Daley v. Allstate Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 13 May 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 15585-4-III,15585-4-III |
| Citation | 86 Wn.App. 346,936 P.2d 1185 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Paul DALEY, Appellant, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign insurance company, Respondent. Panel Four |
William L. Hames, Kennewick, for Appellant.
Scott A. Bruns, Blaine G. Gibson, Dohn, Talbott, Simpson, Gibson & Davis, Yakima, for Respondent.
Paul Daley appeals the summary dismissal of his claim for coverage under the underinsured motorist provision of his policy with Allstate Insurance Company. He contends the superior court incorrectly concluded the policy did not provide coverage for the emotional injuries he claims. Mr. Daley also requests attorney fees because of Allstate's denial of coverage. We reverse and award attorney fees.
Mr. Daley was a Benton County sheriff's deputy on January 17, 1990, when he stopped his police vehicle to assist a man whose motorcycle had stopped running. State Patrol Trooper Raymond Hawn 1 also stopped and parked his vehicle behind Mr. Daley's, across Wine Country Road from the motorcycle. As the two officers were talking with the motorcyclist, a car driven by Jan Spencer "clipped" Mr. Daley and "struck" Trooper Hawn. Trooper Hawn suffered massive head and internal injuries and later died. Mr. Daley's physical injuries were relatively less serious, but he suffers from continuing emotional or psychological problems, including depression and post-traumatic stress disorder.
Mr. Daley apparently obtained the policy limits of Ms. Spencer's liability insurance policy, and he then sought additional compensation under the underinsured motorist (UIM) provision of his Allstate policy. The UIM provision provided in pertinent part:
We will pay damages for bodily injury or property damage which an insured person is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle. Injury must be caused by accident and arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of an underinsured motor vehicle. Bodily injury means bodily injury, sickness, disease or death. Property damages means injury to or destruction of property.
Allstate refused to provide benefits under this provision, and Mr. Daley filed this action. On Allstate's motion for summary judgment, the superior court agreed the term "bodily injury" does not include emotional or psychological damages. Mr. Daley appeals the court's summary dismissal.
In this context, our inquiry is the same as the superior court's. Our Lady of Lourdes Hosp. v. Franklin County, 120 Wash.2d 439, 451, 842 P.2d 956 (1993). Summary judgment is proper only when the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, show there is no issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c); Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wash.2d 434, 437, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982). We resolve all reasonable inferences from the evidence against the moving party and grant summary judgment only if reasonable people could reach only one conclusion. Detweiler v. J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co., 110 Wash.2d 99, 108, 751 P.2d 282 (1988).
The primary issue in this case is whether Allstate's UIM policy covered Mr. Daley's emotional injuries. RCW 48.22.030(2) requires insurers to offer coverage for damages from underinsured motor vehicles. An underinsured motor vehicle is
a motor vehicle with respect to the ownership, maintenance, or use of which either no bodily injury or property damage liability bond or insurance policy applies at the time of an accident, or with respect to which the sum of the limits of liability under all bodily injury or property damage liability bonds and insurance policies applicable to a covered person after an accident is less than the applicable damages which the covered person is legally entitled to recover.
RCW 48.22.030(1). Policies issued under this statute "allow[ ] an injured party to recover those damages which the injured party would have received had the responsible party been insured with liability limits as broad as the injured party's statutorily mandated underinsured motorist coverage limits." Britton v. Safeco Ins. Co., 104 Wash.2d 518, 531, 707 P.2d 125 (1985); see Hamilton v. Farmers Ins. Co., 107 Wash.2d 721, 727, 733 P.2d 213 (1987).
An initial question is whether Washington tort law permits Mr. Daley to recover for his emotional injuries. In other words, if Mr. Daley were not legally entitled to recover damages from Ms. Spencer, he would have no claim for coverage under the policy's UIM provision.
Historically, the law created "numerous artificial boundaries" limiting recovery for emotional damages in various circumstances. Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash.2d 424, 434, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976). These boundaries are partly a result of concerns that "claims of mental harm will be falsified or imagined." W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts § 54, at 361 (5th ed.1984) (hereafter Prosser).
In Washington and elsewhere, however, emotional damages accompanying a physical injury are recognized as a proper (if "parasitic") element of recovery. Hunsley, 87 Wash.2d at 428, 553 P.2d 1096; see 16 David K. DeWolf & Keller W. Allen, Washington Practice, Tort Law and Practice § 4.5, at 78 (1993) (hereafter DeWolf); Prosser, supra, § 54, at 362-63; 4 Stuart M. Speiser et al., The American Law of Torts § 16:1, at 943-44 (1987); see, e.g., Green v. Floe, 28 Wash.2d 620, 636-37, 183 P.2d 771 (1947); Redick v. Peterson, 99 Wash. 368, 370, 169 P. 804 (1918). In this case, Mr. Daley was physically injured in the accident, so he is entitled to compensation for emotional injuries that also arose from the accident.
Allstate contends, nevertheless, that Mr. Daley's emotional injuries were a consequence, not of his own injuries, but of his witnessing of Trooper's Hawn's death. Perhaps understandably, psychological evaluations do not make this distinction clear; if the difference were pertinent to the analysis here, it is a factual issue that would preclude summary judgment.
However, the distinction is unimportant in this case for two reasons. First, Mr. Daley's physical injuries alleviate the law's historical suspicion of emotional injuries generally. Because his emotional injuries flow directly from the same act that caused his physical injuries, there is no apparent reason to deny recovery for the emotional injuries.
Second, even if it were possible for a fact finder to segregate Mr. Daley's emotional injuries into two classes (one of which includes those resulting from witnessing his fellow officer's death), he would be entitled to recover for those as well. The law permits recovery by "plaintiffs who are actually placed in peril by the defendant's negligent conduct and [by] family members present at the time who fear for the one imperiled." Cunningham v. Lockard, 48 Wash.App. 38, 45, 736 P.2d 305 (1987); see DeWolf, supra, § 4.27, at 93; see also Gain v. Carroll Mill Co., 114 Wash.2d 254, 787 P.2d 553 (1990). Certainly Mr. Daley was placed in peril by Ms. Spencer's conduct, and he is entitled to recover for his resulting emotional injuries on that basis.
Dictum from the Supreme Court's decision in Washburn v. Beatt Equip. Co., 120 Wash.2d 246, 289, 840 P.2d 860 (1992) illustrates this point. In that case, the plaintiff sued for injuries he suffered from an explosion; he sought at trial to admit photographs of a coworker who died in the explosion, and the defense objected that the photos were irrelevant. Id. at 289, 840 P.2d 860. Although the Supreme Court resolved the question on another ground, it noted:
Defendant says that in order to assert a claim for emotional distress suffered as a result of viewing injuries to a third person, that person must be a family member, citing Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash.2d 52, 60, 530 P.2d 291, 77 A.L.R.3d 436 (1975).
... [T]he contention is without merit. Grimsby concerns claims for emotional distress damages resulting from conduct directed at a third party. Plaintiff seeks damages for injury to himself resulting from conduct affecting him directly, and part of what happened in the explosion was plaintiff's seeing his co-worker burn to death while he was close enough to try to put the flames out.
Similarly here, Mr. Daley seeks damages for emotional injuries resulting from conduct that affected him directly, and a part of what happened to him was seeing his fellow officer suffer mortal injuries. The law permits Mr. Daley to recover his emotional injuries in this circumstance.
Washington's UIM statute demonstrates a "strong public policy of assuring protection to the innocent victims of automobile accidents...." Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Wiscomb, 97 Wash.2d 203, 207, 643 P.2d 441 (1982). Courts therefore liberally construe the statute to permit persons to recover from their UIM insurers "those damages which they would be entitled to recover from the responsible parties." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hammonds, 72 Wash.App. 664, 671, 865 P.2d 560 (citing Britton, 104 Wash.2d at 522, 707 P.2d 125), review denied, 124 Wash.2d 1010, 879 P.2d 292 (1994). Because Mr. Daley would be entitled to compensation from Ms. Spencer for his emotional injuries, this public policy favors construing the statute to require Allstate to provide coverage for those injuries under its UIM policy.
However, Allstate contends that, even if Mr. Daley had a right to compensation from Ms. Spencer for his emotional injuries, its UIM clause does not provide coverage because it is expressly limited to "bodily injury or property damage." The precise question raised in this case, then, is whether, in light of the public policy favoring coverage for these injuries, Allstate's UIM clause should be interpreted to exclude damages from emotional injuries.
Interpretation of insurance contracts is a question of law, and "policies are 'given a fair, reasonable,...
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Daley v. Allstate Ins. Co.
...Court of Appeals, however, reversed finding that Daley could recover damages for his emotional injuries. See Daley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 86 Wash.App. 346, 936 P.2d 1185 (1997). The court reasoned that emotional or psychological injuries suffered as a direct result of an incident that also c......
- Daley v. Allstate Ins. Co.