Dand's Estate, In re
Decision Date | 12 September 1952 |
Docket Number | No. 31922,31922 |
Citation | 41 Wn.2d 158,247 P.2d 1016 |
Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Parties | In re DAND'S ESTATE. |
Griffin & Griffin, and Max R. Nicolai, Seattle, for appellant.
Jones, Birdseye & Grey, Albert Olsen, Seattle, E. F. Bernard, Portland, Or., William W. Wells, Pendleton, Or., for respondent.
This is an appeal from a decree holding for naught the will of Janet Dand dated March 19, 1943, annulling and revoking the probate thereof, and admitting to probate her will dated December 29, 1941.
Decedent died December 10, 1950, at the age of 92. She had been blind for fifteen years preceding her death.
Respondents, Jennie M. Meiners and Myrtle J. Klein, two of her daughters, contested the will which had been admitted to probate. The contest was resisted by the Seattle Trust and Savings Bank, executor; by two other daughters, Mabel I. Haw and Marion Smith; a son, John; and a granddaughter, Janet Jarvis. Another granddaughter, Edith Hudson, was present at the trial but did not appear by counsel.
After an extended trial, the trial court entered the following pertinent conclusions of law:
These conclusions were based upon detailed findings of fact. Summarized quite briefly, the trial court found: that decedent owned an estate exceeding three hundred thousand dollars in value at the time of her death; that for many years prior to 1943, decedent, except for her plan to devise a half-section of Canadian land to her granddaughter, Edith Hudson, had manifested an intention to treat her four daughters substantially the same in the distribution of her estate; that she disinherited her son, John, by will in 1940 because of debts contracted by him, but later gave him a small life income from a trust fund; that this intention had been expressed in three wills (two executed and one prepared by counsel but not signed) made by decedent prior to the will of March 19, 1943; that, from the death of her husband in 1916 to the early part of 1943, decedent had relied heavily upon her daughter, Jennie, for advice on business matters, and reposed in her the utmost confidence; that Jennie lived in Oregon and managed the Oregon ranch in good faith.
Specifically, the court found:
The trial court found that, from February, 1943, until decedent's death, Mabel I. Haw, who 'is physically strong in appearance and of a domineering nature,' had full charge of the household. The court further found that decedent, subsequent to March 19, 1943, had no opportunity to discuss freely her true testamentary wishes with an impartial adviser and put them into effect because of her blindness, age, and dependence upon Mabel.
The findings of fact continue:
* * *'
Our scope of review is confined to a determination of whether the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings of fact made by the trial court. Brown v. Van Tuyl, Wash., 242 P.2d 1021 and cases cited.
The record is replete with detailed evidence, inconsistent and conflicting upon most material issues. It would add nothing to the case authority of this jurisdiction to discuss it at length. The evidence includes accusations of theft, alleged confiscation of property, an insanity charge against one of the sisters, a legal action of eviction from the family home against another, a charge of attempted poisoning, excessive drinking, personal fights, neighbors calling the police to the Dand home, an alleged attack with a hammer, locked doors, prowling at night, alleged striking of decedent by Mabel and John, and general family discord.
The crux of the whole situation was the alleged fraud practiced by Mabel in poisoning her mother's mind against Jennie and Myrtle with untruths so that she unduly influenced decedent to make the will of March 19, 1943, in which contestants (Jennie and Myrtle) were devised only a token share of the entire estate. We are not unmindful that:
'* * * in such cases it may well be difficult for one seeking to uphold a will to establish, by affirmative evidence, the negative proposition that no undue influence was exerted in the procurement of the will. * * *' In re Soderstran's Estate, 35 Wash.2d 448, 464, 213 P.2d 949, 958.
However, the trial judge, in his memorandum opinion, to which both appellants and respondents refer in their briefs, said:
This case is a striking example of the wisdom of our rule that the trial court, having the witnesses before it, is in a better position to arrive at the truth than is the appellate court. The respondents are entitled to the benefit of all evidence and reasonable inference therefrom in support of the findings of fact entered by the trial court. Two different theories were presented. The trial court rejected one and accepted the other. After an examination of the record, we cannot say that the evidence...
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