Dahl v. Dahl, No. 24301.
| Court | Supreme Court of South Dakota |
| Writing for the Court | Konenkamp |
| Citation | 2007 SD 64,736 N.W.2d 803 |
| Parties | Lana E. DAHL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Wade A. DAHL, Defendant and Appellee. |
| Docket Number | No. 24301. |
| Decision Date | 27 June 2007 |
v.
Wade A. DAHL, Defendant and Appellee.
[736 N.W.2d 804]
Al Arendt, Pierre, South Dakota, Attorney for plaintiff and appellant.
Mark A. Moreno of Schmidt, Schroyer, Moreno, Lee & Bachand, P.C., Pierre, South Dakota, Attorneys for defendant and appellee.
KONENKAMP, Justice.
[¶ 1.] In this child support action, a parent contends that the child support referee and circuit court erred in denying her motion for modification. We reverse and remand.
[¶ 2.] Lana E. Dahl and Wade A. Dahl were married in 1983. They had two children during the marriage: a son, born June 8, 1988, and a daughter, born August 1, 1990. Lana sued Wade for divorce. In resolving their differences, the parties entered into a Property Settlement Agreement (Agreement), dated July 26, 2004. Each was represented by counsel. A judgment and decree of divorce incorporated the Agreement.
[¶ 3.] The Agreement divided the parties' property and debts. Each agreed not to seek spousal support from the other. Lana received primary physical custody of their daughter, and Wade received primary physical custody of their son. They would "share joint legal custody of their minor children." In addressing child support, the parties entered into an arrangement that would later give rise to the present dispute: "In recognition of the parties' mutual obligations for child support, and their respective incomes, the parties shall not pay any child support owed by one to the other." The Agreement recited that each "does release absolutely and forever all right and claim of alimony, support, medical payments, maintenance or otherwise in consideration of the cash obligations and transfer of property as herein above set forth." They also agreed that each "shall not make application for payment of alimony, medical payments or other periodic payments."
[¶ 4.] In May 2006, their son graduated from high school and in June turned eighteen. Shortly afterwards, Lana petitioned for modification of the parties' child support obligations. She requested that Wade be ordered to pay support for their daughter. The matter was heard by a child support referee, with both parties appearing telephonically. Lana asserted that a change in circumstances existed because their son turned eighteen and graduated from high school. She contended that the Agreement only relieved each parent of their obligation to pay child support to the other based on the parties' "mutual
obligation of support" for their minor children. Because Wade no longer had a support obligation for their son, Lana argued that there was no "mutual obligation of support."
[¶ 5.] Wade responded that the issue of child support was settled with the executed Agreement. When they agreed not to seek support from each other, they were both fully aware that their son would turn eighteen three years before their daughter. Moreover, according to Wade, he "gave up legitimate property and support interests in exchange for [Lana's] right to seek support in the future for [their daughter], and ... since [she] could financially support [their daughter], [Lana] should be required to live up to her end of the Agreement."
[¶ 6.] The Referee noted that the parties were represented by "competent counsel" when they executed their Agreement. He found that the language of the Agreement "does appear to take into account the argument and perception that the parties were making a settlement that called for no support to be paid now or in the future." Further, he observed that the Agreement stated that the parties gave up the right to seek "payment of alimony, support, medical payments or otherwise," in consideration of the property transfers and cash obligations.
[¶ 7.] The Referee also took into consideration the policy reasons why child support agreements are always subject to modification. He concluded, however, that the policy concerns were not present here because Lana had sufficient income to support their daughter and in light of the language of the parties' Agreement. Moreover, the Referee recognized that Lana was aware that their daughter would be fifteen when their son turned eighteen and "could have easily" included language in the Agreement that "it was her intent to come back and seek support for" their daughter. Based on the language of the Agreement and the current financial circumstances of the parties, the Referee denied Lana's request for modification of child support.
[¶ 8.] Lana filed an objection to the Referee's report in circuit court. A hearing was held, and the court upheld the Referee's report and recommendation. Lana now appeals to this Court, arguing that the circuit court erred when it (1) failed to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law; and (2) affirmed the Referee's decision not to award child support.
[¶ 9.] Findings of fact of a child support referee are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard of review. Mathis v. Mathis, 2000 SD 59, ¶ 7, 609 N.W.2d 773, 774 (quoting Hendricksen v. Harris, 1999 SD 130, ¶ 7, 600 N.W.2d 180, 181 (citing Permann v. Dept. of Labor, Unemployment Ins. Div., 411 N.W.2d 113, 116 (S.D.1987); Janke v. Janke, 467 N.W.2d 494, 496-97 (S.D.1991))). Questions of law, however, are reviewed de novo. Id. (citations omitted). "When the circuit court has adopted a child support referee's findings and conclusions, we apply the clearly erroneous standard of review to the findings and give no deference to conclusions of law." In re Loomis, 1998 SD 113, ¶ 6, 587 N.W.2d 427, 429 (citing Wolff v. Weber, 1997 SD 52, ¶ 7, 563 N.W.2d 136, 138 (citing Whalen v. Whalen, 490 N.W.2d 276, 280 (S.D.1992)); Janke, 467 N.W.2d at 497).
[¶ 10.] Lana first contends that the circuit court was required to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law in
support of its decision to affirm the Referee's report and recommended order....
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Kauth v. Bartlett, 24414.
...consider a deviation when a litigant, especially one appearing pro se, does not raise the issue during the hearing. See Dahl v. Dahl, 2007 SD 64, ¶ 21, 736 N.W.2d 803, 808 (striking down a mutual agreement to seek no child support and noting such an agreement was not in the child's best int......
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Crawford v. Schulte, 26457.
...the clearly erroneous standard of review to the findings and give no deference to conclusions of law.” Dahl v. Dahl, 2007 S.D. 64, ¶ 9, 736 N.W.2d 803, 805. “[T]he question whether a source of funds constitutes income [for purposes of calculating child support] involves statutory interpreta......
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Heiss v. Heiss, 24781.
...indicated that a party was not to be relieved from the consequences of a bad deal, but the court more recently in Dahl [v. Dahl, 2007 SD 64, 736 N.W.2d 803] has expressed the thought that child support is subject to adjustment as the fortunes of the parties and the situations of the childre......
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Kauth v. Bartlett, No. 24414.
...consider a deviation when a litigant, especially one appearing pro se, does not raise the issue during the hearing. See Dahl v. Dahl, 2007 SD 64, ¶ 21, 736 N.W.2d 803, 808 (striking down a mutual agreement to seek no child support and noting such an agreement was not in the child's best int......
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Crawford v. Schulte, No. 26457.
...the clearly erroneous standard of review to the findings and give no deference to conclusions of law.” Dahl v. Dahl, 2007 S.D. 64, ¶ 9, 736 N.W.2d 803, 805. “[T]he question whether a source of funds constitutes income [for purposes of calculating child support] involves statutory interpreta......
-
Heiss v. Heiss, No. 24781.
...indicated that a party was not to be relieved from the consequences of a bad deal, but the court more recently in Dahl [v. Dahl, 2007 SD 64, 736 N.W.2d 803] has expressed the thought that child support is subject to adjustment as the fortunes of the parties and the situations of the childre......