Dandridge v. Chromcraft Corp.
Decision Date | 24 January 1996 |
Docket Number | Civil A. No. 2:95CV26-D-B. |
Citation | 914 F. Supp. 1396 |
Parties | Frank DANDRIDGE, Plaintiff, v. CHROMCRAFT CORPORATION and David Woolever, Individually and as Agent of Chromcraft Corporation, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
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Louis H. Watson, Jr., Southaven, MS, for Plaintiff.
Bart Sisk, Kenneth P. Jones, Memphis, Tennessee, for Defendants.
Presently before the court is the motion of the defendants for the entry of summary judgment in their behalf. Finding the motion partially well taken, the same shall be granted in part and denied in part.
The defendant Chromcraft Corporation initially hired the plaintiff Frank Dandridge as a janitor for its facility in Senatobia, Mississippi, on or about August 27, 1984. On September 15, 1986, the plaintiff was transferred to the position of plater rack mechanic, another position within the maintenance department. In this position, the plaintiff's direct supervisor was the defendant David Woolever.
Joe Lusk was hired by Chromcraft as a welder on March 17, 1983. His welder position was one outside of the maintenance department, and Mr. Lusk worked in this position until November 11, 1987. On that date, Mr. Lusk was transferred to the maintenance department as a plater rack mechanic. Prior to this transfer, the plaintiff was the only plater rack mechanic in the maintenance department. Mr. Lusk became the second rack mechanic in the department and the plaintiff trained him for this position.
On July 11, 1994, the defendant Chromcraft transferred the plaintiff from his position as plater rack mechanic to a position in the upholstery department. As a result of this transfer, the plaintiff's salary dropped from the hourly rate of $8.72 to $6.86. Dandridge then terminated his employment with Chromcraft and subsequently obtained other employment.
Dandridge filed this action against the defendants on February 21, 1995, alleging race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as well as state law causes of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of his employment contract with Chromcraft and breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The defendants have filed a motion for the entry of summary judgment, and this court now comes to consider it.
Chromcraft publishes and distributes to its employees in the Senatobia facility an employee handbook, which contains the following language:
Chromcraft Furniture Employee Handbook, Senatobia Plant, Exhibit "A" to the Plaintiff's Complaint.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." F.R.C.P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment carries the burden of demonstrating that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is presented, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Brothers v. Klevenhagen, 28 F.3d 452, 455 (5th Cir.1994). "Where the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. v. Kralj, 968 F.2d 500, 503 (5th Cir. 1992). The facts are reviewed drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. Matagorda County v. Russell Law, 19 F.3d 215, 217 (5th Cir.1994).
Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII provides in relevant part: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer — (1) ... to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The ultimate question in an asserted case of racial discrimination under Title VII is whether the plaintiff's race was a factor in an adverse employment decision against him. Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 39 F.3d 537, 544 (5th Cir.1994) ().
However, given that many employment discrimination cases involve elusive factual questions, the Supreme Court has devised an evidentiary procedure that allocates the burden of production and establishes an orderly burden of proof. This standard for a prima facie case is utilized in determining the merits of motions for summary judgment. In a claim of race discrimination brought under Title VII, the evidentiary procedure to be utilized was originally introduced in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and more recently reaffirmed in St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff has the initial burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a presumption of discrimination arises and the burden of production shifts to the employer to "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge." Flanagan v. Aaron E. Henry Community Health Serv. Ctr., 876 F.2d 1231, 1233-34 (5th Cir.1989); Whiting v. Jackson State Univ., 616 F.2d 116, 121 (5th Cir.1980). The employer need not prove the absence of a discriminatory motive. Whiting, 616 F.2d at 121. Once the employer articulates its nondiscriminatory reason, the burden is again on the plaintiff to prove that the articulated legitimate reason was a mere pretext for a discriminatory decision. Id. Ultimately, the burden of persuasion rests on the plaintiff, who must establish the statutory violation by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. (citing Jepsen v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 610 F.2d 1379, 1382 (5th Cir.1980)). Even if the plaintiff succeeds in revealing the defendant's reasons for terminating him were false, he still bears the ultimate responsibility of proving the real reason was unlawful "intentional discrimination." See St. Mary's, at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2753, 125 L.Ed.2d at 424 ().
At the summary judgment stage, plaintiff need not present a prima facie case of discrimination, but must simply raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of a prima facie case. Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville R. Co., 760 F.2d 633, 641 n. 8 (5th Cir.1985). In order to demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination under a theory of disparate treatment, the plaintiff must show that:
Meinecke v. H & R Block of Houston, 66 F.3d 77, 83 (5th Cir.1995); Valdez v. San...
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