Dagny Management Corp. v. Oppenheim & Meltzer
| Decision Date | 16 December 1993 |
| Citation | 606 N.Y.S.2d 337,199 A.D.2d 711 |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
| Parties | DAGNY MANAGEMENT CORPORATION et al., Respondents, v. OPPENHEIM & MELTZER et al., Appellants. (And Three Other Related Actions.) |
Oppenheim and Meltzer (Stephen L. Oppenheim, of counsel), Monticello, appellant in person.
Eliezer A. Cohen, New York City, for Dagny Management Corp. and other respondents.
Drew, Garigliano & Davidoff (Michael Davidoff, of counsel), Monticello, for Dolphin Development Corp. and other respondents.
Gross, Gross & Gross (S. Richard Gross, of counsel), Liberty, for D. Christopher Du Bois, respondent.
Robert M. Cohen, Ballston Lake, for Dennis Pemberton and other respondents.
Before WEISS, P.J., and MERCURE, CREW and WHITE, JJ.
Appeal from that part of an order of the Supreme Court (Williams, J.), entered September 14, 1992 in Sullivan County, which dismissed the complaint in action Nos. 3 and 4 with costs, upon a decision of the court.
In May 1986, Stephen L. Oppenheim and Perry E. Meltzer, practicing law under the name of Oppenheim & Meltzer (hereinafter the firm), were retained by Dennis Pemberton and Dagney Management Corporation (hereinafter collectively referred to as the client) to assist in obtaining certain real property from Dolphin Development Corporation. During the course of the firm's representation of the client, the firm, inter alia, commenced an action for specific performance on behalf of the client against Dolphin and continued a related proceeding commenced by Pemberton before the State Human Rights Commission. In accordance with the retainer agreement between the client and the firm, the firm was to receive an hourly fee of $100 per hour and a contingency fee of 25% of any recovery of damages as counsel fees.
The client and Dolphin thereafter reached a tentative settlement whereby the property in question would be conveyed to a third party and the client would receive $75,000 out of the proceeds of the sale as damages. The firm, however, apparently believing that the client's recovery under the tentative settlement consisted of more than the sum of money disclosed, interfered with the closing on the property and, as a result, was discharged from service. The client then obtained substitute counsel, settled the underlying actions, closed on the property and received proceeds from the sale in accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement. The firm thereafter commenced actions seeking, inter alia, a judgment determining the amount of fees due from the client. The client also commenced actions against the firm, and all actions were joined for trial. At the conclusion of the nonjury trial, Supreme Court determined that the firm was discharged for cause and, therefore, was not entitled to compensation from the client. This appeal by the firm followed. 1
It is well settled that "notwithstanding the terms of the agreement between them, a client has an absolute right, at any time, with or without cause, to terminate the attorney-client relationship by discharging the attorney" (Campagnola v. Mulholland, Minion & Roe, 76 N.Y.2d 38, 43, 556 N.Y.S.2d 239, 555 N.E.2d 611; see, Matter of Cohen v. Grainger, Tesoriero & Bell, 81 N.Y.2d 655, 602 N.Y.S.2d 788, 622 N.E.2d 288). Where such discharge is without cause, the attorney is entitled to recover in quantum meruit the fair and reasonable value of the services rendered (see, Campagnola v. Mulholland, Minion & Roe, supra, 76 N.Y.2d at 44, 556 N.Y.S.2d 239, 555 N.E.2d 611; see also, Lai Ling Cheng v. Modansky Leasing Co., 73 N.Y.2d 454, 457-458, 541 N.Y.S.2d 742, 539 N.E.2d 570; Smith v. Boscov's Dept. Store, 192 A.D.2d 949, 950, 596 N.Y.S.2d 575). On the other hand, "[w]here the discharge is for cause, the attorney has no right to compensation or a retaining lien, notwithstanding a specific retainer agreement" (Campagnola v Mulholland, Minion & Roe, supra, 76 N.Y.2d at 44, 556 N.Y.S.2d 239, 555 N.E.2d 611).
The record before us reveals that the firm, whether...
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