Dalton v. Lucas

• Decision Date: 15 June 2012
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
• Parties: James R. DALTON, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Frederick J. LUCAS and Transitowne Dodge of Greece, Doing Business as Doan Dodge Chrysler, Defendants–Respondents.

96 A.D.3d 1648
947 N.Y.S.2d 285
2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 04913

James R. DALTON, Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
Frederick J. LUCAS and Transitowne Dodge of Greece, Doing Business as Doan Dodge Chrysler, Defendants–Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

June 15, 2012.

[947 N.Y.S.2d 286]

Cellino & Barnes, P.C., Rochester (K. John Wright of Counsel), for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Trevett Cristo Salzer & Andolina P.C., Rochester (David Murphy of Counsel), for Defendants–Respondents.

PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, CARNI, LINDLEY, AND SCONIERS, JJ.

MEMORANDUM:

[96 A.D.3d 1648]Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for injuries he sustained when a vehicle operated by Frederick J. Lucas (defendant) and owned by defendant Transitowne Dodge of Greece, doing business as Doan Dodge Chrysler (Transitowne), collided with a vehicle operated by plaintiff. The collision occurred when plaintiff and defendant were driving in opposite directions on a two-lane bridge, and the vehicle driven by defendant entered plaintiff's lane of travel and collided head-on with plaintiff's vehicle. Contrary to plaintiff's contention, Supreme Court properly denied those parts of his motion with respect to the issues of negligence and proximate cause because defendants raised a triable issue of fact concerning the applicability of the emergency doctrine.

Under the emergency doctrine, “ ‘when [a driver] is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes the [driver] to be reasonably so disturbed that [he or she] must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the [driver] may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context’ ... provided the [driver] has not created the emergency” ( Caristo v. Sanzone, 96 N.Y.2d 172, 174, 726 N.Y.S.2d 334, 750 N.E.2d 36, quoting Rivera v. New York City Tr. Auth., 77 N.Y.2d 322, 327, 567 N.Y.S.2d 629, 569 N.E.2d 432,rearg. denied[96 A.D.3d 1649]77 N.Y.2d 990, 571 N.Y.S.2d 916, 575 N.E.2d 402;see Lifson v. City of Syracuse, 17 N.Y.3d 492, 497, 934 N.Y.S.2d 38, 958 N.E.2d 72). The existence of an emergency and the reasonableness

[947 N.Y.S.2d 287]

of a driver's response thereto generally constitute issues of fact ( see Patterson v. Central N.Y. Regional Transp. Auth. [CNYRTA], 94 A.D.3d 1565, 1566, 943 N.Y.S.2d 369;Mitchell v. City of New York, 89 A.D.3d 1068, 1069, 933...