Damron v. North Dakota Com'R. of Corrections

• Decision Date: 26 January 2004
• Docket Number: No. A1-03-122.,A1-03-122.
• Citation: 299 F.Supp.2d 970
• Parties: Michael D. DAMRON, Plaintiff, v. NORTH DAKOTA COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTIONS, Bismarck, North Dakota; Tim Schuetzle, Warden ND State Penitentiary; Bob Coad, Deputy Warden (ND); Ingrid Omlid, Education Dir. NDSP; Tammy Barstad, Instructor, NDSP; Dan Wrolstad, former Education Dir. NDSP; Mike Fluck, Guard, NDSP; Mike Kolden, Caseworker, NDSP; Pat Branson, Guard, NDSP; Dan Ebach, NDSP; Corky Stromme, Security, NDSP, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of North Dakota

299 F.Supp.2d 970

Michael D. DAMRON, Plaintiff, v. NORTH DAKOTA COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTIONS, Bismarck, North Dakota; Tim Schuetzle, Warden ND State Penitentiary; Bob Coad, Deputy Warden (ND); Ingrid Omlid, Education Dir. NDSP; Tammy Barstad, Instructor, NDSP; Dan Wrolstad, former Education Dir. NDSP; Mike Fluck, Guard, NDSP; Mike Kolden, Caseworker, NDSP; Pat Branson, Guard, NDSP; Dan Ebach, NDSP; Corky Stromme, Security, NDSP, Defendants.

No. A1-03-122.

United States District Court, D. North Dakota, Southwestern Division.

January 26, 2004.

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Michael Duane Damron, Bismarck, ND, pro se.

Douglas Alan Bahr, Todd A. Sattler, Attorney General's Office, Civil Litigation, Bismarck, ND, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

HOVLAND, Chief Judge.

Before the Court is the Defendants'¹ Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 5, 2002, the plaintiff, Michael D. Damron ("Damron") filed suit in United States District Court for the District of Minnesota against North Dakota and Minnesota prison officials alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), the Rehabilitation Act and Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. Damron has been imprisoned in corrections institutions in both Minnesota and North Dakota since 1997. On September 22, 2003, the Minnesota District Court granted the Minnesota Defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissed the North Dakota Defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction, and transferred Damron's claims against the North Dakota Defendants to the District Court of North Dakota. After the case was transferred to this Court, the Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on October 24, 2003. A response from Damron to the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on December 22, 2003.

II. LEGAL ARGUMENT

Damron sets forth claims against the North Dakota Department of Corrections and against the prison officials in both their official and individual capacities. Damron alleges violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), the Rehabilitation Act, and the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"). Damron has requested monetary relief in the form of $ 6,650 in compensatory damages arising from the alleged denial of educational opportunities and the confiscation of two calculators. In the alternative, Damron seeks injunctive relief in the form of ordering the Department of Corrections to give back his "Correspondence Coursework" and his calculator. Damron also seeks $ 100,000 in punitive damages. He also seeks $ 175,000 to finish his education when he is released from prison, or in the alternative, he seeks injunctive relief in the form of ordering the Department of Corrections to allow him to finish the approved correspondence courses with the appropriate calculator for his alleged learning disability.

In their summary judgment motion, the Defendants assert that all of Damron's claims fail on either issues of immunity or for failure to state a claim. The Defendants also assert that Damron's amended complaint seeks only monetary damages. In his response, Damron contends that Congress in enacting the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act abrogated the sovereign immunity of the states under the Fourteenth Amendment and that there are genuine issues of material fact still in dispute.

A. ADA CLAIM

1) CLAIM AGAINST THE STATE AND THE PRISON OFFICIALS IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

U.S. Const. amend. XI. The United States Supreme Court stated in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974), that "the rule has evolved that a suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment." Edelman, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 94 S.Ct. 1347 (citations omitted). "[A] federal court's remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, ... may not include a retroactive award which requires the payment of funds from the state treasury." 415 U.S. at 663, 677, 94 S.Ct. 1347. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for monetary damages in federal court against a state, including a state agency, by its own citizens as well as citizens of another state unless the State has waived its immunity.

In addition, the United States Supreme Court has held that a suit against an employee acting in his official capacity is tantamount to a lawsuit against the state. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). As such, a suit against the individual prison officials in their official capacities is the same as a suit against the Department of Corrections and the State of North Dakota. However, "Ex parte Young permits a private party to receive prospective injunctive relief in federal court against a state official, even if the Eleventh Amendment otherwise protects the state and its officials from being sued in federal court." Bradley v. Arkansas Dep't of Educ., 189 F.3d 745 (8th Cir.1999) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56, 159, 166-68, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908)). In other words, "state officials may be sued in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief when the plaintiff alleges that the officials are acting in violation of the Constitution or federal law." Missouri Child Care Ass'n v. Cross, 294 F.3d 1034, 1037 (8th Cir.2002).

It is well-established that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits by individuals against a state for money damages under the ADA. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360, 121 S.Ct. 955, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001); Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1010 (8th Cir.1999). "Since Alsbrook and Bradley, [the Eighth Circuit] has clarified that under Ex Parte Young and its progeny, private individuals can in fact sue state officials under the ADA for prospective, injunctive relief only." Grey v. Wilburn, 270 F.3d 607, 609 (8th Cir.2001); see Gibson v. Arkansas Dep't of Correction, 265 F.3d 718, 722 (8th Cir.2001).

The Court expressly finds that Damron's ADA claim for monetary damages against both the Department of Corrections and the prison officials in their official capacities is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. However, Damron's ADA claim against the prison officials in their official capacities is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the extent that he is seeking prospective injunctive relief.

2) CLAIM AGAINST THE PRISON OFFICIALS IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY

Damron has also asserted violations of the ADA against the prison officials in their individual capacities, but he does not specify what provisions of the ADA the prison officials have allegedly violated. The ADA is separated into three titles. Title I applies to discrimination in employment. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117. Title II applies to discrimination in public services. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165. Title III applies to discrimination in public accommodations. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189. The Eighth Circuit has held that individuals may not be sued in their individual capacities directly under the provisions of Title II of the ADA. Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1005 n. 8 (8th Cir.1999). In addition, the Eighth Circuit has noted with approval that three other circuits have held that there is no liability under Title I against individuals who do not otherwise qualify as "employers" under the statutory definition. Id. Further, the Eighth Circuit has also held that when there is no claim that an individual owned, leased, or operated the property in question, there is no colorable claim under Title III of the ADA. Pona v. Cecil Whittaker's Inc., 155 F.3d 1034, 1036 (8th Cir.1998).

In this case, the prison officials were not Damron's employer so Title I cannot be a basis for his claims. Title II clearly does not provide for individual liability. Finally, there is no allegation that the prison officials in their individual capacity owned, leased, or operated the North Dakota State Penitentiary. Thus, under well-established Eighth Circuit precedent, the Court finds that the prison officials may not be sued in their individual capacity under Titles I, II, or III of the ADA.

3) SUMMARY JUDGMENT

At this stage, Damron's only remaining claim under the ADA is for prospective injunctive relief against the prison officials in their official capacity. As discussed above, Title II of the ADA is the only possible section that would apply to Damron's circumstances.

It is well-established that summary judgment is appropriate when, viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Graning v. Sherburne County, 172 F.3d 611, 614 (8th Cir.1999). A fact is "material" if it might effect the outcome of the case and a factual dispute is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The basic inquiry for purposes of summary judgment is whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Quick v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 90 F.3d 1372, 1376 (8th Cir.1996). The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating to the Court that there are no genuine issues...