Dale v. Wynne
| Decision Date | 24 July 2007 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 2:05cv1179-MHT. |
| Citation | 497 F.Supp.2d 1337 |
| Parties | Bridget DALE, Plaintiff, v. Michael W. WYNNE, Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
Joseph Charles Guillot, McPhillips, Shinbaum & Gill, Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff.
Arthur Kirkpatrick, U.S. Air Force JAG Corps-AFLOA/JACL-EL, Arlington, VA, James Joseph DuBois, R. Randolph Neeley, U.S. Attorney's Office, Montgomery, AL, for Defendant.
Relying on the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-7961, plaintiff Bridget Dale has brought this lawsuit claiming that her former employer, the United States Air Force, sued through defendant Michael Wynne, Secretary of the Air Force, impermissibly discriminated against her because of her weight and impermissibly retaliated against her for filing a disability-discrimination complaint. Dale seeks to recover based on four theories: disparate-treatment disability discrimination, hostile-work environment retaliation, and constructive discharge. Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 794a. For reasons given below, the court will grant the Air Force Secretary's motion for summary judgment.
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Once the party seeking summary judgment has informed the court of the basis for its motion, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate why summary judgment would be inappropriate. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see also Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115-17 (11th Cir.1993) (). In making its determination, the court must view all evidence and any factual inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Thus, at the summary-judgment stage, the court assumes that the facts are as Dale alleges and makes all reasonable inferences in favor of her as the nonmoving party.
Dale was employed by the United States Air Force for 29 years. Her last position, which she held from June 2000 until she resigned on June 13, 2003, was as Chief of Business Operations Flight at Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama. Dale received high appraisals for the eight years before her resignation. During much of this time, Dale was 5'3" tall and she weighed over 300 pounds.
In June 2001, Lt. Col. Ann Marie Sykes was assigned to Dale's division to correct its financial problems. Sykes began to berate her in staff meetings and treat her poorly. Dale believed that, although her weight did not limit her ability to perform her job, Sykes perceived her as having a disability because she was overweight. However, Dale's long history of outstanding appraisals, as well as the sworn testimony of many of her colleagues and subordinates, attested to her ability to train her employees and perform her job well.
The following incidents highlight what Dale believed to be disability discrimination due to her weight:
• During a staff meeting and while looking directly at Dale, Sykes said she was "tired of certain civil service employees sitting around fat, dumb and happy."1
• Sykes suggested Dale work in the golf-course snack bar kitchen.2
• Sykes prevented Dale from transferring to a position at Randolph Air Force Base, Texas, as a swap for an employee at that location.3 Sykes said she did not want to replace one incompetent business flight chief with another.
• Dale requested and was denied a humanitarian transfer to England.4
• Sykes undermined Dale's authority by going outside the chain of command and directly contacting Dale's subordinates when Sykes needed information.
• Sykes removed a major portion of Dale's responsibilities when she appointed Paul Lewis, one of Dale's subordinates, as the Director of Club Operations.
• Sykes said Dale could not train her people.
In June 2002, in an effort to gain Sykes's approval and acceptance, Dale underwent gastric bypass surgery so that she could quickly lose weight. She believed that her image with Sykes would improve if she were a smaller person. Following the surgery, Dale took a six-month leave of absence.
On July 26, 2002, Dale filed an informal complaint of disability discrimination against Sykes. On November 26, 2002, Dale contacted an equal-employment opportunity ("EEO") officer and filed a formal complaint alleging disability discrimination and hostile-work environment.
On January 13, 2003, Dale returned to work to discover that Maj. Matthew Wilson was her new supervisor. At their first meeting, Wilson barely acknowledged Dale's presence and dismissed her from the meeting until later in the day. During their second meeting, the same day, Wilson was very short with Dale and instructed her not to make any personnel changes for 90 days. Since they had never worked together, Dale thought Wilson's treatment of her was very unusual.
Similarly to the way Sykes treated Dale, Wilson also dealt directly with Dale's subordinates, and, as a result, Dale's authority was again undermined by having her supervisor bypass her and go directly to her subordinates. On one particular occasion, Wilson would not allow Dale to discipline another subordinate when the subordinate spoke to Dale in a rude and disrespectful manner. Wilson also had what Dale considered to be an offensive sign in his office that said "Fear, sarcasm and intimidation are acceptable leadership traits when used in moderation." There were also times when Wilson would not allow Dale to manage her organization; told her peer managers he would be the approving official for anything she did; told another manager he could not wait to write Dale's appraisal so he could hold her accountable; and would communicate with Dale only through email.
On March 18, 2003, as a result of Wilson's actions, Dale supplemented her EEO complaint with a claim of retaliation. Dale thought that, because she did not know Wilson until he became her supervisor, the only reason she could think of for his actions toward her was in retaliation for her November 2002 EEO complaint.
Dale became depressed about having to work in what she believed was a hostilework environment. On March 13, 2003, she went on extended sick leave, during which time a clinical psychologist diagnosed her with "anxiety secondary to thoughts of returning to the workplace." In May 2003, even though her psychologist cleared Dale to return to work, Dale resigned because she could not handle the alleged harassment and retaliation she experienced at work.
Dale brings four claims against the Air Force Secretary disparate-treatment disability discrimination, hostile-work environment, retaliation, and constructive discharge. She brings disability-discrimination and hostile-work-environment claims based on Sykes's conduct towards her, and retaliation and constructive-discharge claims based on Wilson's conduct towards her.5 The court will address each of Dale's claims below.
Dale first contends that Sykes discriminated against her based on an erroneous perception that Dale's weight substantially limited her ability to perform as Chief of Business Operations; whereas, the Air Force Secretary denies Sykes perceived Dale as being disabled and that Sykes discriminated against her based on her weight. The Secretary further argues that obesity is not a disability that is protected by the Rehabilitation Act.
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 "prohibits federal agencies from discriminating in employment against otherwise qualified individuals with a disability." Mullins v. Crowell, 228 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2000). Discrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act, are governed by the same standards used in cases brought under the Americans with Disability Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117, 12203. Cash v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir.2000). Accordingly, "[c]ases decided under the Rehabilitation Act are precedent for cases under the ADA and vice-versa." Id. at 1305 n. 2.
The Rehabilitation Act covers a plaintiff whose employer regards her as being disabled, even if she does not have an actual disability. 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B)(3). In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999), in interpreting the ADA, the Supreme Court explained that a claim falls within the "regarded as" category when either "(1) a[n employer] mistakenly believes that a person has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or (2) a[n employer] mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities." 527 U.S. at 489, 119 S.Ct. 2139. "In both cases, it is necessary that a covered entity entertain misperceptions about the individual — it must believe either that one has a substantially limiting impairment that one does not have or that one has a substantially limiting impairment when, in fact, the impairment is not so limiting." Id. And, in both of the two Sutton categories, the perceived physical impairment must be one that is covered under the Act. EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 463 F.3d 436, 441 n. 2 (6th Cir.2006); Andrews v. State of Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 807 (6th Cir. 1997); Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 285.(2d Cir.1997).
Dale contends that, because she was overweight, Sykes regarded her...
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