Dalhoff Construction Company v. Maurice

Decision Date27 April 1908
Citation110 S.W. 218,86 Ark. 162
PartiesDALHOFF CONSTRUCTION COMPANY v. MAURICE
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

Appeal from Arkansas Chancery Court; John M. Elliott, Chancellor reversed.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

H. F Auten, for appellant.

Pugh & Wiley, for appellee.

OPINION

HILL, C. J.

Maurice filed suit in chancery court against the Dalhoff Construction Company, the St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company and Martin & Boyd, seeking to recover under a contract between Maurice and the Dalhoff Construction Company, and also for material furnished Martin & Boyd, which it was alleged the Dalhoff Construction Company assumed the payment of, and to enforce a lien against the railway company.

The Iron Mountain Railway Company was building a line of railroad in the eastern part of the State, crossing the Arkansas and White rivers near their mouths, and the Dalhoff Construction Company was the contractor. Maurice was a subcontractor under the construction company on trestle work between the Arkansas and White rivers. Maurice sued the construction company, and obtained judgment and a lien on the railroad. This is an appeal by the construction company as to three items allowed, and a cross appeal by Maurice for one item disallowed.

The first item is for $ 1,891.68 for putting on 7,882 lineal feet of capping at 24 cents per lineal foot. So much of the contract as is material to that point reads as follows: "Said F. W. Maurice, known throughout this agreement as contractor, hereby agrees to and with the Dalhoff Construction Company, known throughout this agreement and referred to as the company, to do and perform all the furnishing, driving and capping all piles, trestle work between the Arkansas and White rivers, on the Memphis, Helena & Louisiana Railroad. * * * For and in consideration of said work being duly performed and completed as provided, and so accepted by said engineer, said company are to pay contractors as follows: For driving and capping, twenty-four cents per lineal foot, the company to furnish all caps and necessary iron work for construction and transportation of labor and material."

Maurice contended, and was sustained by the chancery court, that he should have twenty-four cents per lineal foot for placing the caps on the piling. The construction company contends that the twenty-four cents included driving and capping the piles, as well as furnishing them. Each party has produced evidence tending to corroborate his theory, but the question depends upon a construction of the contract, and testimony of what was done under it could not be considered unless it was ambiguous. When this testimony is turned to to aid the construction of the contract, it is found to be conflicting, and there is little, if any, light thrown upon the question by it. The contract is not ambiguous, but stipulates that Maurice was to furnish the piles and drive and cap them for twenty-four cents per lineal foot, and that the company was to furnish the caps. These caps were necessarily placed upon the piles after they were driven, and were a part of the permanent structure of the trestle. The court erred in making a separate allowance for the capping.

The next question is as to the interest. The decree was for $ 4,647.34, and the court allowed interest from the time of the last estimate,...

To continue reading

Request your trial
5 cases
  • Brown v. Lemay
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • November 20, 1911
    ...parol testimony tending to vary, change, add to or subtract from the terms of the written instrument. 94 Ark. 130; 88 Ark. 213; 86 Ark. 162, 164; 83 Ark. 163; 80 Ark. 508, 509; 67 Ark. 62; 30 Ark. 186, 197. 2. The first instruction of the court ignores an element vital to plaintiff's case, ......
  • Burel v. East Arkansas Lumber Company
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • May 7, 1917
    ...does not come into court with "clean hands." "There were overcharges and an attempt to skin the owner. No interest should be allowed. 86 Ark. 162. Fuhr & Futrell and Ponder, Gibson & Ponder, for appellee. 1. No personal judgment was intended against Mrs. Burel, and really there is none. 2. ......
  • Hockaday v. Warmack
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • January 3, 1916
    ...Id. 9. This is a memorandum of a sale of land in writing. It was definite, complete, certain and unambiguous and required no explanation. 86 Ark. 162; 95 131; 100 Id. 360; 17 Cyc. 610. To add to the consideration would be to vary its terms. 3. Evidence of what occurred in an effort to compr......
  • Bigham v. Dover
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • May 25, 1908
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT