L. Cruce was inadmissible, and that the State did not establish probable cause to believe that he committed the charged offense. Because we hold that the appellant's statement should have been suppressed and that the transfer order is due to be reversed on that ground, we do not address the probable cause issue.
The appellant argues that the admission of his statement violated his right to counsel under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), as well as his right to communicate with his parent under Rule 11(A)(4), A.R.Juv.P. We agree with the second part of this argument. We hold that the appellant made an ambiguous or equivocal request to communicate with his mother and that the failure of the interrogating officer to clarify this request before resuming questioning mandates the suppression of the appellant's statement.
E.C. was arrested for the instant offense and was brought to Sgt. Cruce's office on the evening of November 13, 1991. Sgt. Cruce testified that he "wanted [E.C.'s mother] down there," and he "tried to call her," R. 120, but that she did not have a telephone. R. 121. Cruce knew where the appellant's mother lived and he sent another officer to her house, but that officer was unable to find her. R. 129-31. Sgt. Cruce testified that he had known E.C. and his mother for 13 or 14 years. He had had contact, both official and nonofficial, with each of them on numerous occasions, and he had arrested E.C. "several times." R. 140. The officer stated that although he had gotten the appellant's mother "down there numerous times," R. 120, it was "hard to get her down there." R. 129.
Sgt. Cruce read E.C. his rights and asked him if he wanted to speak to a lawyer or to his mother. Sgt. Cruce initially stated that E.C.'s response was "no" to both inquiries. R. 85, 101-102. On cross-examination, however Sgt. Cruce testified that "he never did say no, I do not want a lawyer." R. 165.
After informing E.C. of his rights, Sgt. Cruce handed E.C. a waiver of rights form, watched while the juvenile appeared to read the form, and obtained E.C.'s signature on the form. After ascertaining that E.C. was willing to give a taped statement, Sgt. Cruce recorded the following conversation:
Rule 11(A), A.R.Juv.P., provides:
Subsections (1), (2), and (3) of Rule 11(A) are "substantially the same as the warnings required in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)." Ex parte Whisenant, 466 So.2d 1006, 1007 (Ala.1985). "In addition to the standard Miranda warnings, [subsection (4) mandates that] a juvenile must also be informed that he can communicate with a parent or guardian." Ex parte Whisenant, 466 So.2d at 1011 (Torbert, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Robinson v. State, 574 So.2d at 914.
The legal principles applicable to the fourth warning (right to communicate with parent) are the same as those applicable to the first three warnings (right to silence and to counsel). See Ex parte Whisenant, 466 So.2d at 1007. See also Atchison v. State, 565 So.2d 1186, 1188 (Ala.Cr.App.1990) ( ). "[E]ach of the four requisites [in Rule 11(A) ] stands on the same footing." Ex parte Whisenant, 466 So.2d at 1007. There is no "rational basis for distinguishing the treatment of th[e] fourth warning from that accorded the first three." Id.
Invocation of the juvenile right to parental communication is governed by the same standard as invocation of the Miranda right to counsel. See L.J.V. v. State, 545 So.2d 240 (Ala.Cr.App.1989). "Analogously to the right to see counsel, if a juvenile indicates, in any manner, that he wishes to talk to a parent, the interrogation must immediately cease." L.J.V. v. State, 545 So.2d at 245. See also Smith v. State, 484 So.2d 560, 561 (Ala.Cr.App.1986).
This court has indicated in a prior case that, if a juvenile makes an ambiguous request to communicate with his parent during custodial interrogation, "police officers are allowed to clarify an equivocal invocation of a right." L.J.V. v. State, 545 So.2d at 245 (emphasis added). We now hold, as we did in the context of an ambiguous request for counsel in Robinson v. State, that the police have an affirmative duty, before resuming interrogation, to clarify a juvenile's ambiguous request to communicate with a parent. The duty to clarify an ambiguous request is the same whether the request relates to attorney consultation or to parental consultation: Once a juvenile makes an equivocal statement during interrogation which may be construed as a desire to confer with his parent, " " Robinson v. State, 574 So.2d at 914.
In the present case, when the appellant was asked the question, "do you want [your mother] down here?" he responded, (Supplemental Record at 1). This response contained an obvious ambiguity which Sgt. Cruce should have clarified before proceeding with the interrogation. Instead, Sgt. Cruce relied on what he thought the appellant meant by the response. The officer testified that, based on his knowledge of E.C. and E.C.'s mother, he interpreted the appellant's answer to mean, R. 154. The fact that the response was subject to "interpretation" at all only...
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