Dan's Car World, LLC v. Delaney
| Decision Date | 08 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 20-0489 |
| Citation | 873 S.E.2d 820 |
| Parties | DAN'S CAR WORLD, LLC, a West Virginia Limited Liability Company d/b/a/ Dan Cava's Toyota World, Defendant Below, Petitioner v. Caressa DELANEY, Plaintiff Below, Respondent |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Gregory H. Schillace, Esq., Schillace Law Office, Clarksburg, West Virginia, Petitioner's Counsel.
John N. Ellem, Esq., Ellem Law Office, PLLC, Parkersburg, West Virginia, Jane E. Peak, Esq., Allan N. Karlin & Associates PLLC, Morgantown, West Virginia, Respondent's Counsel.
After Respondent Caressa Delaney had trouble with the car she bought from Petitioner Dan's Car World (DCW), she sued DCW. During discovery, DCW's conduct included withholding requested documents, even after the circuit court ordered production of the documents and imposed monetary sanctions. When the requested documents finally appeared as an exhibit to DCW's motion for summary judgment, the circuit court denied the motion and sanctioned DCW a second time by striking its defenses. On appeal, DCW challenges not only the sanction, which resulted in a directed verdict at trial, but also the damages awarded by the jury and the circuit court's award of prejudgment interest and attorney fees.
We find that the circuit court acted within its discretion by issuing the sanction, approving the jury's verdict, and ordering DCW to pay attorney fees and costs. But we agree that the circuit court erred by applying prejudgment interest to the entire verdict, so we reverse that portion of the circuit court's order. On remand, we direct the circuit court to assess DCW with Ms. Delaney's attorney fees and costs in defending this appeal.
Ms. Delaney purchased a used 2012 Chevy Equinox from DCW in February 2017. She experienced numerous issues with the vehicle soon after. So, on February 20, 2018, Ms. Delaney sued DCW alleging breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, misrepresentation, breach of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act1 , violation of the West Virginia Consumer Credit Protection Act (WVCCPA)2 , revocation of acceptance, breach of the duty of good faith, and unconscionability. About a month after filing suit, Ms. Delaney served DCW with interrogatories and a request for production of documents. Importantly, Ms. Delaney's request for production sought, among other things, the following:
a complete copy of [DCW's] dealer file for [Ms. Delaney's] vehicle, including but not limited to purchase agreements, finance agreements, advertisements, window stickers, disclosures, work orders, trade-in documents, cancelled checks and credit information.
DCW never responded to the interrogatories or the request for production.
After Ms. Delaney unsuccessfully attempted to induce a response from DCW, she filed a motion to compel the discovery. DCW partially answered the interrogatories shortly before a hearing on Ms. Delaney's motion. Somewhat appeased, Ms. Delaney agreed to forgo the hearing in exchange for DCW's promise to fully answer the interrogatories and respond to the outstanding request for production. The circuit court entered an order reflecting the parties’ agreement on September 12, 2018.
Despite the circuit court's order, DCW never supplemented its answers to the interrogatories or responded to the request for production. Consequently, Ms. Delaney filed a second motion to compel. DCW neither responded to the motion to compel nor appeared for the hearing on it. When DCW's counsel failed to appear, the circuit court telephoned his office and allowed him to participate by phone. DCW's counsel admitted that he violated the circuit court's prior order by not supplementing DCW's answers to the interrogatories or responding to the request for production. So, by order dated February 12, 2019, the circuit court required that DCW's counsel pay Ms. Delaney's counsel $1,200 in attorney fees as a sanction.3 The circuit court further warned that "[a]dditional discovery failures and/or similar conduct by defendant [DCW] or its counsel in the future may justify harsher sanctions by this [c]ourt, including those listed in Rule 37(b)."
After the sanction, DCW supplemented its answers to the interrogatories and responded to the request for production. Notably, DCW represented that it "previously produced" all documents related to the vehicle. Ms. Delaney found this and other responses inadequate and asked DCW to clarify its responses three times between March and May of 2019. She also sought DCW's cooperation to schedule the deposition of its managing member and controller. Again, DCW never responded to any of Ms. Delaney's communications. So, Ms. Delaney subpoenaed DCW's managing member and controller and "all service files, dealership files and any other records that maybe [sic] in [the controller's] possession for [Ms. Delaney's car]." DCW objected to the document subpoena and the deposition dates and venue. Ms. Delaney agreed to reschedule the subpoenaed depositions, but DCW never responded to her attempts to do so. So, Ms. Delaney subpoenaed the witnesses and documents again. When Ms. Delaney finally deposed the controller, DCW again objected to the document subpoena claiming "[w]e believe we've produced all copies of all of the documents with respect to the vehicle, which is the subject of this incident, and has previously been provided to [Ms. Delaney's counsel]." But during the controller's deposition, she testified that DCW possessed a dealer file for Ms. Delaney's car which contained subpoenaed documents and that DCW's counsel instructed her not to bring it.4
On October 25, 2019, Ms. Delaney filed a motion to strike DCW's defenses as a sanction for its continued discovery misconduct. A week before that motion's scheduled hearing, DCW filed a motion for summary judgment and attached as an exhibit unproduced documents that the circuit court's discovery order required it to produce. At the hearing, Ms. Delaney raised the issue, and DCW initially argued that it previously produced the documents but then claimed that it had only recently discovered them.5
The circuit court denied DCW's motion for summary judgment, granted Ms. Delaney's motion to strike DCW's defenses, and scheduled the case for trial. A few days before trial, DCW filed a petition for writ of prohibition with this Court challenging the circuit court's order that struck its defenses. We summarily denied the petition, and the trial proceeded as scheduled. The circuit court directed verdicts for Ms. Delaney on her breach of warranty, Magnuson-Moss Act, revocation of acceptance, WVCCPA, and misrepresentation claims. The circuit court allowed both parties to present evidence for the jury to determine damages. Ms. Delaney and an expert testified on her behalf, but DCW chose not to present any evidence.
The jury awarded Ms. Delaney $18,662.09 which, according to the verdict form, consisted of $12,662.09 for the breach of warranty claims6 , $2,000 for the WVCCPA claim, $2,000 for the misrepresentation claim, and $2,000 in punitive damages. The circuit court awarded prejudgment and post-judgment interest on all damages.
The circuit court also ordered DCW to pay Ms. Delaney $135,937.50 in attorney fees and $8,621.47 in other litigation expenses since she prevailed on her Magnuson-Moss Act and related claims. Ms. Delaney's counsel represented her on a contingent basis, but the circuit court calculated the fees based on an hourly rate of $375 per hour for 362.5 work hours. It deemed the $375 hourly rate reasonable based on affidavits from West Virginia attorneys, and DCW did not object to the proposed rate. The lawyers who represented Ms. Delaney throughout the litigation each submitted itemized time logs after eliminating redundant time and testified to the time logged.
DCW appeals the circuit court orders that denied its motion for a new trial or judgment as a matter of law and awarded attorney fees to Ms. Delaney. Specifically, DCW asserts that the circuit court erred or abused its discretion by: (1) denying DCW's motion for summary judgment, (2) striking DCW's defenses, (3) awarding attorney fees and costs, (4) permitting the jury to award damages for the misrepresentation claim, (5) permitting the jury to award punitive damages, and (6) awarding prejudgment interest for general or punitive damages.
We apply a two-part standard of review to denials of motions for new trials:
In reviewing challenges to findings and rulings made by a circuit court, we apply a two-pronged deferential standard of review. We review the rulings of the circuit court concerning a new trial and its conclusion as to the existence of reversible error under an abuse of discretion standard, and we review the circuit court's underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard. Questions of law are subject to a de novo review.[7 ]
But we apply a less deferential standard of review to denial of motions for judgment as a matter of law: "The appellate standard of review for an order granting or denying a renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law after trial pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure [1998] is de novo. "8 Specifically, "[a]fter considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant party, we will sustain the granting or denial of a pre-verdict or post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law when only one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict can be reached."9
Finally, "[t]he decision to award or not to award attorney's fees rests in the sound discretion of the circuit court, and the exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal except in cases of abuse."10
We can easily dispose of DCW's assignments of error regarding summary judgment, damages for the misrepresentation claim, and punitive damages. And we note that DCW confusingly appeals the order denying its motions for a...
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