Daggett v. Roe Cas. Ejector

• Decision Date: 30 June 1856
• Docket Number: No. 84.,84.
• Citation: 20 Ga. 467
• Parties: Doe ex dem. Charlotte S. Daggett et al., plaintiffs in error. VS. Roe, cas. ejector, and Henry DurdEn and William Reed, tenants,defendants in error.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

20 Ga. 467

Doe ex dem. Charlotte S. Daggett et al., plaintiffs in error. VS. Roe, cas. ejector, and Henry DurdEn and William Reed, tenants, defendants in error.

No. 84.

Supreme Court of the State of Georgia

JUNE TERM, 1856.

Ejectment, in Twiggs Superior Court. Tried before Judge Powers, March Term, 1856.

This action was brought by plaintiff in error to recover lot of land No. 172, in the 28th district of originally Wilkinson, now Twiggs County.

On the trial below, plaintiff introduced a grant to the premises in dispute from the State of Georgia to Ezra Daggett, dated May 26th, 1851. Also, a deed from Charlotte Daggett (who was admitted to be the widow and sole heir of Ezra Daggett) to John M. Cook, one of the plaintiff's lessors. Plaintiff also introduced certificates disclosing the following facts: A certificate from the Secretary of the State dated April 15th, 1853, states that the records of his office do not show that the lot in dispute was granted to Young Clark's orphans or any other fortunate drawer; a certificate from the State Treasurer dated February 15th, 1855, shows that it does not appear from the records of his office that the grant fee for the premises in dispute was paid into the treasury during the year 1816, or at any other time until paid by Ezra Daggett on May 1st, 1851; a certificate from the Surveyor General dated February 6th, 1855, states that the lot in dispute was drawn by Young Clark's orphans, of the 9th district, Columbia County, and that the plat to said lot was never recorded to said orphans, but is recorded to Ezra Daggett. Here plaintiff closed.

Defendant relied upon the following agreement which they read to the Jury, to-wit:

"For the purposes of this trial, it is agreed that defendants were in possession of the premises in dispute at the time of the commencement of this suit, and that they have been in possession of said premises forty or fifty years; that defendant, Henry Durden, was born and raised on the place; that he has ditched and improved the place in the last four years, and the ditching and improvement was worth more than the rent; and that Charlotte Daggett is the sole heir at law of Ezra Daggett."

The Court charged the Jury as follows:

"The Statute of Limitations does not run against the State, and it appearing in evidence that the grant before you was issued on the 26th day of May, 1851, the Court charges you that plaintiff's cause of action did not accrue until the grant issued, and seven years not having elapsed before this suit was brought, plaintiff's right of action is not barred by the Statute of Limitations. But if you believe from the statements in writing signed by Counsel and read to you as evidence, that defendants have been in peaceable possession for 40 to 50 years, holding and using the same as their own without objection from any one, you may presume a grant from the State of Georgia to defendants, or their ancestors, or to some one under whom they claim or hold possession of an anterior date to that now produced to you in evidence by plaintiff. And if you should so presume, you will find for defendants; otherwise, you will find for plaintiff."

A verdict having been rendered for defendants, Counsel for plaintiff excepted to the charge of the Court and claims that it is erroneous.

Stubbs & Hill; Tracey, for plaintiff in error.

Same. Hall, for defendants in error.

By the Court.— Lumpkin, J., delivering the opinion.

This case comes up on an agreed state of facts; and thesingle question for the decision of this Court is, whether a grant may be presumed to land after the lapse of forty years and upwards, from possession alone, unaccompanied by any other proof or circumstance, and without its being made to appear whether the possession at the commencement was rightful or not.

The general understanding amongst our people and profession in this State has been, that not only did not the Statute of Limitations proper run against the State, but that no length of possession would suffice to ripen into a title against the State, and thus induce the Courts to presume a grant to protect that title. Hence, the State has been indifferent whether squatters occupied the public domain or not. She was willing to this temporary or usufruct enjoyment, knowing that the lands were hers, and that she could dispose of them...