Dalton v. Clanton

Decision Date20 December 1988
Citation559 A.2d 1197
PartiesJoseph F. DALTON, Sr., Respondent Below, Appellant, v. Linda J. CLANTON, Petitioner Below, Appellee. . Submitted:
CourtSupreme Court of Delaware

Roderick R. McKelvie and Regina A. Iorii of Ashby, McKelvie & Geddes, Wilmington, for appellant.

Everett P. Priestley of Priestley & Joseph, Wilmington, for appellee.

Before CHRISTIE, C.J., and MOORE and HOLLAND, JJ.

HOLLAND, Justice:

This is an appeal from a decision by the Family Court. The issues presented in this appeal relate back to a decision of the Superior Court, which had reversed an earlier decision by the Family Court. 1 When the Superior Court reversed the initial decision of the Family Court, it held that Joseph F. Dalton ("Father") was obligated to provide support for two of his sons. One of these sons, Joseph, Jr., was an adult. The other son, Jason, was a minor. 2

The statutory criteria which must be considered by the Family Court before entering a support order are set forth in 13 In this case, the Family Court deviated from the Melson Formula in entering its original support order, concerning the minor son, Jason. As a result of that deviation, the Family Court's order was reversed. When the Superior Court remanded this case to the Family Court, it directed the Family Court to use the Melson Formula in determining the amount of support the Father was obligated to pay for Jason.

                Del.C. § 514.  However, in an effort to discharge its statutory obligations on a uniform basis, the Family Court has adopted a procedure in support cases, known as the "Melson Formula."   In fact, the Family Court recognizes a rebuttable presumption that the Melson Formula should be applied in making all child support determinations
                

In this appeal, the Father acknowledges that 13 Del.C. § 501 imposes a duty upon him to contribute to the support of his minor son, Jason. The Father also acknowledges that the factors which the Family Court must consider before entering a support order for a minor child are set forth in 13 Del.C. § 514. However, the Father argues that the Melson Formula is inconsistent with 13 Del.C. § 514.

The Father argues, in particular, that in establishing the Melson Formula, the Family Court has adopted a mechanical calculation for setting an amount for child support that does not consider all of the statutory factors. The Father also argues that by recognizing a rebuttable presumption that the Melson Formula shall be applied to make child support determinations, the Family Court has shifted the focus in child support litigation away from the statutory factors and onto the court-created formula. The Mother argues to the contrary with respect to each of these challenges to the Melson Formula by the Father.

We find that the Family Court's adoption of the Melson Formula, as a rebuttable presumption, and as the proper method of determining all child support cases, is consistent with its statutory obligation to "[m]ake and publish Court rules governing policies, processes, practices, and procedures, which shall be uniform throughout the State." 10 Del.C. § 907(5). We also find that, as a rebuttable presumption, the Melson Formula is consistent with all of the factors set forth in 13 Del.C. § 514. However, in this case, we find that neither the Family Court's initial determination of the amount of support to be paid by the Father for Jason, nor the Superior Court's subsequent reversal of that order, addressed the operation of the Melson Formula as a rebuttable presumption. Therefore, we remand the petition for support, as to Jason, to the Family Court.

The Superior Court's decision that the Father had a duty to support his adult son was predicated upon its conclusion that Joseph, Jr. was unable to support himself. 13 Del.C. § 503. The Father argues that the facts in the record do not support the Superior Court's decision that his adult son, Joseph, Jr., is a "poor person unable to support himself." 13 Del.C. § 503. We agree. We find that the record supports the Family Court's determination that Joseph, Jr. is not a "poor person unable to support himself" and that the Father has no statutory obligation to support him.

Basic Facts

The Father and Linda Clanton ("Mother"), were married in 1963. Three children were born from that marriage: Joseph, Jr., born February 5, 1964; Jeffrey, born July 14, 1968; and Jason, born July 13, 1970. The family resided in Pennsylvania. The Father and Mother separated in 1972 and were eventually divorced in 1974. The Father moved to Delaware, where he remarried. The Father also established a business in Delaware. The Mother remained in Pennsylvania. She married John Clanton in 1974 and two sons were born from that marriage.

Procedural History

The Mother's support petitions in the Family Court of the State of Delaware alleged that both Jason and Joseph, Jr.

lived with her in Pennsylvania. 3 The Family Court referred the Mother's petitions for support to a Master. 10 Del.C. § 913(b). The Master was requested to make factual findings and recommendations. Id.

The Family Court Master found, as a fact, that Joseph, Jr. was able to support himself. The Master recommended that the Family Court find that the Father had no duty to support Joseph, Jr., since he was an adult. 13 Del.C. §§ 501, 503. The Master found, as a fact, that Jason was a minor entitled to be supported by his Father. 13 Del.C. § 501. The Master recommended that the Family Court order the Father to pay monthly support for Jason in the amount of $765.24. This latter recommendation by the Master was based exclusively upon a calculation according to the Melson Formula.

The Father petitioned to have a Judge of the Family Court review the Master's findings and recommendations de novo. 10 Del.C. § 913(c). 4 A Family Court Judge found, after a de novo review, that Joseph, Jr. was not a "poor person" within the meaning of 13 Del.C. § 503. Accordingly, the Family Court Judge held that the Father had no duty under Section 503 to support him. The Family Court Judge also reviewed de novo the Master's findings and recommendations, which were based upon the Melson Formula, quantifying the support obligation of the Father for Jason. The Family Court Judge stated that the Melson Formula served as a guide, not as a compulsion, in making support determinations.

The Family Court Judge noted that the statutory criteria were controlling. The Family Court Judge ruled that "13 Del.C. § 514 did not contemplate such bonanza" as would result in the Mother's favor, if the calculation resulting from an application of the Melson Formula was determined to be the Father's support obligation for Jason. The Family Court declined to enter a support order based upon a literal application of the Melson Formula. The Family Court ordered the Father to pay $450.00 per month for the support of Jason. 5

The Mother filed an appeal in the Superior Court, pursuant to the then existing 10 Del.C. § 960(a) (1975). The decisions of the Family Court, holding that Joseph, Jr. was able to support himself and declining to apply the Melson Formula in establishing the support owed for Jason, were both reversed. The Superior Court remanded the matter to the Family Court. The Superior Court directed the Family Court to enter an appropriate support order, calculated according to the Melson Formula, for both Joseph, Jr. and Jason. The Family Court entered an order requiring the Father to pay $1,421.35 per month for the combined support of Joseph, Jr. and Jason. 6

On March 28, 1988, the Father appealed to this Court from the final support order of the Family Court. On April 18, 1988, this Court granted the Father's motion to remand this matter to the Family Court for the purpose of supplementing the factual record and making further conclusions of law. 7 After receiving additional evidence, at a hearing following the remand from this Court, the Family Court found that Joseph, Jr. was capable of supporting himself, had become a productive capable adult, and was, therefore, not a "poor person" requiring the Father's support. No

evidence was presented to the Family Court which caused it to find a change with regard to Jason's status. The case was then returned to this Court pursuant to this Court's retention of jurisdiction. Supr.Ct. R. 19(c). Thereafter, the briefing of the issues raised in this appeal proceeded in accordance with the rules of this Court. Supr.Ct. R. 15.

Duty to Support Adult Son

The first issue which we will address is whether, and if so, to what extent, the Father is obligated to support his adult son, Joseph, Jr. The Father argues that Joseph, Jr. has not been a "poor person," as that term is defined in 13 Del.C. § 503, since the outset of this litigation, and, therefore, that he has no legal obligation to provide support for Joseph, Jr. The Father argues that there is adequate evidence in the record to support the Family Court's initial and subsequent determinations that Joseph, Jr. was, and is, able to support himself. It is also argued by Father that if he does have a duty to support his adult son, Joseph, Jr., the Melson Formula is not applicable in calculating that obligation.

The Mother argues that the record supports a conclusion that Joseph, Jr. was, and is, a "poor person," who is entitled to be supported by both of his parents. The theory advanced by the Mother to impose a portion of the support obligation for Joseph, Jr. upon the Father, derives from 13 Del.C. § 503, which provides:

Except as expressly provided in § 501 and § 502 of this title, the duty to support a poor person unable to support himself rests upon his spouse, parents, or children, in that order, subject to § 504 of this title as to expenses described therein. If the relation prior in order shall not be able, the next in order shall be liable, and several relations of the same order shall, if able, contribute according to their means. (emphasis added)....

To continue reading

Request your trial
37 cases
  • Division of Child Support Enforcement, ex rel. Harper v. Barrows
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Delaware
    • December 19, 1989
    ...the Melson Formula. 5 That procedure, which operates as a rebuttable presumption, has been approved by this Court. Dalton v. Clanton, Del.Supr., 559 A.2d 1197, 1210-11 (1989). This Court has subsequently held that the Melson Formula is the appropriate standard for determining the amount of ......
  • Lee v. Green
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Delaware
    • February 8, 1990
    ...rebuttable presumption in all child support cases in determining the amount of support required of each parent. See Dalton v. Clanton, Del.Supr., 559 A.2d 1197, 1211 (1989). The husband did not seek child support in his petition for divorce, but waited to file a petition for child support u......
  • Shuba v. Division of Child Support Enforcement ex rel. Reese
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Delaware
    • May 23, 1989
    ...persuasive. The starting point for our determination of the questions presented is this Court's recent decision in Dalton v. Clanton, Del.Supr., 559 A.2d 1197 (1989), Holland, J. (April 6, 1989), decided after the briefing of this appeal. There this Court addressed father's first contention......
  • Guidelines for Child Support Enforcement, In re
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • February 5, 1990
    ...support guidelines promulgated by the supreme court held procedural in concept because they operated as presumptions); Dalton v. Clanton, 559 A.2d 1197 (Del.Super.Ct.1989) (family court's adoption of procedure in making child support determinations was held consistent with its statutory obl......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT