Dai v. Nikaido
| Decision Date | 25 June 2018 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO. 17-00271 KJM |
| Parties | JUN DAI, Plaintiff, v. JASON NIKAIDO, GUY INOUYE, CHIEF OF WASTEWATER DIVISION, DEPT. OF DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION, CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii |
On April 24, 2018, Plaintiff Jun Dai ("Plaintiff") filed a First Amended Complaint ("FAC") against the following defendants: the City and County of Honolulu ("the City"); the City, Department of Design and Construction, Wastewater Division ("the Department"); Robert J. Kroning ("Director Kroning"), in his official capacity as Director of the Department of Design and Construction; and Department employees, Jason Nikaido ("Nikaido") and Guy Inouye ("Inouye") (collectively, "Defendants"). Plaintiff asserts the following six counts in his FAC: Count I, Title VII - Discrimination on the Basis of National Origin against the City and the Department; Count II, Title VII - 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) Title VII Hostile Work Environment ("Hostile Work Environment Claim") against the City and the Department; Count III, Title VII - Retaliation against the City and the Department; Count IV - 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against Inouye and Nikado; Count V - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Inouye and Nikado; and Count VI - 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) ("Civil Conspiracy Claim") against Defendants.
On May 14, 2018, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Counts II and VI of the FAC ("Motion to Dismiss"), which are respectively, Plaintiff's Hostile Work Environmental Claim and Plaintiff's Civil Conspiracy Claim. See ECF No. 52. Plaintiff filed his Opposition on June 5, 2018. See ECF No. 61. Defendants filed their Reply on June 7, 2018. See ECF No. 62.
The Court held a hearing on the Motion to Dismiss on June 25, 2018. Plaintiff appeared pro se. Mitsuko Takahashi, Esq., appeared on behalf of Defendants. After careful consideration of the arguments by the parties, the record in this case, and the relevant case law, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants' Motion.
Plaintiff was born in China and is of Chinese ancestry. See ECF No. 42 at 2, ¶ 1. Plaintiff was a Civil Engineer V for the Department from February 2002 to August 2015. See id. at 5 ¶ 15, 17 ¶ 57. Plaintiff filed his original complaint onJune 8, 2017, which this Court dismissed with leave to amend on December 30, 2017. See ECF No. 32. On the same day, this Court referred the case to the Civil Pro Bono Panel. See ECF No. 33. On February 23, 2018, this Court appointed pro bono counsel to represent Plaintiff for the limited purpose of drafting an amended complaint. See ECF No. 37. Plaintiff, by and through his appointed pro bono counsel, filed his FAC on April 24, 2018. See ECF No. 42. The Court terminated pro bono representation on May 3, 2018. See ECF No. 50. Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss on May 14, 2018. See ECF No. 52.
Defendants argue in their Motion to Dismiss that Count II (Hostile Work Environment Claim) and Count VI (Civil Conspiracy Claim) are too vague, conclusory, and devoid of the factual allegations required to state a plausible claim for relief under their respective theories. ECF No. 52-1 at 5. Defendants thus argue that these counts fail to satisfy even the most basic pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Id. In addition, Defendants argue that the FAC improperly names as parties: (1) the Department, which is not sui juris, i.e., not independent from the City; and (2) Director Kroning, an agent of the City, which is already a named party. See ECF No. 52 at 3. Defendants thus move this Court to dismiss Counts II and VI of the FAC with prejudice, and to dismiss the Department and Director Kroning from this action with prejudice.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ("Rule 12(b)(6)") permits this Court to dismiss a complaint that fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." This Court must, however, take all allegations of material fact in the complaint as true, and must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). "The court need not, however, accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit." Id. "Nor is the court required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences." Id.
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief, which must consist of more than labels and conclusions. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). Id. "A complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief." Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d at 988.
"Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is 'an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race.'" McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1112 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2003)). Encompassed in this prohibition of discrimination is the prohibition of "the creation of a hostile work environment, which violates Title VII's guarantee of 'the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.'" Id. (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986)). "Courts have long recognized that a workplace in which racial hostility is pervasive constitutes a form of discrimination." Woods v. Graphic Commc'ns, 925 F.2d 1195, 1200 (9th Cir. 1991).
To state a Title VII claim based on a hostile work environment, a plaintiff must allege (1) unwelcome, (2) verbal or physical conduct based on a protected characteristic that was (3) sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the plaintiff's employment and create an abusive work environment. Galdamez v. Potter, 415 F.3d 1015, 1023 (9th Cir. 2005). Defendants argue that even whenviewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the wrongful conduct alleged was not severe, or pervasive.
Defendants proffer the following allegations from Plaintiff's complaint, which Defendants contend are insufficient to meet the "severe or pervasive" requirement of a hostile work environment claim:
ECF No. 52-1 at 12-13 (alterations in original) (quoting ECF No. 42 at 10-15).
Defendants contend that the foregoing wrongful conduct alleged was not severe. Defendants argue that none of these allegations evince "actual outrageous, extreme, or otherwise severe verbal or physical conduct that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive." Id. at 13. Defendants also argue that none of the remarks were about Plaintiff's national origin. In support of their contentions, Defendants rely on the Ninth Circuit decisions in Vasquez v. Los Angles, 349 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2003), as amended (Jan. 2, 2004), and Manatt v. Bank of America, NA, 339 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003).
The courts in Manatt and Vasquez did indeed find that the conduct alleged by the plaintiffs in the respective cases were neither severe nor pervasive enough to alter the conditions of the plaintiffs' employment. These cases were decided, however, in connection with a motion for summary judgment. At this stage of the litigation, Plaintiff need not prove all the elements of his claim. Plaintiff is required only to allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
To state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face regarding conduct sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the...
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