Daddona v. Thind
Decision Date | 31 January 2006 |
Parties | Frank P. DADDONA and Catherine M. Daddona, h/w, Appellants v. Bhagwant S. THIND, PennDot, Sun Company, Inc., Trexler Plaza, Imperial Excavating, Sunburst Property Management, Isri Isringhausen, Inc., JRB, Inc., Upper Macungie Township, Kawasaki Construction Machinery Corp. of America. |
Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
John P. Karoly, Jr., Allentown, for appellants.
Thomas Finarelli, Philadelphia, for appellee, Kawasaki Construction Machinery Corp. of America.
BEFORE: McGINLEY, Judge, SIMPSON, Judge, and LEAVITT, Judge.
OPINION BY Judge SIMPSON.
In this appeal we review the conduct of a products liability trial. A jury rejected Frank P. Daddona (Daddona) and Catherine M. Daddona's (collectively, Plaintiffs) claim that a front-end loader manufactured by Kawasaki Construction Machinery Corporation of America (Kawasaki) was defectively designed. Plaintiffs appeal an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County (trial court) that denied their post-trial motion seeking a new trial. We affirm.
In January 1996, Daddona attempted to remove snow from the parking area of Trexler Plaza, a truck stop and gas station in Fogelsville, Pennsylvania, using a front-end loader manufactured by Kawasaki. The loader was equipped with a rigid bucket attachment. As Daddona drove forward, the bucket struck a metal drainage grate. As a result of the sudden stop, Daddona struck his head inside the cab of the loader.
Plaintiffs subsequently filed suit against several defendants. Essentially, Plaintiffs' action involved two claims: one against the owners of Trexler Plaza and other defendants for allegedly causing the accident, and the other against Kawasaki for allegedly causing Daddona to suffer enhanced injuries. Kawasaki pursued cross-claims for contribution against several co-defendants. During the course of the litigation, several defendants were dismissed at the summary judgment stage. Plaintiffs settled with all remaining defendants, with the exception of Kawasaki.
The trial court subsequently granted Kawasaki's motion to bifurcate the case and a jury trial on the issue of liability commenced on September 22, 2004. Plaintiffs proceeded on a theory of strict liability, asserting Kawasaki's defective design rendered the front-end loader insufficiently crashworthy. In turn, Kawasaki pursued its cross-claims for contribution against the settling defendants.
Eight days later, and after 48 minutes of deliberation, the jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of Kawasaki, finding the front-end loader was not defective or unsafe for its intended use, the first special interrogatory. As a result, the jury did not answer the remaining 14 special interrogatories concerning whether the defect was a substantial factor, the presence of an enhanced injury, the feasibility of the proposed alternative design, whether the proposed alternate design would have prevented the enhanced injury, and the liability of the settling defendants. Further, because of the bifurcation, damage issues were not submitted to the jury.
Plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion for post-trial relief seeking a new trial, which set forth 31 allegations of error. Plaintiffs' brief in support of their post-trial motion, however, addressed only seven of those alleged errors. As a result, the trial court determined Plaintiffs waived the remaining 24 issues. See, e.g., Jackson v. Kassab, 812 A.2d 1233 (Pa.Super.2002) ( ). The trial court subsequently issued a thorough and thoughtful opinion disposing of the seven issues properly preserved. Ultimately, the trial court denied Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial. This appeal by Plaintiffs followed.1
Hadar v. AVCO Corp., 886 A.2d 225, 228 (Pa.Super.2005). To prevail in a products liability case, a plaintiff must prove: the product is defective; the defect existed when it left the defendant's hands; and, the defect caused the plaintiff's injury. Id. See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). The threshold inquiry in all products liability cases is whether there is a defect. Dep't of Gen. Servs. v. United States Mineral Prods. Co., 809 A.2d 1000 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2002). In any product liability case grounded in strict liability, the product, and not the manufacturer's conduct, is on trial. Hutchinson v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., 876 A.2d 978 (Pa.Super.2005).
"Crashworthiness" is a subset of products liability law and usually arises in the context of a vehicular accident. Harsh v. Petroll, 840 A.2d 404, 417 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2003), aff'd, ___ Pa. ___, 887 A.2d 209 (2005). The term crashworthiness means the protection a motor vehicle affords its passenger against personal injury or death as a result of a motor vehicle accident. Id. The doctrine imposes liability on the manufacturer not for causing the accident, but rather for failing to minimize the injuries or even increasing the severity of the injuries sustained in an accident brought about by a cause other than the alleged defect. Habecker v. Clark Equip. Co., 36 F.3d 278 (3d Cir.1994). "[T]he crashworthiness doctrine permits a plaintiff to recover for enhanced injuries, i.e., only for those injuries he can prove he would not have sustained if he had been riding in a crashworthy vehicle." Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 142 (3rd Cir.2000), (citation omitted). "If enhanced injuries cannot be shown, then no liability exists as to the manufacturer." Id.
In order to establish a cause of action on a theory of crashworthiness, a plaintiff must show: the design - of the product was defective; an alternative, safer design practicable under the circumstances existed; what injuries, if any, the plaintiff would have suffered if the alternative design was used; and the defective design caused or exacerbated specific injuries. Barker v. Deere & Co., 60 F.3d 158 (3rd Cir.1995).2
In this case, Plaintiffs alleged the front-end loader manufactured by Kawasaki was defectively designed rendering it uncrashworthy. Plaintiffs proposed an alternative, safer design that consisted of a three-point seat belt for the operator's seat, and padding for the front-end loader's rollover protection system (ROPS), where they claimed Daddona struck his head. Plaintiffs alleged, if Kawasaki equipped the front-end loader with a three-point seat belt, Daddona would not have struck the ROPS. They further claimed padding on the ROPS would have lessened or eliminated the injury. Plaintiffs alleged, as a result of the lack of a three-point seat belt and padding on the ROPS, Daddona sustained significant head injuries, including a physical injury, traumatic brain injury, permanent cognitive injuries and distress anxiety.
When responding to a request for a new trial, a trial court must follow a two-step process. Harman ex rel. Harman v. Borah, 562 Pa. 455, 756 A.2d 1116 (2000). First, it must decide whether one or more mistakes occurred at trial. Id. Second, if the court concludes a mistake occurred, it must determine whether the mistake was a sufficient basis for granting a new trial. Id. The harmless error doctrine underlies every decision to grant or deny a new trial. Id. A new trial is not warranted merely because some irregularity occurred during the trial or another trial judge would rule differently; the moving party must show prejudice resulting from the mistake. Id.
As an appellate court, to review the two-step process of the trial court for granting a new trial, we also employ a two prong analysis. Id. First, we examine the decision of the trial court that a mistake occurred. In so doing, we must apply the appropriate standard of review. Id. If the alleged mistake involved an error of law, we must scrutinize for legal error. If, on the other hand, the alleged mistake involved a discretionary act, we must review for an abuse of discretion. Id. If there were no mistakes at trial, we must affirm a decision by the trial court to deny a new trial as the trial court cannot order a new trial where no error of law or abuse of discretion occurred. Id.
On appeal, Plaintiffs raise seven issues, the majority of which contain numerous sub-issues. In all, Plaintiffs present more than 25 issues for our review.3
Plaintiffs first contend the trial court abused its discretion in refusing their requests to present rebuttal to Kawasaki's closing argument. As a basic principle, Plaintiffs assert, they were entitled to rebut Kawasaki's closing. We disagree.
The right to present opening and closing argument is part of the constitutional right to representation by an attorney in civil cases, and no court may deny a party's counsel the right to argue its case before a jury. See Nestor v. George, 354 Pa. 19, 46 A.2d 469 (1946); Speer v. Barry, 349 Pa.Super. 365, 503 A.2d 409 (1985); Turley v. Hennis Freight Lines, Inc., 263 Pa.Super. 523, 398 A.2d 699 (1979). Indeed, Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure No. 225, entitled "Summing Up," states: "[a]ttorneys for each party ... may make an opening address to the jury and may also make an address to the jury after the close of the testimony."
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure No. 223(3), however, authorizes a trial court to make and enforce rules regulating "the number and length of addresses to the jury." Burish v. Digon, 416 Pa. 486, 491, 206 A.2d 497,...
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