Dade County v. City of North Miami Beach
| Decision Date | 21 July 1953 |
| Citation | 69 So.2d 780 |
| Parties | DADE COUNTY et al. v. CITY OF NORTH MIAMI BEACH. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Hudson & Cason, Miami, for appellants.
Louis M. Jepeway and Harry W. Prebish, Miami, for appellee.
December 14, 1934, the City of North Miami Beach, conveyed to Dade County, Florida, 56.75 acres of land for park purposes. The warranty deed of conveyance contained the following reservations:
'This property is deeded to the grantee named herein solely to be used and maintained for park purposes and the grantor herein reserves into itself, its legal successors all right of reversion in and to said property in the event of the discontinuance of such property for park purposes and the maintenance as such.'
December 12, 1951, the grantor filed its bill for declaratory decree in which it prayed:
(1) That an injunctive order be granted without notice restraining defendants from taking any further action in relation to said lands.
(2) The Court finds and decrees that the grantee having failed to make use of said lands for park purposes they have reverted to the grantor under the reversion clause of the deed.
(3) That defendants be required to remise, quitclaim and return said lands to the plaintiff in order that it be possessed of an unincumbered title thereto.
An answer was filed, testimony was taken and at final hearing the chancellor entered a decree in response to the prayer of the bill.
The point for determination is whether or not there was a 'discontinuance of such property for park purposes' that would authorize the grantor to invoke the right of reversion as provided in the quoted part of the deed.
The clear condition of the reversion clause is that it may be invoked by the grantor 'in the event of the discontinuance of such property for park purposes and the maintenance as such.' It is well settled that such restrictions are not favored in law of they have the effect of destorying an estate, that they will be construed strictly and will be most strongly construed against the grantor. Ocean Beach Realty Co. v. City of Miami Beach, 106 Fla. 392, 143 So. 301. 'Discontinuance' as employed in the deed is equivalent to abandonment but there is no specification as to when it was intended that abandonment of the property take place.
Some of the cases hold that when no time is fixed in the deed for reversion to take place a reasonable time consistent with the intention of the parties, the thing to be accomplished and the circumstances incident to its accomplishment will be considered to have been intended. A mere delay in the application of the land for the purpose of the grant or its improper use therefor will not impair the grant nor will it authorize the grantor to repossess it. When as in this case there is no dispute about these facts, what constitutes reasonable time is a question of law. Mizell v. Watson, 57 Fla. 111, 49 So. 149; Dillon on Municipal Corporations, Vol. 2, Section 653; Tiffany on Real Property, Vol. 4, Section 1113; Swope v. Kansas City, 10 Cir., 132 F.2d 788. Since abandonment may not be shown by proof of nonuse, delay in use when the public need is not pressing does not constitute abandonment. Town of Chouteau v. Blankenship, 194 Okl. 401, 152 P.2d 379, 171 A.L.R. 87.
The lands in question, 56.75 acres, are known locally as East Greynolds Park. West Greynolds Park, 170.94 acres, is separated from it by the Florida East Coast Railway and the Federal Highway, but both are being developed as a single project. It is shown that West Greynolds Park has been extensively developed for park purposes and that eighty per cent of East Greynolds Park is mangrove swamp or what is commonly known as overflowed land, but it is conclusively shown that the county accepted the property; that the spoil bank along the north side of Royal Grades Canal has been leveled and the land filled for 200 feet to the north, a large billboard was removed, the park has been regularly patrolled by the county police, a fire that appellee refused to do anything about was extinguished by the county and a rock road was laid out near the center of the land and another on the north side of the...
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