Daker v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
| Decision Date | 08 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | 1:20-cv-01052 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
| Parties | WASEEM DAKER, Plaintiff, v. STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY, a Subsidiary of STATE FARM INSURANCE, Defendant. |
JOE BILLY McDADE UNITED STATES SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE.
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) filed by Defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, a subsidiary of State Farm Insurance (doc. 40) and a Motion to Sur-Reply filed by Plaintiff Waseem Daker (doc. 48). This matter has been fully briefed and is ripe for review. For the following reasons, the Motion to Sur-Reply is denied and the Motion to Dismiss is granted.
Plaintiff is currently incarcerated in Smith State Prison in Glennville, Georgia (doc. 45 at 4), serving a life sentence for a number of convictions including murder. See in re Daker, No. 1:11-CV-1711, 2014 WL 2548135, at *1 (N.D.Ga. June 5, 2014), aff'd in part, vacated in part Daker v. Warren, 779 Fed.Appx. 654 (11th Cir. 2019).
Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit pro se on February 4, 2020 alleging breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Doc. 1 at 9). In April of the same year, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Original Complaint. (Doc. 5). That Motion was fully briefed, but before the Court resolved the Motion, Plaintiff moved to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 15). The court granted leave. Defendant then moved to dismiss the First Amended Complaint. (Doc. 17). Plaintiff filed a Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (doc. 21) and simultaneously sought leave to file a Second Amended Complaint (doc. 22). Plaintiff argued the proposed amendments added facts pertinent to his claims. (Doc. 22 at 2). Therefore, the Court granted leave. (Doc. 22 at 2). Defendant then moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (doc. 26), and Plaintiff filed a Response to the Motion to Dismiss (doc. 29). The Court dismissed the breach-of-contract claim with leave to amend but dismissed the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim with prejudice. (Doc. 30). Plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint (doc. 39), and Defendant has again moved to dismiss (doc. 40).
Plaintiff claims he has maintained ownership of a home located at 1888 Austin's Pointe Drive in Lawrenceville, Georgia, while incarcerated, and he rented it to two tenants, Willie Hill and Chris Hightower, from July 2016 to June 2017. (Doc. 39 at 2, 4). Plaintiff alleges these tenants “abused and vandalized” his property after Plaintiff obtained a writ of possession against them for not paying rent. (Doc. 39 at 4). Following this, Plaintiff says his brother, Wesam Daker, burglarized his home in January 2018, stealing a pool table, crystal chandelier, thermostat, toilet seats, carpeting, and various appliances. (Doc. 39 at 4-5). Plaintiff also claims his brother damaged his front door, door handles, and towel racks while he was inside the home and then left the front door ajar, allowing animals to enter and cause further damage to the floor and walls. (Doc. 39 at 5).
Plaintiff states he held an insurance policy[1] with Defendant for the property at issue, and he filed two claims after the above incidents: one regarding the damage caused by his two tenants (No. 11-2970-S52) and a second regarding the damage, theft, and loss of rent caused by his brother (No. 11-2970-J36). (Doc. 39 at 5). Defendant denied both claims in February 2018. (Doc. 39 at 5). Pertinent to the claims herein, the Policy contained the following two provisions:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief.” To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must present factual allegations that, accepted as true, “raise a right to relief above the speculative level” to the point of plausibility. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). A plaintiff is not required to anticipate defenses or plead extensive facts or legal theories; rather, the complaint need only contain enough facts “to present a story that holds together.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010). While this requirement presents a low hurdle, a complaint requires “more than labels and conclusions.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 728 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
Determining whether a complaint has met the Rule 8(a)(2) requirement is “a context-specific task that requires a reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 679). On review of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. United States ex rel. Berkowitz v. Automation Aids, Inc., 896 F.3d 834, 839 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Kubiak v. City of Chi., 810 F.3d 476, 480-81). This means “accept[ing] all of the well-pleaded facts as true and ‘draw[ing] all reasonable inferences [from those facts] in favor of the plaintiff.' ” Id. (quoting Kubiak, 810 F.3d at 480-81). In this vein, pro se complaints must be construed liberally and held to a less strict standard than complaints submitted by lawyers. Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011)).
In the instant Motion to Dismiss, Defendant argues Plaintiff's claim is time-barred and inappropriately seeks recovery of punitive damages. (Doc. 40 at 4, 9). Plaintiff argues his claim is not time-barred, asserting a number of defenses including promissory estoppel, equitable estoppel, and equitable tolling. (Doc. 45). Additionally, Plaintiff has sought leave to file a sur-reply. (Doc. 48). The Court will address each issue in turn.
“The decision to permit the filing of a sur[-]reply is purely discretionary and should generally be allowed only for valid reasons, such as when the [non-]movant raises new arguments in a reply brief.” Meraz-Camacho v. United States, 417 Fed.Appx. 558, 559 (7th Cir. 2011). This Court stated a version of that same rule in Cummins, Inc. v. TAS Distrib. Co., Inc., 676 F.Supp.2d 701, 706 (C.D. Ill. 2009), in which it denied a motion to file a sur-reply because no new issues were raised in the reply and the plaintiff merely sought to restate the objections asserted in its response. The same is true here. Defendant's Reply did not assert any new issues; rather, it merely addressed Plaintiff's enforceability, promissory estoppel, equitable estoppel, and equitable tolling arguments. (Docs. 45, 46). For these reasons, the Motion to Sur-Reply is denied. However, even if the Court had granted the Motion to Sur-Reply, nothing contained therein would have affected the outcome.
The general rule is that federal district courts sitting in diversity “apply federal procedural law and state substantive law.” Nat'l Am. Ins. Co. v. Artisan & Truckers Cas. Co., 796 F.3d 717, 723 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Under Erie, “[s]ubstantive law includes statutes of limitations and ‘rules that are an “integral part of the statute of limitations, ” such as tolling and equitable estoppel.' ” McMahan v. Deutsche Bank AG, 892 F.3d 926, 933 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Hollander v. Brown, 457 F.3d 688, 694 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 748 (1980))). The Court must therefore look to Illinois choice-of-law rules to determine whether Illinois or Georgia law applies here. See Spitz v. Proven Winners N. Am., LLC, 759 F.3d 724, 729 (7th Cir. 2014).
Unlike federal law, Illinois courts treat statutes of limitations and the defenses thereto as procedural matters that are “governed by the law of the forum.” Heiman v. Bimbo Foods Bakeries 902 F.3d 715, 718 (7th Cir. 2018); Thomas v. Guardsmark, Inc., 381 F.3d 701, 707 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill.2d 325, 351, 770 N.E.2d 177, 194 (2002)). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff asserts there is a conflict between Illinois and Georgia jurisprudence with respect to limitations defenses, Illinois jurisprudence will control. Nevertheless, the Court concludes the outcome of the instant matter would be the same in either state, as the subsequent analysis will demonstrate.
A timeliness defense is an affirmative defense that may, in some cases, be resolved at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage of proceedings.[2] Indep. Tr. Corp. v. Stewart Info Servs. Corp., 665 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 2012). Generally, whether a claim is time-barred presents questions of fact, and if a question of fact predominates, a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is improper. See Marshall-Mosby v. Corp. Receivables, Inc., 205 F.3d 323, 326 (7th Cir. 2000). Contrarily, “dismissal . . . is appropriate when the complaint alleges facts sufficient to establish that the suit is indeed tardy.” Amin Ijbara Equity Corp. v. Vill. Of Oak Lawn, 860 F.3d 489, 492 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks...
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