Whitney v. City of New Haven

• Decision Date: 17 March 1890
• Citation: 58 Conn. 450,20 A. 666
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: WHITNEY et al. v. CITY OF NEW HAVEN et al.

20 A. 666

58 Conn. 450

WHITNEY et al.

v. CITY OF NEW HAVEN et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March 17, 1890.

Case reserved from superior court, New Haven county.

S. E. Baldwin, for plaintiffs. C. R. Ingersoll and W. K. Townsend, for defendants.

PRENTICE, J. This action involves the validity of a vote of the court of common council of the defendant city, authorizing and directing the defendant Lake, its auditor, to procure the demolition and removal of the old state-house building, located upon the public green in the defendant city, and the propriety of Lake's action pursuant to such vote. The complaint sets out at great length the history of the location and erection of the building, the release to the city of the state's interest therein, the use which has been made of it, and to which it was adapted, the acts of the court of common council and voters of the city which culminated in the order of demolition, and the conduct of Lake in carrying into effect the order. The complaint asks for an injunction restraining the execution of the order, and for damages against the defendant Lake for the destruction or the building as directed. Sundry citizens and tax-payers of the city are plaintiffs, and the city, Lake, and the county of New Haven are defendants. No appearance is made on behalf of the county. The city and Lake demur to the allegations of the complaint. Various issues are thus raised. Some of these are not discussed in the plaintiffs' brief, and are apparently waived. The remainder may be conveniently grouped and discussed as counsel for the plaintiffs groups and discusses them. The plaintiffs seek relief by virtue of an alleged interest of the county in the building. The objections to granting relief upon this ground are manifest. The plaintiffs are in court only as citizens and tax-payers of the city of New Haven. Whatever their relations to the county and to the county treasury may be, they have chosen, and by the allegations of their complaint established, their status in court as "citizens and taxpayers of the city." Furthermore, the complaint is singularly silent as to any present interest in or threatened damage to the county. The only allegation of county interest is that contained in the sixth paragraph, which sets out that the city and county, prior to 1833, together contributed $10,000 towards the construction of the building, and that the county thereby acquired an equitable interest therein. Whether or not that interest has continued to exist during the 50 and more years which have elapsed, does not appear. That the county has during the last half century had any beneficial interest in or use of the building is not stated. That any damage to the county, or to the plaintiffs, as the champions of its interests, was threatened by the demolition of the building, is not charged. In fact, paragraph 45, which contains the only allegation of threatened damage upon which the action rests, recites only a damage threatened to the plaintiffs as tax-payers of the city. Again, by statute there exist officials whose duty it is to protect the rights and interests of the county, and away is provided for actions to be brought to enforce these rights. We fail to discover whence arises the right of these plaintiffs to come forward and maintain this action in the county's behalf and make the county itself a defendant. An examination of the complaint makes it apparent that the proceedings were instituted for the relief of the plaintiffs as citizens and tax-payers of the city of New Haven, and by reason of city rights supposed to have been invaded. To that end the complaint was framed, and in that aspect its claims are to be judged and determined.

Regarding the complaint as an effort to protect city rights, the first question which arises is as to the power of courts to intervene to restrain the execution of the orders of bodies like courts of common council. The law is well settled. They may interfere to prevent an illegal exercise of power. They may enjoin the exercise of power in an informal or illegal manner. When, however, such bodies are acting within the limits of the powers conferred upon them, and in due form of law, the rights of courts to supervise, review, or restrain is exceedingly limited. Courts of common council exercise an authority delegated by the general assembly. This delegation of power carries with it the corresponding duty, and vests the delegated body with the right and duty to exercise the discretion and judgment incidental to the proper performance of that which is delegated. With the exercise of discretionary powers courts rarely, and only for grave reasons, interfere. These grave reasons are found only where fraud, corruption, improper motives, or influences, plain disregard of duty, gross abuse of power, or violation of law, enter into or characterize the result. Difference in opinion or judgment is never a sufficient ground for interference. 1 High, Inj. § 785; Dill. Mun. Corp. §§94, 832; Fellowes v. City of New Haven, 44 Conn. 240; Dibble v. Town of New Haven, 56 Conn. 199, 14 Atl. Rep. 210. The question presented to the court of common council of New Haven as to the advisability of repairing or demolishing the old state house building was one involving discretion and judgment. If, in attempting to determine the issue, it was acting within the scope of its powers, and was acting in legal form, it follows that the superior court cannot supervise or revise its determinations and acts, unless some of the grave reasons above enumerated exist to justify the interference. The court of common council was plainly acting within its powers. The charter confers upon it the right "to manage, regulate, and control the property, real and personal, of the city." Whether it was acting in due form we shall have occasion to see later. Assuming, for the present, that it was, we have only to look at the complaint to ascertain what it discloses of a state of facts warranting judicial intervention. In paragraph 32 we find an allegation that the action of the council was a "gross breach of trust." If this conclusion were justified by the facts, which are fully set up, the plaintiffs would doubtless be entitled to relief. But this single allegation of a conclusion is not sufficient to save the complaint if the facts from which it was drawn, and which are not to be disregarded, do not support the conclusion. Hewison v. City of New Haven, 34 Conn. 138. Examining these facts, we not only find nothing to justify the conclusion that the decision to remove the building was a gross breach of trust, but much to negative that conclusion. The plaintiffs' statement of the issues presented by the state-house problem discloses that it was one upon which reasonable and fair-minded men might well disagree. The question as to whether the building should be repaired or demolished was one which involved many considerations. The complaint shows that the issue involved fair and by no means plain questions of economy and wise administration. The true policy was not so plain as that only a knave could disregard it, or so manifest as to render either a decision to repair or to demolish a palpable or gross disregard of the city's interest. The court of common council, in the performance of its duty, was called upon to meet the issue presented and to determine what should be done. In reaching...