Dailey v. City of New Haven

• Decision Date: 03 March 1891
• Citation: 60 Conn. 314,22 A. 945
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: DAILEY et al. v. CITY OF NEW HAVEN et al.

22 A. 945

60 Conn. 314

DAILEY et al.

v. CITY OF NEW HAVEN et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March 3, 1891.

Case reserved from superior court, New Haven county.

Suit by Hugh Dailey and Tilton E. Doolittle. state's attorney, against the city of New Haven and others, to enjoin the defendant city from refusing to accept a trust fund for the benefit of its poor. Defendants demurred to the complaint, and the case was reserved thereon for this court.

L. Harrison and J. W. Ailing, for plaintiffs. W. K. Townsend, for city of New Haven.

H. T. Blake, for trustees of estate of Philip Marett. S. E. Baldwin, for executors and residuary legatees of Ellen M. Gifford. H. Stoddard and J. W. Bristol, for Yale University.

SEYMOUR, J. The will of Philip Marett, late of the city of New Haven, gives one-fifth of the remainder of certain estate "to the city of New Haven, to be held in trust by the proper authorities, and the income to be applied, through such agencies as they see fit, for the supply of fuel and other necessaries to deserving indigent persons not paupers, preferring such as are aged or infirm." On the 10th day of June, 1890, acting upon the report to the court of common council of a committee to whom was referred "the matter of the acceptance or rejection of the trust of $130,000 bequeathed to the city by Philip Marett, deceased, for the use of indigent poor not paupers," the board of aldermen of the city passed a resolution "that the city of New Haven do not accept the bequest to it for the benefit of indigent poor not paupers under and by the will of the late Philip Marett." Thereupon a complaint was brought by Hugh Dailey, a resident tax-payer and elector of the city and town of New Haven, and Tilton E. Doolittle, as the state's attorney for New Haven county, against the city, its mayor, and the other parties interested in the remainder, one-fifth of which was given to the city of New Haven as aforesaid.

The complaint contained, among other allegations, the following: "(7) A resolution is pending before the court of common council of the city of New Haven in and by which it is proposed that the city of New Haven shall refuse to accept the trust of said one-fifth part of said residuary estate so given in trust as aforesaid. Such resolution has been adopted by the individuals who compose the board of aldermen, part of said court of common council, and such resolution is likely to be adopted by the individuals who compose the board of councilmen of said city, and is likely to be approved by the individual who holds the position of mayor of said city. (8) The members of said court of common council and the mayor of said city have no authority to decline the acceptance of said one-fifth part of said residuary estate, so given in trust as aforesaid. (9) The trust abovementioned, created by the will of said Marett, is a public charity, and the beneficiaries of said charity are not represented by the. members of said court of common council or the mayor of said city, nor have such members of said court or said mayor any right to annul and destroy the public charity created by said will. (10) The due administration of the public charity created by said will will tend to largely decrease the expenses for the care of paupers in the city and town of New Haven, and thus render unnecessary to a considerable extent the imposition of taxes to be paid for the support of such paupers; and the city of New Haven is wholly embraced within the limits of the town of New Haven, and includes nineteen-twentieths of the population and taxable property of the town of New Haven. (11) The city of New Haven and the Young Men's Institute, [naming the other beneficiaries of said residuary estate,] all claim an interest in said fifth part of said residuary estate in case the city of New Haven declines and refuses to accept the trust created by said will, but none of said corporations propose to carry out the charitable intentions of the testator, as stated in the clause of said will herein referred to, even if they receive the funds in question. (12) In case the city of New Haven refuses to accept the performance of the duties of said trust, the said Blake and Beardsley [trustees, who now hold the remainder ready for distribution] propose to regard the trust in favor of the public charity, as above described, terminated, and to pay over said sum of over $130,000, being the amount of said trust fund, to the city of New Haven in trust, for library purposes, to [naming the other beneficiaries of said residuary estate,] for purposes other than the supply of fuel and other necessaries to deserving and indigent persons not paupers, in the city of New Haven, preferring such as are aged and infirm, as stated in said will." Following these allegations was a prayer for judgment: "(1) That the city of New Haven, and its mayor, and the members of its court of common council, be enjoined from declining to accept said trust fund, or from declining to carry out the provisions of said will relating to the administration of said trust fnud. (2) If it shall be held that the court of common council of the city of New Haven have the power to refuse to accept said trust and to refuse to administer the same, and if the city of New Haven does refuse to accept or administer said trust, then the plaintiffs pray this court, as a court of equity, to take said fund so given for public charity, as stated in said will, into its own care, and to appoint suitable trustees to receive the same from said Beardsley and said Blake, and administer said fund according to the true intent and meaning of the said will of Philip Marett."

A temporary injunction was granted restraining the mayor of New Haven from approving any resolution or vote of the court of common council of the city, whereby the city shall decline to accept the funds so given to the city by the will of Philip Marett, in trust for the public charity stated in the complaint. Thereupon a statement of facts was agreed upon by the plaintiffs, the city of New Haven, and Henry F. Peck, mayor of the city, they being the only parties that, up to that time, had entered an appearance. At their request the superior court reserved the case and the questions of law thereon arising for the consideration of this court. Subsequently, by leave of the court, the complaint was amended, and E. Edwards Beardsley and Simeon E. Baldwin were made parties defendant thereto, and duly cited to appear. They appeared, assented and agreed to the agreed statement of facts theretofore filed, made answer to the complaint, and filed a cross-complaint. Afterwards the city of New Haven and the mayor filed a demurrer to the complaint, and the case stands before us upon the questions arising upon the pleadings and upon the agreed statement of facts. The statement contains a series of questions which the court of common council instructed the city attorney to incorporate therein, and which, it is agreed in the statement, shall be reserved for the advice of this court.

The first question in natural order relates to the power of the superior court to grant the prayer of the complaint and enjoin the city of New Haven and its mayor and the members of its court of common council from declining to accept the trust fund, or from declining to carry out the provisions of the will relating to the administration of the trust fund. We unhesitatingly ad vise the superior court that it has no such power. If the city has a right to accept a trust of this character and administer it, which we shall presently consider, yet it has an undoubted right to decline to accept it. How can it be otherwise? It is not a duty imposed upon it by its charter or ordinances to accept and administer it. No one can compel another to accept a trust by naming him as trustee. If, in a given case, a refusal to accept would defeat the trust, it would be because the instrument creating it so provided. Courts will see to it that trusts do not fail because of the refusal of the trustee named to act, unless it is certain that the settlor so intended; and this rule, which is a universal one, would have no meaning if trustees were legally bound to act when appointed. The law is well settled in respect to the power of courts to restrain the action of bodies like courts of common council. In the very recent case of Whitney v. City of New Haven, 58 Conn. 450, 20 Atl. Rep. 686, this court held that whenever such bodies are acting within the limits of the powers conferred upon them, and in due form of law, the right of courts to supervise, review, or restrain is exceedingly limited. With the exercise of discretionary powers courts rarely, and only for grave reasons, interfere. Those grave reasons are found only where fraud, corruption, improper motives or influences, plain disregard of duty, gross abuse of power, or violation of law enter into or characterize the result. Difference in opinion or judgment is never a sufficient ground for interference. Courts of common council exercise an authority delegated by the general assembly, which carries with it corresponding duties, and vests the delegated body with the right and duty to exercise the discretion and judgment incidental to the proper performance of what is delegated. Several other decisions in our state recognize the same sound doctrine.

The next question to be considered is whether the city of New Haven can legally become trustee of the fund, and administer the same. We shall look in vain in its charter for any express authority authorizing it to accept and administer trusts of the nature of that created by the will under consideration. Nor is the city of New Haven under any legal liability to support or aid "deserving persons not paupers;" indeed, it has no legal power so to do. The rule is well established,...