Stanley v. University of Southern California

Decision Date06 January 1994
Docket NumberNo. 93-56185,93-56185
Parties63 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1021, 63 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 42,757, 127 Lab.Cas. P 33,045, 88 Ed. Law Rep. 984, 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1394 Marianne STANLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA; Michael L. Garrett, Individually and His Official Capacity as Athletic Director; Does 1 Through 20, Inclusive, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Robert L. Bell, Law Offices of Robert L. Bell, Washington, DC, Alvin L. Pittman, Law Offices of Alvin L. Pittman, Los Angeles, CA, for plaintiff-appellant.

J. Al Latham, Jr., Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, Los Angeles, CA, for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Before: ALARCON, LEAVY and KLEINFELD, Circuit Judges.

ALARCON, Circuit Judge:

Marianne Stanley, former head coach of the women's basketball team at the University of Southern California (USC), appeals from an order denying her motion for a preliminary injunction against USC and Michael Garrett, the athletic director for USC (collectively USC).

Coach Stanley contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying a preliminary injunction on the ground that she failed to present sufficient evidence of sex discrimination or retaliation to carry her burden of establishing a clear likelihood of success on the merits. Coach Stanley also claims that the court misapprehended the nature of the preliminary injunction relief she sought. In addition, she argues that the district court clearly erred in finding that USC would suffer significant hardship if the preliminary injunction issued. Coach Stanley further asserts that she was denied a full and fair opportunity to present testimonial evidence at the preliminary injunction hearing and to demonstrate that USC's purported justification for paying a higher salary to George Raveling, head coach of the men's basketball team at USC, was a pretext for sex discrimination and retaliation. We affirm because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a preliminary injunction. We also hold that the district court did not deny Coach Stanley a full and fair opportunity to present evidence of sex discrimination, retaliation, and pretext.

I. PERTINENT FACTS

Coach Stanley signed a four-year contract with USC on July 30, 1989, to serve as the head coach of the women's basketball team. The expiration date of Coach Stanley's employment contract was June 30, 1993. Coach Stanley's employment contract provided for an annual base salary of $60,000 with a $6,000 housing allowance.

Sometime in April of 1993, Coach Stanley and Michael Garrett began negotiations on a new contract. The evidence is in dispute as to the statements made by the parties. Coach Stanley alleges in her declarations that she told Garrett that she "was entitled to be paid equally with the Head Men's Basketball Coach, George Raveling[,] and that [she] was seeking a contract equal to the one that USC had paid the Head Men's Basketball Coach" based on her outstanding record and the success of the women's basketball program at USC. She also requested a higher salary for the assistant coaches of the women's basketball team. According to Coach Stanley, Garrett verbally agreed that she should be paid what Coach Raveling was earning, but he asserted that USC did not have the money at that time. He indicated that "he would get back [to her] with an offer of a multi-year contract ... that would be satisfactory." Garrett alleges in his affidavit, filed in opposition to the issuance of the preliminary injunction, that Coach Stanley told him that "she wanted a contract that was identical to that between USC and Coach Raveling."

On April 27, 1993, Garrett sent a memorandum which set forth an offer of a three-year contract with the following terms:

1993-94 Raising your salary to $80,000 with a $6,000 housing allowance.

1994-95 Salary of $90,000 with a $6,000 housing allowance.

1995-96 Salary of $100,000 with a $6,000 housing allowance.

Presently, Barbara Thaxton's base salary is $37,000 which I intend to increase to $50,000. It is not my policy to pay associate or assistant coaches housing allowances. Therefore that consideration is not addressed in this offer.

The memorandum concluded with the following words: "I believe this offer is fair, and I need you to respond within the next couple of days so we can conclude this matter. Thank you." According to Garrett, Coach Stanley said the offer was "an insult."

Coach Stanley alleged that, after receiving this offer, she informed Garrett that she "wanted a multi-year contract but his salary figures were too low." Coach Stanley also alleged that she told Garrett she "was to make the same salary as was paid to the Head Men's Basketball Coach at USC." Garrett asserted that Coach Stanley demanded a "three-year contract which would pay her a total compensation at the annual rate of $96,000 for the first 18 months and then increase her total compensation to the same level as Raveling for the last 18 months." He rejected her counter offer.

Coach Stanley alleged that Garrett stated to her that he thought his proposal was fair and he would "not spend a lot of time negotiating a contract." According to Coach Stanley, Garrett's attitude toward her changed and he became "hostile." Garrett told her that she would not be paid the same as Coach Raveling and that she should be satisfied with being the second highest paid women's basketball coach in the PAC-10 Conference.

After this discussion, Coach Stanley retained attorney Timothy Stoner to negotiate the terms of the new contract. Coach Stanley alleged that Garrett rejected her offer "to negotiate a contract that would allow me to gradually work my way to the contract salary and benefits level that USC had provided to George Raveling." Coach Stanley alleged further that Garrett refused to "negotiate in good faith." He withdrew the multi-year contact offer he had previously made to her. Coach Stanley also alleged that Garrett told her attorney that he would offer a one-year contract at a $90,000 salary, plus a $6,000 housing allowance.

Garrett alleges that Stoner proposed a three-year contract with compensation starting at $88,000 in the first year, $97,000 in the second year, and $112,000 in the third year. According to Garrett's affidavit, Coach Stanley also made certain "unprecedented demands, such as: free room and board for her daughter who is anticipated to attend USC as an undergraduate student; radio and television shows where Stanley and the women's team would be spotlighted; and monetary payments tied to conference championships, wins in NCAA play-off games, and coach of the year honors." Garrett indicated that these "incentives" were unacceptable to USC.

On June 21, 1993, Garrett transmitted a written offer of a one-year contract to Mr. Stoner. The offer contains the following terms with reference to salary:

In consideration of the performance of her duties and responsibilities as Head Women's Basketball Coach, USC shall pay to Stanley an annual salary of $96,000, commencing as of the effective date of this Agreement and payable in equal monthly installments. Stanley shall also be eligible to participate in all of the USC employee benefits as set forth from time to time in the USC Staff Handbook.

Coach Stanley alleges that she contacted Garrett sometime thereafter, "to remind him of the promise he and the University made to me for a multi-year contract that would fairly compensate me for my services and efforts...." Garrett told her that she had until the end of that business day to accept the one-year contract at $96,000 or USC would begin to look at other candidates for her position.

Garrett alleged that he received a telephone call from Coach Stanley on July 13, 1993, in which she "renewed her demand for the three-year contract on the economic terms previously proposed by her counsel." Garrett reiterated that a one-year contract at $96,000 was USC's final offer. Garrett told Coach Stanley that her final decision to reject or accept the offer had to be communicated to him by the end of the day.

Garrett alleged that Coach Stanley did not accept the offer. The following day, Coach Stanley sent a memorandum requesting additional time to consider the offer because she was too distressed to make a decision. Garrett sent a memorandum to Coach Stanley on July 15, 1993, in which he stated, inter alia:

My job as athletic director is to look out for the best interests of our women's basketball program as a whole, and that is what I have been trying to do all along. The best interests of the program are not served by indefinitely extending the discussions between you and the University, which have already dragged on for weeks. That is why I told you on Tuesday that I needed a final answer that day.

Since I did not hear from you, as it now stands the University has no offers on the table. If you want to make any proposals, I am willing to listen. Meanwhile, for the protection of the program, I must, and am actively looking at other candidates. I am sorry that you feel distressed by this situation. As I have said, I have to do what is best for our women's basketball program.

Finally, I was not aware that you were in Phoenix on official University business. Your contract with the University expired at the end of June, and I must ask you not to perform any services for the University unless and until we enter into a new contract. I will arrange for you to be compensated on a daily basis for the time you have expended thus far in July on University business....

Coach Stanley did not reply to Garrett's July 15, 1993 memorandum. Instead, on August 3, 1993, her present attorney, Robert L. Bell, sent a letter via facsimile to USC's Acting General Counsel...

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