Dake v. State

• Decision Date: 29 December 1995
• Docket Number: CR-94-1657
• Citation: 675 So.2d 1365
• Parties: Jimmy Charles DAKE v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 1365

675 So.2d 1365

Jimmy Charles DAKE v. STATE.

CR-94-1657.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

Dec. 29, 1995.

John Mark McDaniel and Robert B. Tuten, Huntsville, for Appellant.

Jeff Sessions, Atty. Gen., and Gregory O. Griffin, Sr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for Appellee.

TAYLOR, Presiding Judge.

The appellant, Jimmy Charles Dake, pleaded guilty to four violations of § 32-10-2, Code of Alabama 1975, for leaving the scene of an accident. For each conviction, the appellant was sentenced to one year in the penitentiary followed by four years of probation. The sentences were to be served concurrently.

The state's evidence tended to show that on July 3, 1994, the appellant drove his pickup truck into the rear of a mule-pulled wagon in Owens Crossroads, Alabama. All four passengers in the wagon were injured in the collision. One victim suffered a lacerated liver and spleen, one suffered a broken leg, one lost the use of a finger, and one victim sustained a broken foot. The appellant did not attempt to aid these victims and he fled the scene when the police arrived.

I

The appellant contends that his convictions on four counts of "leaving the scene of an accident" violated his constitutional rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, because, he argues, there was only one "leaving." The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in pertinent part:

"No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb...."

(Emphasis added.)

The statute under which the appellant was convicted, § 32-10-2, Code of Alabama 1975, reads as follows:

"The driver of any motor vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or the death of any person or damage to any vehicle which is driven or attended by any person shall give his name, address and the registration number of the vehicle he is driving, shall upon request exhibit his driver's license to the person struck or the driver or occupant of or person attending any motor or other vehicle collided with or damaged and shall render to any person injured in such accident reasonable assistance, including the transportation of, or the making of arrangements for the transportation of such person to a physician or hospital for medical or surgical treatment, if it is apparent that such treatment is necessary or if such transportation is requested by the injured person."

Under this statute, therefore, the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident in which someone is injured or killed must 1) provide a name, address, and vehicle registration number, 2) exhibit a driver's license upon request, and 3) render reasonable assistance to any person injured in the accident. The appellant asserts that he violated these statutorily imposed duties only once. He contends that only one conviction should have been allowed because, he argues, there was only one accident and one criminal act--leaving the scene of the accident without rendering assistance to the victims. The state asserts that four convictions were lawful because the appellant failed to aid four injured people. This is an issue of first impression.

In McKinney v. State, 511 So.2d 220 (Ala.1987), the Alabama Supreme Court applied the principles set out in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), ¹ and its progeny and held that a single criminal act that causes injury to more than one person could constitute more than one offense and support more than one prosecution and conviction. However, the Court stated, " 'To truly adopt the majority view ... multiple convictions should be allowed only for crimes against persons.' " McKinney, 511 So.2d at 225, quoting R. Owens, Alabama's Minority Status: A Single Criminal Act Injuring Multiple Persons Constitutes Only A Single Offense, 16 Cum.L.Rev. 85 (1985-86). The Court in McKinney held that "legislative intent to allow multiple prosecutions for a single act that injures more than one person is determined by the 'description of the unit of prosecution within the substantive criminal law statutes. 16 Cum.L.Rev., supra, at 104.' " McKinney, 511 So.2d at 224. The Court, quoting Owens, further stated:

" 'How, then, should the unit of prosecution be described so that an intent to allow multiple convictions is clear and unequivocal? Instead of using the word "any" to describe the unit of prosecution, the singular words "a" or "another" should be used. An examination, then, should be made of the Alabama Criminal Code to see how the unit of prosecution is described. This examination will disclose whether the code allows multiple convictions.

" 'A review of the criminal code discloses that there are basically four categories into which the statutes can be divided. The first category includes those statutes that prohibit conduct that cannot affect multiple persons or property with a single act. These statutes prohibit such crimes as sex offenses, criminal trespass, burglary, forgery, and escape. The second category contains statutes in which the unit of prosecution is described with the word "any"; based on the above mode of statutory construction, only one conviction should be allowed. This category consists of the following statutes: interference with custody, indecent exposure, enticement of a child to enter a vehicle or house for immoral purposes, possession of burglary tools, criminal possession of explosives, and transportation of stolen property, or property obtained by false pretense into the state.

" 'Under the majority view, the remaining two categories would allow multiple convictions. The third category uses the indefinite article "a" to describe the unit of prosecution, and includes such offenses as arson, offering a false instrument for recording, illegally possessing or fraudulently using a credit or debit card, permitting or facilitating an escape, bribing or intimidating a witness or a juror, promoting prostitution, abandoning a child, and endangering the welfare of a child. The last category uses the descriptive term "another," and incorporates, in addition to the above offenses, all forms of homicide, assault, kidnapping and unlawful imprisonment, theft of property, robbery, and the hindering of the prosecution or the apprehension of an escapee.' "

16 Cum.L.Rev., supra, at 105-07.

McKinney, 511 So.2d at 224-25. (Emphasis added.) Under the above classification scheme, a violation of § 32-10-2 falls into the second category of statutory offenses because the "descriptive unit of prosecution" in that statute is the word "any." See § 32-10-2, supra. Furthermore, "leaving the scene of an accident" is not a crime against the person. For these reasons, we hold that the law of the State of Alabama, as set out in McKinney, prohibits multiple convictions for violations of § 32-10-2.

The conclusion we reach is consistent with caselaw both before and after McKinney. Our research discovered only four cases involving § 32-10-2 where more than one person sustained injuries in the accident. In each case, only one conviction was obtained against the defendant for the offense of leaving the scene of an accident. The most recent case applying McKinney is Turner v. State, 584 So.2d 864 (Ala.Cr.App.1990). See also Lyle v. State, 497 So.2d 834 (Ala.Cr.App.1986); Mann v. State, 473 So.2d 1225 (Ala.Cr.App.1985); and Fretwell v. State, 414 So.2d 1012 (Ala.Cr.App.1982).

Our conclusion is also consistent with our recent holding in Knight v. State, 675 So.2d 487 (Ala.Cr.App.1995), in which we held that...