D.R. v. Antelope Valley Union High Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 08 October 2010
• Docket Number: No. CV 10–04751 SJO (MANx).,CV 10–04751 SJO (MANx).
• Citation: 746 F.Supp.2d 1132
• Parties: D.R., a minor, by and through her Parents and Guardians Ad Litem COURTNEY R. and Jennifer R., Plaintiff,v.ANTELOPE VALLEY UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, a public entity, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California

746 F.Supp.2d 1132

D.R., a minor, by and through her Parents and Guardians Ad Litem COURTNEY R. and Jennifer R., Plaintiff,

v.ANTELOPE VALLEY UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, a public entity, Defendants.

No. CV 10–04751 SJO (MANx).

United States District Court, C.D. California.

Oct. 8, 2010.

Edward Gary Burg, Jessica Ilene Shpall, Manatt Phelps and Phillips LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff.Alan Fredrick Varner, Sylvester Oppenheim & Linde, Encino, CA, for Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION; ORDER SUSTAINING IN PART AND OVERRULING IN PART EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS [Docket Nos. 10, 12, 19]S. JAMES OTERO, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff D.R.'s (“Plaintiff”) ¹ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, filed on July 30, 2010 (“Pl.'s Mot.”). Defendant Antelope Valley Union High School District (“Defendant”) filed an Opposition on August 17, 2010 (“Def.'s Opp'n”), to which Plaintiff replied on August 23, 2010 (“Pl.'s Reply”). Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction on August 13, 2010 (“Def.'s Mot.”). Plaintiff filed an Opposition on August 23, 2010 (“Pl.'s Opp'n”), to which Defendant replied on August 27, 2010 (“Def.'s Reply”). In addition, Plaintiff filed Evidentiary Objections in Support of her Motion for Preliminary Injunction on August 23, 2010 (“Pl.'s Obj.”). The Court held oral arguments for the Motions on October 7, 2010. For the following reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED, and Plaintiff's Evidentiary Objections are SUSTAINED IN PART AND OVERRULED IN PART.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a 17–year old high school senior at Eastside High School in Lancaster with Charcot–Marie–Tooth Disease (“CMT”), a genetic progressive neurological disorder that affects the limbs, particularly her legs. (Complaint (“Compl.”) ¶ 3; Declaration of D.R. in Support of Pl.'s Mot. (“D.R. Decl.”) ¶ 3.) Plaintiff alleges that she has reduced hand and leg strength because of her CMT disorder, and ascending stairs is impossible for her. (Pl.'s Mot. 2:10–16; D.R. Decl. ¶¶ 7, 8.) Therefore, the disorder denies her access to the second floor of her high school, which was recently constructed and opened in August 2009. (Compl.¶ 1.) Most of Plaintiff's classes are held in a two-story “Classroom Building,” which has four elevators that are kept locked and can only be operated by an elevator key. (Pl.'s Mot. 2:25–3:4.) The school library, career center, and classrooms are located on the second floor of the Classroom Building. (D.R. Decl. ¶ 13.)

Plaintiff began attending Eastside High School in August of 2009 as a junior. (Pl.'s Mot. 2:22–24.) Previously, Plaintiff had spent her freshman and sophomore years at another school in the same district that consisted of only one-story. (D.R. Decl. ¶ 11.) At the end of her freshman year, Plaintiff received a Rehabilitation Act Section 504 (“Section 504”) and American with Disability Act (“ADA”) Accommodation Plan, which allowed her, among other things, extra time between classes and to complete her assignments. (D.R. Decl. ¶ 11.) Soon after enrolling at Eastside High School, Plaintiff's mother requested a meeting to revise Plaintiff's Section 504/ADA Plan to include elevator access. (Pl.'s Mot. 3:27–4:2.) Defendant revised Plaintiff's Section 504/ADA Plan to have staff or teachers make elevators available for her, but denied Plaintiff's request for an elevator key. (Pl.'s Mot. 4:2–7.)

No evidence has been provided to show that Plaintiff is less than a good student. ( See generally Def.'s Opp'n.) Plaintiff's grade point average (“GPA”) through her junior year is 3.8.² (Pl.'s Mot. 4:11.) She is also a member of “Lion Leaders,” a student leadership group. (Pl.'s Mot. 6:9–11.) Through the student group, Plaintiff volunteers at school functions. ( See D.R. Decl. ¶ 42.) She also attends school activities. ( See D.R. Decl. ¶ 43.)

In the fall of 2009, Plaintiff frequently missed between 10 to 45 minutes of class time while waiting for a staff or teacher to provide access to an elevator. (D.R. Decl. ¶ 19.) She further missed class time to use the restroom because she could not do so between classes. (Pl.'s Mot. 3:23–25.) The tardiness and disruptions forced her to drop two Advance Placement (“AP”) classes. (Pl.'s Mot. 4:13–16.) Plaintiff sometimes called her mother and her mother would have to call the school so that someone with an elevator key could be dispatched to unlock the elevator. (Declaration of Jennifer R. in Support of Pl.'s Mot. (“Jennifer R. Decl.”) ¶ 7.)

After the denial of the request for an elevator key, Plaintiff's mother retained counsel. (Jennifer R. Decl. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff's counsel wrote a demand letter on February 12, 2010 and held a meeting with the Defendant on March 2, 2010. (Pl.'s Mot. 5:1–7.) On March 9, 2010, Plaintiff requested a due process hearing pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). (Def.'s Mot. 1:18–19.) Plaintiff also requested a Section 504 due process hearing on March 26, 2010. ( See Def.'s Mot. 1:19–21.) At a meeting on March 17, 2010, Plaintiff's mother allegedly refused to authorize Defendant to assess Plaintiff's eligibility under IDEA and Defendant purportedly provided a “Mobility Plan” that created a “Mobility Liaison” to open the elevators for Plaintiff. ( See Def.'s Mot. 1:25–2:2; Pl.'s Mot. 5:9–17.) On April 28, 2010, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff's due process complaint and Administrative Law Judge Susan Ruff (“ALJ Ruff”) granted the motion on the ground that the Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”) did not have jurisdiction over the claims. (Def.'s Mot. 2:4–9.)

After Defendant implemented its Mobility Plan, Plaintiff still missed class time because the Mobility Liaison was late, absent, or without an elevator key. (D.R. Decl. ¶¶ 37, 38, 40.) Plaintiff rejected the accommodation to have a full-time Mobility Liaison because Plaintiff felt self-conscious and it brought unwanted attention and scrutiny. ( See Exhibit (“Ex.”) I to Declaration of Alan Varner (“Varner Decl.”) in Support of Def.'s Opp'n.) Plaintiff began her senior year on August 9, 2010. (Pl.'s Mot. 6:19.) On June 25, 2009, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant for violations under the ADA, Section 504, and the California Unruh Act (“Unruh Act”). ( See generally Compl.) Plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction on July 30, 2010 and prayed the Court to enjoin Defendant to provide her with an elevator key. (Pl.'s Mot. 19–20.)

II. DISCUSSIONA. Legal Standard

1. Mandatory Preliminary Injunction

A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that: (1) she is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) she is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in her favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 129 S.Ct. 365, 374, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008). In the Ninth Circuit, preliminary injunction is also appropriate if the plaintiff can show that “serious questions going to the merits were raised and the balance of hardship tips sharply towards the plaintiff's favor.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 622 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that the sliding scale test remains viable so long as plaintiff can satisfy other factors contained in Winter ) (citation omitted). A mandatory injunction, which commands performance of an act, is particularly disfavored and a district court should deny relief unless the facts and law clearly favor the moving party. See Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1320 (9th Cir.1994). The Court, however, is fully empowered to grant mandatory injunctions, especially when prohibitory orders may be ineffective or inadequate. See Katie A., ex rel. Ludin v. Los Angeles County, 481 F.3d 1150, 1156–57 (9th Cir.2007) (unnecessary institutionalization).

2. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

IDEA is a “comprehensive educational scheme, conferring on disabled students a substantive right to public education and providing financial assistance to enable states to meet their educational needs.” Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1300 (9th Cir.1992) (citation omitted). To receive financial assistance, state and local educational agencies must ensure that children with disabilities are guaranteed specified procedural safeguards, such as an impartial due process hearing and an appeal. See Witte v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 1271, 1274 (9th Cir.1999); 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(f), (g). The IDEA does not restrict or limit the rights of disabled students or their parents under other statutes like the ADA and Section 504. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 ( I ). The IDEA, however, requires administrative exhaustion prior to the filing of a civil action “seeking relief that is also available under” the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 ( I ).³ “To qualify under IDEA, a child must satisfy three criteria: (i) [s]he must suffer from one or more of the categories of impairments delineated in IDEA, (ii) [her] impairment must adversely affect [her] educational performance, and (iii) [her] qualified impairment must require special education and related services.” Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884, 899 (9th Cir.1995). California adopted IDEA with notable changes, one of which is the exclusion of children who can obtain “a free appropriate public education” through modification of the regular school program. See Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56026, 56040.

3. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The Ninth Circuit has held that “[i]f a plaintiff is required to exhaust [IDEA] administrative remedies but fails to do so, the federal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's claim.” Blanchard v. Morton Sch. Dist., 420 F.3d 918, 920–21 (9th Cir.2005) (citing Witte, 197 F.3d at 1274). Recent Supreme...