Dan v. Dan

• Decision Date: 16 December 2014
• Docket Number: No. 19054.,19054.
• Citation: 315 Conn. 1,105 A.3d 118
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Mary Lou DAN v. Michael T. DAN.

315 Conn. 1

105 A.3d 118

Mary Lou DAN

v.Michael T. DAN.

No. 19054.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 22, 2014.

Decided Dec. 16, 2014.

Charles D. Ray, with whom was Lee F. Lizotte, Hartford, for the appellant (defendant).

George J. Markley, Fairfield, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Louise Truax, Fairfield, filed a brief for the Connecticut Chapter of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers as amicus curiae.

ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, McDONALD, ROBINSON and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.

Opinion

ZARELLA, J.

The primary issue that we must resolve in this certified appeal is whether the trial court may modify a judgment, rendered in accordance with a stipulated alimony award, solely on the basis of an increase in the income of the supporting spouse. Approximately ten years after the plaintiff, Mary Lou Dan, and the defendant, Michael T. Dan, were divorced, the plaintiff filed a motion for modification of the stipulated alimony award pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–86,¹ claiming that the circumstances of the case had changed substantially because the defendant's income had increased significantly and the plaintiff's medical costs had “sky-rocketed.” At the outset of the evidentiary hearing on the motion, the parties stipulated that there was a substantial change in circumstances because the defendant's income had substantially increased. Thereafter, the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for modification and substantially increased the amount of alimony that the defendant was required to pay to the plaintiff. The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court had abused its discretion as a matter of law by increasing the alimony award when the sole change in circumstances was an increase in his income. Dan v. Dan, 137 Conn.App. 728, 729, 731 n. 4, 49 A.3d 298 (2012). The Appellate Court upheld the trial court's decision to grant the motion. See id., at 733, 49 A.3d 298. This court then granted the defendant's petition for certification to appeal to this court on the following issue: “Did the Appellate Court properly [uphold] the trial court's granting of the plaintiff's motion for modification based [on] a change in circumstances?”²

Dan v. Dan, 307 Conn. 924, 55 A.3d 565 (2012). We conclude that, in the absence of certain exceptional circumstances, which we explain hereinafter, an increase in income, standing alone, does not justify the modification of an alimony award. We further conclude that, because the trial court did not expressly address the issue of whether such exceptional circumstances exist in the present case, the Appellate Court improperly upheld the trial court's decision to grant the plaintiff's motion, and the case must be remanded to the trial court for a new hearing at which the proper standard may be applied.

The record reveals the following procedural history and facts that are undisputed or that were found by the trial court. The parties were divorced in 2000 after more than twenty-nine years of marriage. They had three children, all of whom had attained the age of majority before the divorce. In accordance with a stipulation between the parties, the trial court, Sheedy, J., awarded the plaintiff $15,000 per month in alimony, as well as a sum equal to 25 percent of any bonus income that the defendant received. The parties also agreed that the defendant's alimony obligation would cease when he reached the age of sixty-five or his retirement, whichever occurred first.³

In 2010, the plaintiff filed a motion for modification of the alimony award pursuant to § 46b–86, claiming that the defendant's income had “greatly increased” and that her medical expenses had “skyrocketed.” After an evidentiary hearing on the motion before the court, Winslow, J.,⁴ the court found that the plaintiff had not proven her claim that there was a substantial change in her circumstances because of an increase in her out-of-pocket medical expenses. The defendant conceded during the hearing, however, that he had a substantial increase in his income since the divorce and that this constituted a substantial change in circumstances for purposes of § 46b–86. Accordingly, the sole issue before the court was whether the statutory factors set forth in General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 46b–82 (a)⁵ justified a modification of the alimony award.

The trial court ultimately found that the defendant's base salary in 2000 was $696,000. In 2010, his annual salary was $3.24 million, plus $3 million in stock option cash-ins. The court also found that the defendant worked “excessively long hours and that is obviously something that relates to some of his compensation.” Apart from the alimony that the plaintiff received from the defendant, the plaintiff had annual income of between $8000 and $12,000. The court further found that, as of 2011: the plaintiff was sixty-one years old; the defendant was sixty years old; the plaintiff had several health problems, including diabetes that was poorly controlled, which circumstance had existed at the time of the divorce; the plaintiff had no college degree; and, although she had once worked as a receptionist and executive assistant, she had not been employed since 1977.

Addressing the statutory factors set forth in § 46b–82, the trial court stated that it had not “given much weight at all to the needs of the parties” because “the income level of the defendant makes [it] unnecessary [to inquire] into the actual needs of the parties. There is more than enough income to meet and exceed the needs of each party.”⁶ The court also stated that it did not “weigh heavily” the estate of either party and gave “virtually no or little weight” to the cause of the dissolution. Rather, the factors that the court had considered important “were the length of the marriage, the health of the parties, the station and occupation of the parties, the amount and sources of income, [and] the vocational skills of the parties.” On the basis of these factors, the court increased the alimony award from $15,000 to $40,000 per month, plus 25 percent of any bonus income that the defendant received, and ordered that the alimony, instead of terminating when the defendant reached the age of sixty-five, would continue until the plaintiff's death, remarriage or cohabitation. The court also stated, however, that the defendant's retirement might constitute a substantial change in circumstances justifying a modification of the alimony award.

After the trial court issued its oral decision, the defendant filed a motion for articulation in which he requested that the court clarify whether it had considered the “§ 46b–82 factors ‘anew,’ or [whether] it consider[ed] only any difference in the factors that occurred from the date of dissolution until the date of modification....”⁷ In addition, the defendant requested that the court “articulate the factual and legal basis for [its] decision to extend the term of [the defendant's] alimony obligation beyond that set forth in the parties' [stipulation], and beyond that requested by the plaintiff....” The court granted the motion for articulation. With respect to the defendant's first request, the court stated that it “could not and did not attempt to ascertain the status of each additional criterion at the time of the dissolution judgment. The court looked at all the criteria currently.” With respect to the defendant's second request, the court stated that it had continued the defendant's alimony obligation beyond his sixty-fifth birthday because “[the] cessation of alimony on a date certain would be inequitable in light of the dramatic change in the parties' circumstances now apparent ten years after the [parties'] divorce.”

The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court from the trial court's decision to grant the plaintiff's motion for modification. The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court “reasonably determined that, considering the length of the parties' marriage, the health of the parties, the amount and sources of income and the vocational skills of the parties, the defendant's alimony should be increased.” Dan v. Dan, supra, 137 Conn.App. at 732, 49 A.3d 298. This certified appeal followed.⁸

On appeal, the defendant contends that, contrary to the Appellate Court's conclusion, (1) the trial court improperly granted the plaintiff's motion for modification solely on the basis of the defendant's increased income, (2) even if the trial court properly granted the motion for modification, the substantial increase in alimony was an abuse of discretion, and (3) the trial court improperly considered the statutory criteria in § 46b–82 anew rather than limiting its consideration to the criteria that had changed since the date of dissolution. We agree with the defendant that, when the only substantial change in circumstances after an award of alimony has been made is an increase in the income of the paying spouse, a modification of the alimony award ordinarily is not justified if the original award was and continues to be sufficient to fulfill the original purpose for which it was made. We further conclude that, because the trial court made no finding as to whether the original alimony award continues to be sufficient to meet its original purpose, the case must be remanded for a new hearing at which the court may apply the proper standard in making such a finding. Accordingly, we need not address the issues of whether the trial court abused its discretion when it substantially increased the award or properly considered factors that have not changed since the date of dissolution in determining the amount of the modification.

We begin our analysis with a review of the legal principles governing the modification of alimony awards. “It is ... well established that when a party, pursuant to § 46b–86, seeks a postjudgment modification of a dissolution decree ... he or she must demonstrate that a substantial change in circumstances has arisen subsequent to the entry of the [d...