Damoth v. Reinitz

• Decision Date: 26 March 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-1085,85-1085
• Parties: 11 Fla. L. Weekly 746 Robert M. DAMOTH, Appellant, v. Paul F. REINITZ, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 881

485 So.2d 881

11 Fla. L. Weekly 746

Robert M. DAMOTH, Appellant, v. Paul F. REINITZ, Appellee.

No. 85-1085.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

Second District.

March 26, 1986.

George J. Felos, of Felos & Felos, Dunedin, for appellant.

William A. Wares, of McKay & Thomas, Tampa, for appellee.

DANAHY, Acting Chief Judge.

Robert M. Damoth sued Paul F. Reinitz, a nonresident, in an action for fraud. Damoth appeals a nonfinal order quashing service of process and dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over Reinitz. ¹

We are asked to decide whether our "long arm" statute applies to this case and, if so, whether it is fair and in accord with requirements of due process for Florida courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over Reinitz. We hold that Florida courts do have jurisdiction and, accordingly, reverse the order.

We begin our discussion with an analysis of the pertinent provision of our "long arm" statute and the facts of this case. Section 48.193(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1984), provides:

Any person, whether or not a citizen of this state ... submits himself ... to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from the doing of any of the following acts:

(c) Owning, using or possessing any real property within this state.

At the hearing on Reinitz' motion to dismiss the complaint and quash the service of process, the trial court considered Damoth's pleadings and the affidavit he filed in response to Reinitz' affidavit. On review we must determine whether the jurisdictional allegations are sufficient to invoke the long arm statute. We have undertaken that task conscious of the burdens of proof imposed on the parties. See Electro Engineering Products Co. v. Lewis, 352 So.2d 862 (Fla.1977), Jones v. Jack Maxton Chevrolet, Inc., 484 So.2d 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) [11 FLW 403]; Yale Industrial Products, Inc. v. Gulfstream Galvanizing & Finishing, Inc., 481 So.2d 1304 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). Waldrip v. Dyal Sales Co., 436 So.2d 418 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).

The facts alleged in Damoth's first count are these: Reinitz, a resident of Indiana, is the co-owner of sixty-five acres of Florida real estate. In 1982 he caused the property to be listed for sale with his agent in Florida. That period had expired when, in 1984, Reinitz initiated telephone contact with Damoth at Damoth's Florida residence. Reinitz inquired whether Damoth was interested in purchasing the property. Damoth said that he was and during the next several months the parties entered into extensive negotiations by telephone and correspondence. Throughout these negotiations, Reinitz represented that he had an executed power of attorney from his co-owners authorizing him to act in their behalf in all matters concerning an option and sale of the property. Damoth alleges that that representation was false, was known by Reinitz to be false when he made it, and that he, Damoth, relied on it to his financial detriment. Damoth goes on to allege that the parties agreed to the terms of an option for the sale of the property at a price of $9,000 per acre with $2,000 to be paid by Damoth to bind the option which was to be drawn up and executed by the parties. Damoth paid over the $2,000 binder at Reinitz' request before an option was signed.

While the option was being drawn by an attorney, Damoth incurred expenses for improvements to the property, a survey, an abstract of title, an engineering study, and a hydrology report. These expenses were incurred either at Reinitz' request or with his knowledge and consent. Later, Reinitz informed Damoth that their agreement was terminated and that he would not sign the option Damoth had sent to him because one of his co-owners demanded a greater sales price for the property. In his second count, Damoth goes on in a similar vein to allege an alternate theory of fraud which we find unnecessary for our disposition of this case to summarize here.

Damoth did not allege that the complained-of events occurred only in Florida. Yet, in his response to all of Damoth's allegations, Reinitz essentially responds that he neither made the representations nor did any of the acts attributed to him occur "in the State of Florida." We think that response misses the point when testing the sufficiency of allegations necessary to invoke subsection (1)(c) of our long arm statute. Reinitz' denial that the events occurred within Florida is not a denial that they in fact occurred elsewhere, e.g., Indiana. Thus, for our analysis of jurisdiction, Damoth's allegations are sufficient.

We find that in either count of the complaint Damoth alleged a cause of action for fraud. See Mossler Acceptance Co. v. Perlman, 47 So.2d 296 (Fla.1950). Further, we believe that the cause of action does "arise from" Reinitz' ownership of real property in this state as that term is envisioned by section 48.193(1)(c). Construction of our long arm statute is limited only by its terms and the due process requirement of minimum contacts with this state. DeMarco v. Cayman Overseas Reinsurance Association, 460 So.2d 547 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Further, we think that the term "arising from" is broad; it is not restricted to actions which directly challenge the ownership of the property, nor to actions in which the property itself is the subject of the lawsuit. See Tandy & Wood, Inc. v. Munnell, 97 Idaho 142, 540 P.2d 804 (1975). Rather, the term...