Dahl's Estate, In re, 1926

• Decision Date: 23 December 1960
• Docket Number: No. 1926,1926
• Citation: 125 So.2d 332
• Parties: In re Estate of Eugene T. DAHL, Deceased.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 332

125 So.2d 332

In re Estate of Eugene T. DAHL, Deceased.

No. 1926.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Dec. 23, 1960.

Mann, Harrison, Mann & Rowe, St. Petersburg, for petitioners.

No appearance for respondents.

KANNER, Judge.

The petitioners seek a writ of certiorari to have reviewed an order of the county judge of Pinellas County wherein he relinquished to the circuit court of that county jurisdiction to determine the validity of the will, previously admitted to probate, of the late Eugene T. Dahl.

Of the two petitioners, Beatrice Cavanaugh Dahl is the surviving spouse as the result of a ceremonial marriage to the deceased and is the principal beneficiary under the will, while the other petitioner, executor of that will, is the First National Bank in St. Petersburg.

Eugene T. Dahl died on August 24, 1959; his will was admitted to probate in the county judge's court of Pinellas County on September 1, 1959. In February of 1960, two brothers of the deceased, respondents, filed a suggestion in the probate proceeding, the subject of which was that an action had been instituted in the circuit court of Pinellas County by the Dahl brothers as plaintiffs against the defendants-petitioners seeking a decree to declare the decedent's will invalid and to annul the ceremonial marriage between the decedent and Beatrice Cavanaugh Dahl. A copy of the complaint in the circuit court action was attached to the suggestion. It was suggested that the circuit court had exclusive jurisdiction as to annulment of marriage and had concurrent jurisdiction with the probate court as to the will's validity, for which reasons the respondents suggested that the county judge yield to the circuit court jurisdiction as to the will's validity.

Replying, the petitioners moved to quash the suggestion on the ground that the probate court had exclusive jurisdiction of the probate of wills and administration of estates.

The order which is the subject of this petition was entered by the county judge denying the petitioners' replies and motions to quash and relinquishing jurisdiction to determine the validity of the probated will to the circuit court, upon the condition that if the circuit court should decline, the probate court would reassume jurisdiction upon the subject of validity. The county judge reasoned that since that court has no jurisdiction to annul marriage, it could not grant total relief and that the parties and the estate would be benefited by consolidation of the two questions into one suit for determination by one court.

In the circuit court action, the plaintiffs, respondents here, were seeking that the marriage between the decedent and Beatrice Cavanaugh Dahl be decreed a nullity, that the last will and testament admitted to probate be decreed null and void, that a prior will be decreed to be the last will and testament of the decedent, or that in the alternative it be decreed that Eugene T. Dahl died intestate. The petitioners, as defendants in the circuit court, filed motions to dismiss the complaint on the ground, inter alia, of lack of jurisdiction of the circuit court to determine validity of the will. Oral argument was heard by the chancellor on April 26, 1960, but as of the date of the petition he had issued no ruling on these motions.

Since the county judge's court determined in effect that it did not have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the validity of the will and that it was authorized to yield its jurisdiction to the circuit court, the petitioners seek to quash the order through the remedy of certiorari because of the court's asserted failure to proceed in accordance with fundamental principles of law. The petitioners' premise is that a fundamental question of jurisdiction is involved in that the county judge acted without authority in relinquishing jurisdiction to the circuit court over subject matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the county judge's court and as to which the circuit court has no jurisdiction.

Jurisdictionally, as to probate courts, 'The county judge's courts shall have jurisdiction of the settlement of the estates of decedents and minors, to order the sale of real estate of decedents and minors, to take probate of wills, to grant letters testamentary and of administration and guardianship, and to discharge the duties usually pertaining to courts of probate.' Article 5, section 7(3), Constitution of the State of Florida, F.S.A. Under the former Article 5, section 17, the jurisdictional wording is the same as that of the present provision. However, under the former Article 5, section 11, relating to jurisdiction of circuit courts, those courts then had 'supervision and appellate jurisdiction of matters arising before County Judges pertaining to their probate jurisdiction, or to the estates and interests of minors, and of such other matters as the Legislature may provide.' The language just quoted is not retained in the new article. Thus, supervision of matters arising before county judges pertaining to their probate jurisdiction has been withdrawn as has the appellate jurisdiction. Article 5, section 6 (3) and section 5(3), Constitution of the State of Florida. The constitutional jurisdictional terms have been implemented into statutory enactments by sections 36.01(3) and 732.01, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. Chapter 732 provides fully and specifically for proceedings for probate as well as revocation of probate of wills in county judges' courts.

By statutory enactment, courts of equity are empowered with concurrent jurisdiction with county judges in the construction of wills or parts of them. However, the court first acquiring jurisdiction for construction of a will shall retain it. No petition or complaint for construction may be maintained in any court until the will has first been probated. Section 732.42, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. Thus concurrent jurisdiction is conferred upon courts of equity to construe wills under the conditions specified, but there is no such statutory power granted to courts of equity to pass upon the validity of wills.

Pertaining to probate jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of Florida has made certain pronouncements. In the case of Pournelle v. Baxter, 1940, 142 Fla. 517, 195 So. 163, it was stated that courts of equity have not been vested with express jurisdiction to take probate of wills or to revoke or to cancel wills. In the case of In re Peters' Estate, 1945, 155 Fla. 453, 20 So.2d 487, it was declared that courts of equity are without power or jurisdiction over the validity of wills, since section 17 of Article 5 of the Florida Constitution vested in the county judge, among other things, jurisdiction of the settling of estates of decedents, the taking of probate of wills, and the granting of letters testamentary. By the cases of Ullendorff v. Brown, 1945, 156 Fla. 655, 24 So.2d 37, and In re Monks' Estate, 1944, 155 Fla. 240, 19 So.2d 796, it was held that the county judge's court, generally speaking, has the exclusive power to do all things necessary in the settlement of the estate of a decedent, from the probate of a will or the issuance of the letters of administration to the completion of the administration and the entry of a final order of discharge. Also, in the case of In re Niernsee's Estate, 1941, 147 Fla. 388, 2 So.2d 737, 739, it was stated that the probate court 'is a court of general jurisdiction' in regard to all matters within its cognizance and that the probate of a will is within the exclusive jurisdiction of a probate court.

The case of Pournelle v. Baxter, supra, [142 Fla. 517, 195 So. 165] was an equity proceeding brought in the...