Damora v. Stresscon Intern., Inc., 45553

• Decision Date: 12 November 1975
• Docket Number: No. 45553,45553
• Parties: Robert DAMORA, Petitioner, v. STRESSCON INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Florida Corporation, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 80

324 So.2d 80

Robert DAMORA, Petitioner, v. STRESSCON INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Florida Corporation, et al., Respondents.

No. 45553.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Nov. 12, 1975.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 23, 1976.

Jackson L. Peters of Knight, Peters, Hoeveler, Pickle, Niemoeller & Flynn, and Jeanne Heyward, Miami, for petitioner.

John F. Howard of Howard, Camillo & Payne, Fort Lauderdale, for respondents.

OVERTON, Justice.

The petitioner, Damora, is a New York architect who is seeking to enforce, pursuant to Section 682.03, Florida Statutes, a contract provision requiring arbitration in a foreign jurisdiction, specifically New York City, New York.

Petitioner-Damora and the respondents-Givotovskys entered into a standard form American Institute of Architects (AIA) contract providing for the petitioner to design and supervise construction of a residence in Florida for the respondents. Respondents, who are the real parties in interest in this proceeding, filed a third party complaint alleging that the petitioner negligently prepared plans and specifications and negligently supervised construction, resulting in damages to the respondents.

The contract between the parties was the 'standard form of agreement between owner and architect,' which included an arbitration provision as Condition 12. An addendum to Condition 12 was added to the contract, which provided that the arbitration would be in New York City, New York. The arbitration provision with the addendum inserted reads:

'12 Arbitration

'Arbitration of all questions in dispute under this Agreement Shall be in New York City, New York, shall be at the choice of either party and shall be in accordance with the provisions, then obtaining, of the Standard Form of Arbitration Procedure of the American Institute of Architects. This Agreement shall be specifically enforceable under the prevailing arbitration law and judgment upon the award rendered may be entered in the court of the forum, state or federal, having jurisdiction. The decision of the arbitrators shall be a condition precedent to the right of any legal action.'

(The underlined portion is the addendum.)

The petitioner moved to require arbitration pursuant to the provisions of Section 682.03, Florida Statutes, and requested the court to enter an order directing the parties to proceed with arbitration in accordance with the terms and provisions of the contract. The trial court denied the motion to require arbitration, and the District Court of Appeal affirmed per curiam without opinion but certified this question to this Court:

'WHERE AN AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE FUTURE DISPUTES PROVIDES FOR ARBITRATION IN ANOTHER JURISDICTION (IN THIS CASE, NEW YORK), IS SUCH A PROVISION A REJECTION OF THE FLORIDA ARBITRATION CODE, CHAPTER 682, F.S., AS TO RENDER THE AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE NOT BINDING UPON OR ENFORCEABLE IN THE COURTS OF THIS STATE?'

We have jurisdiction. ¹

The question is one of first impression in this state. We answer it in the affirmative. It is our opinion that under the contract terms in this specific case, the Florida Arbitration Code, Chapter 682, Florida Statutes, was rejected by the parties by reason of their agreement to arbitrate in New York City, New York. We hold the provision that arbitration was to take place in New York constituted a stipulation that the Florida Arbitration Code should not apply. See Section 682.02, Florida Statutes (1973).

The Florida courts have no statutory authority under Chapter 682 to compel arbitration in another jurisdiction. Further, the agreement between the parties failed to specify either that Florida law shall govern or that Florida arbitration procedure shall apply. The inference from the wording of the agreement is that New York arbitration law shall govern and the American Institute of Architects' standard form of procedure shall apply.

The rights of the parties under this arbitration provision stand and fall upon the contract terms, not the statutory arbitration procedure in this state.

Absent the statutory authority of Chapter 682 to enforce the arbitration provision, the controlling law of this state clearly makes an arbitration provision voidable at the instance of either party and prohibits its being used as a bar to an action by either party in a court of competent jurisdiction. Mr. Justice Sebring stated the law of this state prior to the enactment of Chapter 682 in Fenster v. Makovsky, 67 So.2d 427, 429 (Fla.1953), where he said:

...