Dallas County Civil Service Com'n v. Warren, 04-98-00159-CV
| Decision Date | 03 March 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 04-98-00159-CV,04-98-00159-CV |
| Citation | 988 S.W.2d 864 |
| Parties | DALLAS COUNTY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and Dallas County, Appellants, v. Betty Jean WARREN, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Jana Marie Prigmore, Assistant District Attorney, Bill Hill, Criminal District Attorney, Dallas, for Appellant.
Ronald E. Harden, The Hardin Law Firm, L.L.P., Terrell, Alfred L. Ruebel, Erhand, Ruebel & Jennings, P.C., Dallas, for Appellee.
Before PHIL HARDBERGER, Chief Justice, TOM RICKHOFF, Justice and ALMA L. LOPEZ, Justice.
The Dallas County Civil Service Commission ("Commission") and Dallas County ("County") appeal a judgment in favor of Betty Jean Warren ("Warren") in an appeal from the Commission's decision upholding the termination of Warren's employment by the County. At the hearing before the Commission, the burden of proof was erroneously imposed on Warren, then, on appeal to the trial court, the trial court erroneously submitted the substantial evidence issue to the jury. Given this combination of errors, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the cause to the trial court with instructions to: (1) award Warren only those attorneys' fees arising from her due process claim; and (2) remand the cause to the Commission for another hearing with instructions to apply the proper burden of proof.
Warren was hired by Dallas County to work as a secretary in the juvenile section of the public defenders office in April of 1990. Warren was the only secretary in the section, and she worked for six attorneys.
During Warren's initial six month probationary period, her supervisor, Elizabeth Parmer, documented various problems with Warren's work product. In addition, Parmer documented Warren's failure to attend mandatory staff meetings. Toward the end of Warren's probationary period, Parmer approached the head of the public defenders office, Carl Hayes, requesting that Warren be terminated. As a compromise, Hayes decided to extend Warren's probationary period an additional six months. After the additional six months, Warren was removed from probationary status, and her subsequent performance evaluations rated her as competent. In addition, she was given a letter of commendation from the supervisor that replaced Parmer in 1993, Sandra Harward.
In 1994, several incidents occurred which culminated in Warren's dismissal. In May of 1994, an intern called to say that she would be late. Warren failed to relay the message to Hayes, which almost resulted in the intern's dismissal. Warren explained that the intern arrived at the office before Hayes and that she told the intern that she had not relayed the message because she had not seen Hayes.
On June 9, 1994, an attorney called and asked Warren whether she had any cases on her docket that day because the attorney was sick and wanted to stay home. Warren informed her that she did not have any cases; however, Hayes subsequently received a phone call from a judge in whose court the attorney was scheduled to appear. As a result, Hayes and another attorney had to handle the case unprepared. Warren explained that she looked at the docket on the attorney's desk as instructed, but the docket that was on the attorney's desk was for the wrong day. In addition to the mistake regarding the docket, Warren was unable to find the client's file who was scheduled to appear in court. Warren explained that the file was misplaced by a co-worker who Warren was cross-training.
Hayes adopted a policy that prohibited smoking within the building. This policy was more stringent that the policy adopted by the County; however, Hayes had the discretion to adopt such a policy. Warren and a few other employees continued to smoke in vacant offices in violation of this policy. Warren also encouraged other employees to continue smoking in the vacant offices. Warren testified that she did not encourage other employees to continue smoking in violation of the policy.
Warren was given several verbal warnings and a written warning regarding her actions in documenting the absences and timeliness of another employee, Belinda Jimenez. Warren admitted that she kept notes regarding the time she was required to cover as receptionist for Jimenez because it required her to be away from her desk. Warren also admitted that she inquired into whether Jimenez had ever been placed on suspension because of problems regarding her tardiness. However, Warren denied that she kept a "secret file" on Jimenez.
On June 3, 1994, Warren's supervisor, Mike Morrow, met with her to counsel her regarding these incidents and her work performance. Morrow informed Warren that any future problems could affect her continued employment.
On June 15, 1994, Hayes gave Warren a memorandum regarding the incident involving the attorney who was told that she did not have any cases on her docket when she called in sick. The memorandum stated that any future "foul-ups" would be dealt with severely, and any further "cover-ups" would result in unconditional termination.
On June 17, 1994, Warren sent out discovery to be filed before it was signed by the attorney. The discovery was also sent without the required attachments. Warren attempted to blame another employee but admitted to a different employee that she had left out the attachments. Warren stated that she was following instructions and that it was the fault of the person who was instructed to file and deliver the documents.
On June 24, 1994, Warren typed a report for an attorney that contained mistakes and omissions. Warren testified that she was only asked to prepare a report by putting a written list into alphabetical order. Warren contended that the errors and omissions could have been in the original list which was not presented as evidence.
Warren was terminated on July 15, 1994. She filed a grievance with the Commission. At the hearing, Warren was instructed that she had the burden of proving to the panel that her termination should be overturned. At the end of the hearing, a County employee was instructed by a commissioner to attempt to locate a position for Warren with the County. On October 19, 1994, Warren was notified that the Commission had decided not to take any action to overturn the termination. Warren then appealed to the trial court.
The trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of Warren on her due process claim based on the Commission's improper placement of the burden of proof at the Commission hearing. The trial court submitted the issue of whether Warren's dismissal was justified and whether Warren was terminated because of her race to the jury. The jury found that the Commission and the County had failed to prove by substantial evidence that Warren's dismissal was justified; however, the jury found that Warren was not terminated based on her race. The jury awarded damages for the unjust dismissal and the violation of Warren's due process rights. The Commission and the County appeal from the trial court's judgment, asserting the following seven points of error: (1) the issue of whether substantial evidence supported the Commission's decision should have been decided by the trial court as a matter of law not by the jury; (2) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury's finding that Warren's dismissal was not justified; (3) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury's finding of actual damages with regard to Warren's unjust dismissal claim; 1 (4) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's finding that Warren was denied her right to due process; (5) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury's finding of actual damages based on Warren's due process claim; 2 (6) the trial court improperly rendered judgment based on separate theories for the same measure of damages; and (7) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the finding that Warren is entitled to recover attorneys' fees of $72,374.50.
In their first point of error, the Commission and the County assert that the issue of whether Warren's dismissal was justified should have been decided by the trial court based on the substantial evidence rule as a matter of law, and not by the jury. Warren counters that the issue was properly submitted to the jury because her petition raised claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Fourteenth Amendment, and common law.
Although Warren's petition did raise numerous claims, the unjust dismissal question that was submitted to the jury was a question regarding whether the Commission's decision was supported by substantial evidence. Instruction number one of the jury charge reads:
Plaintiff appealed the finding of the Dallas County Civil Service Commission which upheld her termination. The burden of proof is on Defendants to show there was substantial evidence to support the Commission's finding. "Substantial evidence" may be defined as such evidence as will convince reasonable men and on which they may not reasonably differ, that is, competent evidence such as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion or justify a decision. It does not include perjured, incredible or unreasonable testimony.
Jury question number 1 then inquires: "Did Defendants prove by substantial evidence that Plaintiff's dismissal was justified?" The question does not relate to a section 1983 claim, a Fourteenth Amendment claim or a common law claim. Rather, the question is clearly directed at the Commission's decision and whether it was supported by substantial evidence. 3
A county employee who is removed from his or her position on a final decision of a commission may appeal the commission's decision by filing a petition in district court. TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 158.012 (Vernon 1988). Although section...
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