Dall. Hous. Auth. v. Nelson
| Decision Date | 19 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 05-13-00818-CV,05-13-00818-CV |
| Parties | DALLAS HOUSING AUTHORITY, Appellant v. KIMBERLY NELSON, Appellee |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Texas |
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 Dallas County, Texas
Before Justices Lang, Stoddart, and Schenck
Opinion by Justice Schenck
Appellant Dallas Housing Authority ("DHA") sought to evict appellee Kimberly Nelson from an apartment in Little Mexico Village for nonpayment of rent. The justice court's judgment in favor of DHA included rent due in the amount of $3,172. On de novo appeal to the trial court, DHA again sought eviction and past due rent. Nelson alleged retaliation by DHA. After a bench trial, the trial court rendered judgment for Nelson. In four issues, DHA contends the trial court erred by awarding a statutory penalty and attorney's fees to Nelson. We affirm the trial court's judgment. Because all issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
Nelson and DHA entered into a one-year lease agreement dated September 30, 2011, for an apartment in the Little Mexico development in Dallas. The lease provided for monthly rent of $154.00 to be paid on the first of each month. On August 13, 2012, DHA filed a complaint for forcible detainer in the justice court, alleging that Nelson owed $3,172.00 in unpaid rent, and seeking possession of the premises.
The justice court granted the relief sought by DHA in a judgment dated August 24, 2012. In the de novo appeal to the trial court, Nelson alleged that DHA retaliated against her in violation of the Texas Property Code. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.331(a) (West 2014) (retaliation by landlord); see also TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.335 (). In her operative pleading, Nelson alleged that DHA had filed three previous eviction suits against her in 2011 and 2012 for nonpayment of rent and "non-lease violations." She alleged that she prevailed in all three cases, and in one of the cases was awarded attorney's fees after the court found that DHA had retaliated against her. Nelson further alleged that she lost her job in December 2011, and since January 2012, had sought to reduce her rent as allowed under the lease "if Tenant has a decrease in income . . . that will last 30 days or longer." She alleged that DHA "wholly failed to respond" to her request and instead filed eviction suits for nonpayment of rent. Although Nelson pleaded for sanctions and attorney's fees, DHA did not file a plea in abatement or otherwise assert its immunity from suit or immunity from liability on Nelson's claims.
At the bench trial, the trial court heard testimony from Nelson and from Latonya Smith, the assistant manager for DHA at Little Mexico Village. Nelson testified that during the pendency of the third eviction suit, she paid her rent into the registry of the court because DHA would not accept her payments. The primary factual dispute was whether DHA had providedNelson the requisite forms to process her request for reduction of rent and whether Nelson had completed and returned them. Smith testified Nelson had neither requested nor completed the three required forms. Nelson testified she notified DHA of her job loss by certified letter. She also testified she completed and returned the one form DHA provided.
The trial court rendered judgment for Nelson, ruling that DHA "failed to meet its burden" and should take nothing. The trial court's judgment further recited that Nelson met her burden on her retaliation claim "and is entitled to $154.00 plus $500.00 and an award of reasonable and necessary attorney's fees." See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.333 (). The court found reasonable and necessary attorney's fees to be $3,500 for trial, and made additional findings regarding attorney's fees for post-trial motions and appeal. This appeal followed.
DHA challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's judgment. When, as here, no findings of fact or conclusions of law are timely requested or filed, we imply all necessary findings in support of the trial court's judgment. Roberson v. Robinson, 768 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Tex. 1989) (per curiam). However, when a reporter's record is included in the record on appeal, the implied findings may be challenged for legal and factual sufficiency. See id. We review implied findings by the same standards we use in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury's answers or a trial court's fact findings. Id. In conducting a legal sufficiency review, we must determine whether the evidence would enable the factfinder to reach the determination under review. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). We will not disturb a finding for factual insufficiency unless the evidence in support of the finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong andmanifestly unjust. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001). In the absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law, the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed if it can be upheld on any available legal theory that finds support in the evidence. Point Lookout West, Inc. v. Whorton, 742 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Tex. 1987) (per curiam).
DHA's issues also present questions of law. We review the trial court's ruling on questions of law de novo. See, e.g., Ferry v. Sackett, 204 S.W.3d 911, 912 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.).
In its first issue, DHA contends the trial court erred by ruling that DHA failed to meet its burden of proving that Nelson breached the lease. We construe DHA's contention to be that it proved Nelson's breach of lease as a matter of law. See, e.g., Croucher v. Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. 1983) (). DHA contends the evidence established that Nelson's rent for July 2012 was due on July 1, 2012, and was late after July 5, 2012. DHA points to a provision in the lease that failure to pay rent on time is a ground for lease termination. On July 16, 2012, DHA gave Nelson notice that her lease would be terminated in fourteen days for failure to pay rent in the amount of $3,172.00. On July 31, 2012, DHA gave Nelson notice to vacate her apartment within three days. On August 13, 2012, DHA filed its forcible detainer action, alleging Nelson failed to pay rent for August, and seeking rent in the amount of $3,172.00. DHA also argues that a grievance hearing was held on July 18, 2012, at which a panel of tenants decided that Nelson had breached the lease and should be evicted.
The evidence was also undisputed, however, that Nelson had been paying rent into the registry of the court during the pendency of the prior detainer action, and that several months'rent remained in the court's registry. Final judgment (in Nelson's favor) in the prior case was not rendered until July 13, 2012. Nelson testified that she paid the July rent into the registry of the court on July 30. In addition, the parties vigorously disputed whether Nelson was entitled to a reduction of rent after she lost her job. The lease provided that "DHA will process an interim reduction in rent if Tenant has a decrease in income or change in household composition or circumstances that will last 30 days or longer." Nelson testified that the grievance hearing did not address or resolve her request for reduction in rent. Smith testified that Nelson did not provide adequate information to process her request, while Nelson testified to the contrary. Some of the parties' correspondence was admitted into evidence at trial.
Thus, the question whether Nelson breached the lease was vigorously disputed at trial. DHA claimed Nelson owed over $3,000 in rent in its notice of termination. Nelson, however, claimed she was due a reduction in rent some six or seven months before her alleged breach, and the evidence is undisputed that she paid several months' rent into the registry of the court in the course of DHA's forcible detainer action already pending against her. She prevailed in that action. In sum, there were factual disputes regarding the timing and amount of Nelson's rent payments due under her lease. The trial court was the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the evidence. Altus Brands II, LLC v. Alexander, 435 S.W.3d 432, 440 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.). There was evidence to support the trial court's ruling. We cannot say that DHA established the contrary proposition as a matter of law. See Croucher, 660 S.W.2d at 58. We overrule DHA's first issue.1
DHA's second and third issues relate to Nelson's claim that DHA retaliated against her. In its second issue, DHA contends Nelson produced no evidence in support of her claim of retaliation. Citing section 92.331 of the Property Code, DHA argues that Nelson was required to establish that DHA took retaliatory action against her within six months after a protected act. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.331(a). DHA contends that there was no evidence of any protected act, and no evidence of any retaliatory action. DHA argues the only mention of retaliation was in Nelson's pleadings, which are not evidence. DHA also contends that it took only lawful actions to evict Nelson and terminate her lease for nonpayment of rent, and that its failure to process her rent reduction was due to Nelson's own failure to provide the required paperwork. DHA concludes that its lawful actions do not constitute retaliation as a matter of law.
Chapter 92 of the Texas Property Code prohibits retaliation by a landlord against a tenant and provides that retaliation is an absolute defense in a...
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