Dallas County Water Control & Imp. Dist. No. 3 v. City of Dallas

• Decision Date: 11 October 1950
• Docket Number: No. A-2629,No. 3,3,A-2629
• Parties: DALLAS COUNTY WATER CONTROL AND IMP. DIST., et al. v. CITY OF DALLAS, et al.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 291

233 S.W.2d 291

149 Tex. 362

DALLAS COUNTY WATER CONTROL AND IMP. DIST. No. 3, et al. v. CITY OF DALLAS, et al.

No. A-2629.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Oct. 11, 1950.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 8, 1950.

Marie McCutcheon, Claude D. Bell, Jr., Dallas, Vinson, Elkins & Weems and Victor W. Bouldin, all of Houston, for appellants.

H. P. Kucera, City Atty., and H. Louis Nichols, Asst. City Atty., Dallas, for appellees.

HART, Justice.

On December 30, 1949, the City Council of the City of Dallas passed an ordinance extending the city limits so as to include all of the territory theretofore included in Dallas County Water Control and Improvement District No. 3, and on March 7, 1950, the City Council passed another ordinance fixing March 17, 1950, as the date on which the City of Dallas would take over the District and the District would be abolished. Appellants, being the District and certain residents of the territory annexed, brought this suit against the City and the Mayor and City Council of Dallas, asking for an injunction against the enforcement of these ordinances on the ground that Article 1175, paragraph 2, and Article 1182c-1, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes, under which the ordinances were adopted, are unconstitutional. The district court denied the appellants temporary injunctive relief and on the cross-action of the City of Dallas issued a mandatory injunction ordering the directors of the District to deliver its property and records to the City. The appellants brought the case to this Court by direct appeal under Article V, Section 3-b, of the Texas Constitution, Vernon's Ann.St., Article 1738a, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes, and Rule 499-a, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

The City of Dallas is a home rule city and in adopting the annexation ordinance of December 30, 1949, followed the procedure prescribed by the Dallas city charter in conformity with the provisions of Article 1175. On this appeal the only question regarding the validity of the annexation ordinance is as to the constitutionality in this respect of Article 1175, paragraph 2.

In 1912 the voters of Texas adopted the 'Home Rule Amendment', Article XI, Sec. 5, of our Constitution, relating to the government of cities of more than five thousand inhabitants. In 1913 the Legislature passed an 'enabling act', Chapter 147, Acts 33rd Legislature, Regular Session, p. 307, which was designed, according to Section 10 of the Act, to provide a means whereby the cities affected thereby could 'avail themselves of the constitutional amendment recently adopted'. Section 4 of this statute provided in part as follows:

'Sec. 4. That by the provisions of this Act it is contemplated to bestow upon any city adopting the charter or amendment hereunder the full power of local self government, and among the other powers that may be exercised by any such city, the following are hereby enumerated for greater certainty:

'The power to fix the boundary limits of said city, to provide for the extension of said boundary limits and the annexation of additional territory lying adjacent to said city, according to such rules as may be provided by said charter.'

With slight changes in the wording of the first paragraph the quoted sections of the statute are now found in Article 1175, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes, the second paragraph expressly conferring the power to extend the city limits and to annex territory being copied exactly from the original statute in paragraph 2 of Article 1175.

Since the adoption of the Home Rule Amendment and the enabling act, many cities have taken advantage of the authority conferred upon them to extend their limits and to annex additional territory. In some cases the annexation proceedings have been attacked, and in all such cases coming before this Court the validity of the statutory provisions quoted above has been upheld expressly or by necessary implication. Cases so holding include Eastham v. Steinhagen, 111 Tex. 597, 243 S.W. 457; City of Waco v. Higginson, Tex.Com.App., 243 S.W. 1078; Tod v. City of Houston, Tex.Com.App., 276 S.W. 419; City of Wichita Falls v. Bowen, 143 Tex. 45, 182 S.W.2d 695, 154 A.L.R. 1434; City of Houston v. State ex rel. City of West University Place, 142 Tex. 190, 176 S.W.2d 928; Beyer v. Templeton, 147 Tex. 94, 212 S.W.2d 134. See also Cohen v. City of Houston, Tex.Civ.App., 176 S.W. 809 (writ of error refused) and Id. 205 S.W. 757 (writ of error refused).

The particular contention that the appellants stress in this case is their claim that Article 1175, paragraph 2, is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to municipal corporations. This contention, however, is answered by the language quoted with approval by this Court in City of Houston v. State ex rel. City of University Place, 142 Tex. 190, 195, 176 S.W.2d 928, 931: 'Now the power of a Home Rule City to fix its boundaries is the power to legislate. Prior to the adoption of the Home Rule Amendment to the State Constitution, the Legislature could fix or alter the boundaries of an incorporated city, and it was held in Graham v. City of Greenville, 67 Tex. 62, 2 S.W. 742, that such power was not restricted by the State Constitution. The Home Rule Amendment took this legislative power from the Legislature and conferred it upon cities which adopted a Home Rule Charter. Of course, in altering their boundaries cities must observe the procedure prescribed by the enabling act.'

Under the reasoning adopted by this Court in the language just quoted, the Constitution itself, in the Home Rule Amendment, gives home rule cities the power to fix and extend their boundaries. Whether, in the absence of the Home Rule Amendment, the Legislature could have delegated this power to municipalities without fixing more definite standards than are contained in Article 1175, is a question which is not before us. The delegation of power involved in this case is not unconstitutional, because under the construction of the Home Rule Amendment approved by this Court, there is authority in the Constitution itself for the exercise of this legislative power by home rule cities. It seems evident that one object of the adoption of the Home Rule Amendment was to empower home rule cities to exercise legislative powers theretofore exercised by the Legislature, subject to limitations which the Legislature might impose by general law. We adhere to the view we have heretofore approved, that one of the powers intended to be conferred on home rule cities by the Home Rule Amendment is the power to fix and extend their boundaries and to annex additional territory, subject to limitations contained in the general laws.

We do not regard...