Dade County v. United Resources, Inc.

• Decision Date: 07 August 1979
• Docket Number: No. 79-212,79-212
• Citation: 374 So.2d 1046
• Parties: DADE COUNTY, etc., and the Board of County Commissioners for Metropolitan Dade County, Florida, Petitioners, v. UNITED RESOURCES, INC., a Florida Corporation, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 1046

374 So.2d 1046

DADE COUNTY, etc., and the Board of County Commissioners for Metropolitan Dade County, Florida, Petitioners, v. UNITED RESOURCES, INC., a Florida Corporation, et al., Respondents.

No. 79-212.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Aug. 7, 1979.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 24, 1979.

Stuart L. Simon, County Atty., and Stanley B. Price, Asst. County Atty., for petitioners.

Bailey & Dawes and Guy B. Bailey, Jr., Miami, for respondents.

Before PEARSON, KEHOE and SCHWARTZ, JJ.

KEHOE, Judge.

Petitioners, respondents below, bring this petition for writ of certiorari to review a final judgment granting a rehearing and a writ of certiorari quashing a zoning resolution issued by petitioner Board of County Commissioners for Metropolitan Dade County (Commission). The resolution quashed denied a zoning application filed by respondents, petitioners below. We grant the petition.

Respondents filed a zoning application which requested several boundary changes. The subject property is located from N.W. 170th Street to N.W. 186th Street between N.W. 77th Avenue and N.W. 87th Avenue, and from N.W. 186th Street to N.W. 202nd Street between theoretical N.W. 77th Avenue and N.W. 87th Avenue. The property is 582.11 acres in size and the proposed development would consist of 5,907 dwelling units. A development of this magnitude is required by Chapter 380, Florida Statutes (1977) to be reviewed by the South Florida Regional Planning Council (SFRPC) unless specifically exempted by the local government agency based upon objective guidelines. On June 25, 1974, the Commission, pursuant to Resolution No. Z-162-74 determined that respondents had vested rights in regard to certain sections of this property in accordance with Section 380.06(12) Florida Statutes (1973), and was not subject to the statutory provisions relating to developments of regional impact (DRI). This resolution specifically stated that the exemption from DRI requirements did not predetermine the subsequent zoning issues. Resolution No. Z-162-74 was not appealed by respondents. The subject zoning application was submitted for review to the Dade County Developmental Impact Committee (DIC). The DIC is required to review all developments of county impact and developmental impact statements, and to inform the Commission whether and to what extent the proposed development will affect the Dade County Comprehensive Development Master Plan (Plan), essential public services, and other land use factors. As a minimum standard, the DIC must specify the basis for its conclusions. Following a detailed review of the subject application, the DIC submitted its report to the Commission. Among other things, this report stated as follows:

"There is a question as to whether the proposed parcel plan for Section 11-52-46, dated revised August 28, 1975, is in substantial compliance with the master plan of August 21, 1974, which was reviewed by the County Commission at the time the above resolution was adopted. Since the original conceptual master plan reviewed by the County Commission did not give details on acreages in parcel 3 and 11, nor did it contain statistical data which normally accompanies a parcel plan, it is difficult to determine whether the current plan is in substantial compliance with the master plan of August 21, 1974. Data concerning density and approvals for adjacent land development in Broward County was not submitted by the Applicant."

By this statement, a question was raised as to whether the application submitted by respondents conformed to the previous plans submitted by them.

Based upon the report, the Commission scheduled a public hearing for September 24, 1975. At this hearing, respondents requested a deferment to furnish additional information to satisfy the concerns of DIC expressed in its report. The hearing was deferred until December 9, 1975. Prior to the hearing, the DIC reported to the Commission that it had received no additional information about the apparent problems raised in its report. At the hearing on December 9, 1975, the Commission raised the question of what vested rights to develop did respondents have. The Commission's counsel stated that Resolution No. Z- 162-74 granted vested rights to respondents as of the DRI procedure under Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, but that those vested rights were not intended to vest rights or predetermine issues pertaining to future applications for zoning or rezoning on this subject property. The Commission was further advised that it had a "clean slate" in regard to the question of zoning. Respondents argued that vested rights had accrued. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Commission denied the application with prejudice. See Zoning Resolution No. Z-321-75.

After this denial, respondents filed a petition for writ of certiorari. After a hearing on February 28, 1978, the circuit court, on September 13, 1978, entered a final judgment and order denying the petition for writ of certiorari which stated in pertinent part as follows:

"The denial of rezoning of Petitioners' property is a legislative matter and this Court must adhere to the time-honored legal concept that it will not interfere with the legislative determination absent a record showing that the County Commission had clearly departed from the essential requirements of law. This Court finds no such illustration by the Petitioner nor is there any showing in the formal record of any attempt by the Petitioners to rebut the substantial competent evidence to support the County Commission's denial of their zoning application. As such, this Court must apply the fairly debatable rule which governs the disposition of this matter. Dade County v. Inversiones Rafamar, S.A., 360 So.2d 1130 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Dade County v. Yumbo, S.A., 348 So.2d 1392 (392) (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Dade County v. Marca, S.A., 331 So.2d 142 (Marca v. Dade County, 332 So.2d 142) (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). The Court finds that the adoption of Zoning Resolution No. Z-321-75 bears a substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals and welfare and is constitutionally valid. See, City of Miami Beach v. Weiss, 217 So.2d 836 (Fla.1969).

"Petitioners opine that the doctrine of equitable estoppel controls the judicial determination of this cause. The Court must reject this argument in that the formal record belies the application of the doctrine. . . . A review of the history of this matter demonstrates that the doctrine does not apply in this cause. . . .

"The Petitioners were informed systematically by Dade County at every level of review that there existed no guarantee as to the ultimate zoning on their property. . . .

". . . Petitioners were never granted zoning on their property and were constantly apprised of their need to secure zoning approval from the Respondents. The doctrine of equitable estoppel cannot be supplied to the facts of this cause.

"The Petitioners have not demonstrated the necessary ingredients required to apply equitable estoppel against Respondents. To adopt Petitioners' argument would be to advocate that the December 9, 1975 hearing of the County Commission was a mere formality and that the Petitioners had no burden of proof at that time. . . ."

Upon petition for rehearing, the circuit court entered a final judgment granting rehearing, issuing a writ of certiorari, quashing the action of the Commission, and remanding with instructions. From this final judgment, etc., petitioners bring the instant petition for writ of certiorari seeking to quash the final judgment, etc., and to have the cause remanded with instructions that Zoning Resolution No. Z-321-75 be reinstated.

Among the contentions advanced by petitioners in support of their petition, we find the following to be persuasive. First, petitioners contend that the adoption of Zoning Resolution No. Z-321-75 was fairly debatable. Petitioners argue that the constitutional validity of a zoning resolution depends upon its relationship to the public health, safety, morals, and welfare. If the resolution has a substantial relationship to any of these objections, it may be constitutionally valid, i. e., within the police power of the legislative body. See, e. g., City of Miami Beach v. Weiss, 217 So.2d 836 (Fla.1969); City of Miami Beach v. 8701 Collins Avenue, 77 So.2d 428 (Fla.1954); and Dade County v. Valdes, 366 So.2d 809 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). Further, zoning resolutions like other municipal resolutions are presumed valid and should not be interfered with by the courts, unless they are arbitrarily and unreasonably applied to a particular piece of property. See, e. g., Eastside Properties, Inc. v. Dade County, 358 So.2d 873 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978; and Smith v. City of Miami Beach, 213 So.2d 281 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968). In making this determination, the courts should not ordinarily substitute their judgment for that of the legislative body. See Skagg's Albertson's v. ABC Liquors, Inc., 363 So.2d 1082 (Fla.1978). The test used in Florida is whether a particular resolution as applied to a particular piece of property is "fairly debatable," i. e., whether the question of the resolution meeting the constitutional test...