Oddi v. Ford Motor Company, 99-3406

• Decision Date: 09 May 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-3406,99-3406
• Citation: 234 F.3d 136
• Parties: (3rd Cir. 2000) DAVID ODDI; ERIN ODDI, HIS WIFE v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY; GRUMMAN ALLIED INDUSTRIES INC.; GRUMMAN OLSON BODIES, INC.; OLSON BODIES, INC. V. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT DAVID ODDI, APPELLANT Argued:
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 136

234 F.3d 136 (3rd Cir. 2000)

DAVID ODDI; ERIN ODDI, HIS WIFE v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY; GRUMMAN ALLIED INDUSTRIES INC.; GRUMMAN OLSON BODIES, INC.; OLSON BODIES, INC.

V.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT

DAVID ODDI, APPELLANT

No. 99-3406

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Argued: May 9, 2000

Filed October 13, 2000

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, (Civil Action No. 95-cv-01341), District Judge: Hon. Robert J. Cindrich

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Attorneys for Appellant: Paul A. Tershel, Esq. (Argued) Mary Chmura Conn, Esq. Tershel & Associates Helena Professional Building 55 South Main Street Washington, PA 15301

Attorneys for Appellee Ford Motor Company: John E. Wall, Esq. (Argued) Michael F. Nerone, Esq. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C. Two Ppg Place, Suite 400 Pittsburgh, PA 15222-5402

Attorneys for Appellee Grumman Allied Ind., et al.: John H. Williams, Esq. (Argued) Gorr, Moser, Dell & Loughney 437 Grant Street 1300 Frick Building Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Before: Greenberg and McKee, Circuit Judges, and Garth, Senior Circuit Judge

OPINION FOR THE COURT

McKee, Circuit Judge.

David Oddi was catastrophically injured in a one-vehicle accident when the truck he was driving struck a guardrail and a bridge abutment. Thereafter, he filed two separate product liability actions in state court. He sued Ford Motor Company, which designed and manufactured the chassis of the truck, and he brought a separate action against Grumman Allied Industries, Inc. (then known as Olson Bodies, Inc), which designed and manufactured the finished truck. Ford and Grumman removed the actions to the district court where they were consolidated.¹ Ford and Grumman eventually moved for summary judgment based upon their contention that Oddi could not establish a prima facie case because his proposed expert testimony failed to satisfy the requirements of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U. S. 579 (1993). The district court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of Ford and Grumman, and against Oddi. The district court subsequently denied Oddi's motion for reconsideration, and this appeal followed. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY.

On June 21, 1993, Oddi was driving a bread truck owned and maintained by Continental Baking Company. He was proceeding northbound at exit 14 of Interstate 79 near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, at approximately 55 to 60 miles an hour when the truck struck a guardrail and bridge abutment. Oddi's legs were crushed so badly by the force of the accident that they both had to be amputated. Oddi's left arm was also permanently injured.

The truck was a 1976 special order Ford M-5000 Stripped Chassis that Continental had ordered through a Ford dealership for use as a bread delivery truck. When the truck left Ford's possession and control it was comprised only of basic component parts such as frame rails, axles, engine, drive train, wheels and a front bumper. Continental took delivery of the Stripped Chassis and delivered it to Grumman for the design and manufacture of the finished vehicle. Grumman designed and manufactured all necessary aspects of the vehicle pursuant to Continental's specifications. This included modifications to the occupant compartment ("cab") and floor boards. Continental had used the truck as a bread delivery truck from 1976 through 1993, and it had been driven for hundreds of thousands of miles in that capacity before this accident occurred.²

The suits that Oddi filed after his accident asserted claims against Ford and Grumman under theories of strict liability, negligence, breach of warranty and failure to warn.³ Oddi claimed Ford's defective design of the front bumper of the bread truck allowed the underside of the truck to ride up or "ramp" onto the guardrail and strike the bridge abutment.⁴ He also claimed that after the truck ramped onto the guardrail, the left front wheel of the truck hooked over the rail preventing him from steering away from the bridge abutment. He alleged that defects in the cab (designed and manufactured by Grumman) had caused the flooring to bend upon impact with the bridge abutment and apply such force as to crush both his legs. He also alleged that the truck rolled over and down an adjacent embankment after it struck the bridge abutment.

Ford denied any design defects and also denied that the truck ramped the guardrail. According to Ford, the truck simply struck the guardrail and rolled over it. Similarly, Grumman denied that the flooring was deficient or that it caused any injury at all.⁵

Oddi retained two experts to support his contention that his injuries were caused by defects in the manufacture and design of the truck. John N. Noettl, an engineer, was retained to testify about the defective design, and Leon Kazarian, a bio-mechanist, was retained to testify about the process by which Oddi received his injuries.

After deposing both of Oddi's experts, Ford and Grumman moved for summary judgment. Ford argued that all of Oddi's claims should be dismissed because Oddi's proposed expert testimony could not survive the threshold inquiry required under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U. S. 579 (1993), and, therefore, Oddi could not establish a prima facie case. Grumman did not initially make a specific challenge under Daubert. Instead, Grumman initially argued only that Oddi's evidence was either inadmissible or failed to satisfy Oddi's burden of proof.

Oddi responded to the summary judgment motions by filing a brief in opposition, an affidavit of Noettl, and excerpts of Noettl's deposition testimony. Oddi did not request an evidentiary hearing or oral argument, nor did he submit anything else in response to Ford's Daubert challenge.

After reviewing Oddi's submissions in opposition to the summary judgment motions, Grumman filed a reply brief in which it argued that Oddi still could not meet his burden of showing that the truck was not crashworthy. Grumman also challenged Oddi's experts under Daubert. Oddi responded by filing a motion to strike Grumman's reply brief claiming that the district court had not granted leave to Grumman to file it. In the alternative, Oddi sought leave to submit opposing affidavits if needed.

On March 31, 1999, the district court entered a Memorandum Opinion in which it ruled that Oddi's experts did not meet Daubert's admissibility standards. Absent the testimony of those experts, Oddi could not establish a prima facie case of liability, and the district court therefore granted summary judgment in favor of Ford and Grumman.

Oddi filed a motion for reconsideration in which his major argument was that the district court should have held a hearing on the Daubert challenge before granting summary judgment. However, the district court disagreed and on September 2, 1999, denied his motion for reconsideration. Oddi then sent a letter to the district court enclosing a copy of our August 2, 1999 decision in Padillas v. Stork-Gamco, Inc., 186 F.3d 412 (3d Cir. 1999). Oddi argued that Padillas required that an evidentiary hearing be held so that he could meet the defendants' Daubert challenges. However, the district court disagreed and issued a supplemental Memorandum Opinion in which it held that Oddi was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

This appeal followed.

II. THEORIES OF LIABILITY.

Although Oddi based his suits upon several different theories of liability, he only appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment on his crashworthiness and negligent failure to test claims. We will begin our inquiry by discussing each of those theories.

A. Crashworthiness.

"The term crashworthiness means the protection that a motor vehicle affords its passenger against personal injury or death as a result of a motor vehicle accident." Kuptez v. Deere & Co., Inc., 644 A.2d 1213, 1218 (Pa. Super. 1994). The doctrine "imposes liability on the manufacturer not for causing the accident, but rather for failing to minimize the injuries or even increasing the severity of the injuries sustained in an accident brought about by a cause other than the alleged defect." Habecker v. Clark Equipment Co., 36 F.3d 278, 283 (3d Cir. 1994)("Habecker III"). "[T]he crashworthiness doctrine permits a plaintiff to recover for enhanced injuries, i. e., only for those injuries he can prove he would not have sustained if he had been riding in a crashworthy vehicle." Carrasquilla v. Mazda Motor Corp., 963 F. Supp. 455, 458 (M. D. Pa. 1997)(citations and internal quotations omitted). "[I]f enhanced injuries cannot be shown, then no liability exists as to the manufacturer." Id.

Crashworthiness is a subset of products liability law.⁶ Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not yet adopted the crashworthiness doctrine for products liability cases,⁷ we have predicted that it would do so in an appropriate case. See Habecker v. Clark Equipment Co., 942 F.2d 210 (3d Cir. 1991)("Habecker II").⁸ To establish a cause of action on a theory of crashworthiness, a plaintiff must show: (1) the design⁹ of the product was defective; (2) an alternative, safer design that was practical existed; (3) what injuries, if any, the plaintiff would have received had the alternative design been used; and (4) the defective design caused or exacerbated specific injuries.¹⁰ Barker v. Deere and Co., 60 F.3d 158, 161 n.3 (3d Cir. 1995)(citation omitted).

B. Negligent Failure to Test.

Oddi alleged that Ford and Grumman were negligent for "[f]ailing to do adequate, necessary and proper testing of the vehicle prior to the sale which would have revealed the dangerous condition of the product." Complaint, at P 4r. Oddi refers to this theory of recovery as the tort of "negligent failure to test." Oddi's Br. at 26. He claims that its elements are as set forth...